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Abstract
Post-quantum cryptography is the field of study and development of crypto-
graphic primitives providing security in the presence of adversaries capable
of running large-scale error-tolerant quantum computations. Works in this
area span from theoretical analysis of security definitions and protocols, to the
research of classical and quantum cryptanalytic algorithms, to the development
of cryptographic schemes that can be deployed for real-world usage.
In this thesis, we investigate three topics in practical post-quantum cryptog-
raphy. First, we research quantum circuit depth-width trade-offs in the case
of Grover’s algorithm and how these impact the cost of running key-search
attacks against block ciphers. Such attacks have been proposed by the US Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology as benchmarks to define quantum
security, and hence their cost should be well understood. Furthermore, Grover
speed-ups are a component of many quantum attacks, making the study of
these trade-offs of independent interest.
Second, we study the “primal attack” on lattice-based cryptosystems. This
consists of using lattice reduction to recover an unusually short vector in a
q-ary lattice, which results in a break of LWE- and NTRU-based schemes. We
compare two alternative heuristics used to estimate the expected cost of this
attack due to Gama et al. (Eurocrypt 2008) and Alkim et al. (USENIX 2016)
and provide experimental evidence of the validity of the latter. Then, using
the techniques introduced in Dachman-Soled et al. (Crypto 2020), we continue
this line of work to provide estimates on the full probability distribution of the
cost of the attack, providing further experimental validation.
In the last chapter, we move our focus from cryptanalysis to implementation.
We implement a lattice-based actively secure key encapsulation mechanism
on a currently commercially available smart card from the SLE 78 family by
Infineon. We do this by repurposing classic arithmetic techniques that enable
us to take advantage of the card’s RSA coprocessor to compute polynomial
multiplications in Zq[x]/(x256+1). The resulting scheme, a variant of Kyber768,
runs key generation in 79.6 ms, encapsulation in 102.4 ms, and decapsulation
in 132.7 ms. Our techniques can be adapted to other RSA/ECC coprocessors
and demonstrate the feasibility of repurposing already deployed cryptographic
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Cryptography is a field of study that researches techniques to provide various
forms of security to communications1, such as confidentiality, integrity and
authenticity. As an academic subject, contemporary cryptography lives in the
intersection of computer science, electronic engineering, and (applied) pure
mathematics. It enjoys deep connections to, among others, information and
complexity theory, algebra, algorithmics, and circuit design.
Outside of the academic world, cryptography has been practised throughout
history, and its use has become pervasive since the beginning of the digital
age and the mass deployment of personal computing devices. Widespread
use of encrypted communications over the Internet, the availability of chip
card payment terminals in retail stores and the adoption of cryptographic
technology by mobile messaging services means that the general public relies on
cryptography during everyday life. Thus, it is fundamental for cryptographic
techniques to be practical and secure.
While these two words have multiple possible meanings in the context of infor-
mation security, in this thesis we consider the following two: a cryptographic
primitive or protocol is practical if its use by one or more parties does not
hinder their ability to communicate, for example by significantly slowing them
down or by increasing their communication costs; it is secure if it does provide
a well understood and sufficient amount of security that would otherwise have
been missing.
Hard problems. At the core of modern cryptography are hardness assump-
tions. These take the form of mathematical problems that are understood to
1And more recently also to delegated computations.
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be hard to solve, in the sense that finding the solution to a random instance of
the problem requires a significant amount of computation. Some examples are
the problem of finding the prime factorisation of an integer N = p× q, where
p and q are unknown prime factors of similar size, such that log p ≈ log q; the
problem of finding what elements in some large family of random permutations
{f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n} map given known inputs to their known output; the
problem of solving a set of approximate linear equations Ax ≈ b over a finite
integer ring Zq.
The mathematical nature of the hardness assumption may allow for different
cryptographic functionality to be built from it and will affect the resulting
protocols’ practicality, while the assumption’s computational hardness will
affect the protocols’ security. From this point of view, practicality and security
are intrinsically connected: if the hardness of the problem scales badly with
the size of its description, protocol designers may need to either compromise
on the security or the practicality of any constructions derived from it. Ideally,
cryptographers prefer hard problems that allow for a concise description.
Today, most constructions providing advanced functionality such as public-
key encryption or digital signatures2 rely on one of two (families of) hard
mathematical problems: the Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem [DH76] and the
RSA problem [RSA78]. The first is formulated using finite fields or elliptic
curves and is closely related to the discrete logarithm problem [den90, Mau94,
MW99, JN03], the latter is formulated using integer rings and is closely related
to the factoring problem [BV98, Bro16, AM09].
Their security is established by the extensive cryptanalytic literature exploring
the concrete and asymptotic hardness of these problems [Pol78, LLMP93,
Gor93, BBB+09, BGG+20]. Their practicality is the result of decades of
electronic circuit miniaturisation and arithmetic circuit optimisation that
allow running protocols built on them on both general-purpose computers and
embedded hardware with heavily constrained computational resources.
2Both being technologies that allow parties to communicate securely even if they have
not previously met to agree on a shared secret key.
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Post-quantum cryptography. In a breakthrough result, in 1994 Peter
Shor published an algorithm [Sho94] that allows solving both the factoring
and discrete logarithm problems in a short amount of time. To run Shor’s
algorithm, however, a radically different kind of computer is required, usually
referred to as a quantum computer. While first conceived in the 1980s [Ben80,
MY80, Fey82, Fey86], practical advancements in quantum computing hardware
have been initially slow. In recent years, however, the pace of advancement
has increased, and industry investments resulted in the first small-scale noisy3
quantum computers being built [MQT18, MN18, AAB+19, Gib19, WFG21].
Due to Shor’s algorithm, the availability of large-scale quantum computers
would result in a complete loss of security for protocols built on RSA or DH
assumptions, making many of the cryptographic constructions we rely on today
unfit for purpose.
As a consequence of the potential risk posed by hypothetical future quantum
computers, the topic of post-quantum cryptography, that is the research and
development of cryptographic techniques not rendered insecure by quantum
computers, has gained great traction. In 2016, Google conducted its first
post-quantum cryptography at-scale test [Lan16]. Later the same year, the
US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a process
to standardise post-quantum public-key encryption and digital signature algo-
rithms [Nat16], to make these technologies available both to industry and to
the public.
Whatever we may think of the timeline or even plausibility of the arrival of
large-scale general quantum computers, post-quantum cryptography continues
gaining momentum. Given the long shelf life of cryptographic standards and
the high stakes of standardising primitives, the security of these schemes, and
thus the concrete hardness of post-quantum mathematical problems, should
be understood in detail.
Some of the most popular mathematical objects used to provide post-quantum
security are lattices. Lattices consist of integer linear combinations of a set of




vectors called a basis. Given a lattice basis, various computational problems
can be defined, most famously that of finding the shortest non-zero vector in
the lattice it describes. The research presented in this thesis focuses on some
aspects of the concrete security and practicality of lattice-based cryptography,
cryptography that uses lattice problems as its core hardness assumption.
0.1 Thesis overview
In this thesis, we present research carried out as part of four different publi-
cations, the content of each being presented in a different chapter. Overall,
our work covers three different topics in post-quantum cryptography, with
Chapters 3 and 4 investigating the same topic.
Throughout these chapters, special care has been put in trying to make our
work reproducible. In the process of writing the four publications, source code
was produced to further our understanding of the subject of study and to
verify our hypotheses. In almost all cases this source code has been made
publicly available, with any improvements made to third party tools being
contributed back to their original projects, and any issues found with them
being reported. The only exception has been the smart card implementation in
Chapter 5, which could not be published due to intellectual property concerns of
collaborators. However, proof of concept code demonstrating the fundamental
algorithmic techniques employed in that chapter has been released.
We now give an overview of the content of each chapter.
Chapter 1. This chapter covers mathematical notation and preliminary




Chapter 2. Originally published as
Jaques S., Naehrig M., Roetteler M., Virdia F.
Implementing Grover Oracles for Quantum Key Search on AES and LowMC.
In: Canteaut A., Ishai Y. (eds) Advances in Cryptology, Eurocrypt 2020.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 12106. Springer, Cham.
As part of the call for standardisation of post-quantum public-key encryption
and signature schemes [Nat16], the US NIST proposed a criterion to deter-
mine whether a considered scheme is secure enough. Quantum algorithmic
speedups have so far proved less dramatic when attacking block ciphers, such
as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [DR01]. Therefore, NIST defined
security “categories” that a proposed construction can achieve based on the
three versions of AES. The assumption is that any scheme as hard to break
as AES should be secure for the foreseeable future, with a scheme as hard to
break as AES-256 being more secure (“Category 5”) than one not significantly
harder to break than AES-128 (“Category 1”). The comparative nature of
these definitions of security means that establishing the cost of attacking AES
using a quantum computer becomes an essential step required to carry out the
standardisation process, since this cost becomes a criterion for adequacy.
Making use of recently developed tools [SGT+18] for designing and simulating
quantum circuits, in Chapter 2 we investigate the non-asymptotic costs of
attacking AES using a quantum computer, under a set of assumptions on the
architecture of such a machine. Our techniques show that AES is slightly
easier to attack than NIST predicted (under the same assumptions), mean-
ing that in this particular model post-quantum security is slightly easier to
achieve than first suggested. We also extend our analysis to the LowMC block
cipher [ARS+15], which plays an important role as a building block for one of
the digital signature schemes proposed for standardisation.
The author of this thesis contributed towards the chapter’s concept, the design
and implementation of the Grover oracles, the analysis of the impact on the
definitions of security proposed by NIST.
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Chapter 3. Originally published as
Albrecht M. R., Göpfert F., Virdia F., Wunderer T.
Revisiting the Expected Cost of Solving uSVP and Applications to LWE.
In: Takagi T., Peyrin T. (eds) Advances in Cryptology, Asiacrypt 2017.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10624. Springer, Cham.
Many lattice-based cryptographic schemes rely on the hardness of the Learning
With Errors (LWE) problem, or a variant thereof, to provide security. The
two most effective approaches to solving LWE are the primal and dual lattice
attacks. In Chapter 3, we present an experimental investigation of the two
different approaches used for estimating the complexity of the primal attack
at the time of the chapter’s publication. We verify that results align with the
approach presented in [ADPS16], with minor explainable deviations from the
expected behaviour. With such experimental evidence, we proceed to implement
the [ADPS16] heuristic in the popular “LWE estimator” script4 [APS15] and
use this to demonstrate how the change in heuristic affects the estimated
security of some cryptosystems proposed in the literature.
The author of this thesis contributed towards the design, implementation and
running of all experiments, the analysis of the results, the analysis of the impact
of the [ADPS16] approach on previously proposed cryptographic parameters.
Chapter 4. Originally published as
Postlethwaite E. W., Virdia F.
On the Success Probability of Solving Unique SVP via BKZ.
In: Garay J.A. (eds) Public-Key Cryptography, 2021.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 12710. Springer, Cham.
The heuristic presented in [ADPS16] for estimating the cost of the primal attack
only predicts the expected cost for a random instance of the LWE problem.
This however does not allow estimating the probability of the attack being
cheaper than expected, a phenomenon sometimes observed in our experiments




the expected cost proposed in [DDGR20] to account for the probabilistic nature
of lattice attacks. This allows us to predict the success probability of cheaper
instances of the primal attack. We provide a heuristic analysis and extensive
experiments and demonstrate how such an analysis could potentially impact
the estimated cost of attacking three key encapsulation schemes proposed to
NIST for standardisation.
The author of this thesis contributed towards all aspects of this chapter.
Chapter 5. Originally published as
Albrecht M. R., Hanser C., Hoeller A., Pöppelmann T., Virdia F., Wallner A.
Implementing RLWE-based Schemes Using an RSA Co-Processor.
IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2019(1).
In Chapter 5, we move our attention to the practicality of lattice-based en-
cryption. We look at the space of embedded devices, which present some of
the harshest restrictions on hardware capabilities. These devices are usually
augmented with specific hardware arithmetic coprocessors to enable them to
efficiently run the expensive computations required by RSA- and DH-based
cryptography. We investigate to what extent these “pre-quantum” coprocessors
can be used to speed up post-quantum lattice-based public-key encryption.
Our experiments suggest that the resulting implementations are fast enough
to potentially be used as a transitional approach to deploying post-quantum
public-key encryption on embedded hardware while waiting for specialised
lattice coprocessors to be developed and certified.
The author of this thesis contributed towards the design of all arithmetic
strategies used to run computations on the RSA coprocessor, to their proof of
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In this chapter we set the notation used in the rest of the thesis, and recall
some fundamental background that our work builds upon.
1.1 Notation
For x ∈ R, we write bxe to mean the closest integer to x (where by+ 12e := y+1
for y ∈ Z). For a, b ∈ Z, we write a mod(+) b or [a]b for the unique integer
â ≡ a mod b such that 0 ≤ â < b. We write a mod(−) b for the unique integer
â ≡ a mod b such that −b/2 ≤ â < b/2. We may refer to an integer a ∈ Zb
as being “small” if a mod(−) b is small, smallness depending on the context.
We extend this definition to tuples, vectors, matrices and polynomials over Z
component-wise. Similarly as for integers, we may refer to a vector v ∈ Znb
as being “short” if v mod(−) b is short. We often write {a, . . . , b} to mean
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the set [a, b] ∩ Z. We denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}. We write log to mean
logarithms in base 2 and ln to mean logarithms in base e. We denote by ‖ · ‖p
the `p norm, for p ∈ {∞} ∪ Z≥1. If unspecified, p = 2. We write
JconditionK :=
{
1 if condition is true,
0 if condition is false.
Linear algebra. We denote vectors by bold lowercase letters such as v, and
matrices by bold uppercase letters such as M, and refer to their entries with
a subscript index vi, Mi,j , counting indices from 1. By abuse of notation we
consider vectors to be row resp. column vectors depending on context, such
that vM and Mv are meaningful. In particular, given column vectors v1
and v2, we may write the concatenated vector w = (v1 | v2) as a row vector
implicitly transposing the vi vectors in order to avoid overloading the notation.
We write inner products using angular brackets 〈v,w〉. The transpose of v is
indicated as vt, while the adjoint of v (the complex conjugate of its transpose)
is indicated as v†. We write Im for the m×m identity matrix over whichever
base ring is implied from context. We write 0m×n for the m×n all zero matrix.
If the dimensions are clear from the context, we may omit the subscripts. Given
a set of vectors S of size n and a ring R (e.g. R = Z or R), we write spanR(S)
to mean the R-span of S, i.e. {∑ni=1 µivi : vi ∈ S, µi ∈ R}.
Probability. Given a probability distribution D with support S ⊂ R, we
denote sampling an element s ∈ S according to D as s← D. If the sampling
is done using coins r, we write s
r←− D. For a bounded support S, we denote
the uniform distribution over S as U(S). We denote the mean and variance
of D as E(s) or E(D), and V(s) or V(D), respectively, where s ← D and
V(s) = E(s2)− E(s)2. We sometimes use
√
V similarly to denote the standard
deviation of a random variable. Given a discrete (resp. continuous) probability
distribution D, we denote its probability mass function (resp. probability
density function) as fD and its cumulative mass function (resp. cumulative
density function) as FD. Given s← D, by definition P [s ≤ x] = FD(x).
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Rings. We identify polynomials f =
∑
i fi x
i of degree n − 1 with their
corresponding coefficient vector f = (f0, f1, . . . , fn−1). We abuse notation
and write ‖f‖ to mean the Euclidean norm of f . Unless stated otherwise, we
work in the polynomial rings R = Z[x]/(xn + 1) where n is a power of 2, and
Rq = R/(q) for some positive integer q. We let R
k (resp. Rkq ) be a ring module
of dimension k over R (resp. Rq). Throughout we identify equivalence classes
in Rq with their representative polynomial with coefficients mod
(−) q, and
their lifted versions in R and in Z[x].
Asymptotic notation. Given two functions f, g : R→ R, following [Knu76]
and [CLRS09, § 3.1] we write
• f ∈ O(g) if there exists y ∈ R such that |f(x)| < cg(x) for some c > 0
and all x > y,
• f ∈ o(g) if f(x)/g(x)→ 0 as x→∞,
• f ∈ Ω(g) if and only if g ∈ O(f),
• f ∈ ω(g) if and only if g ∈ o(f),
• f ∈ Θ(g) if f ∈ O(g) ∩ Ω(g), meaning that there exists some y ∈ R such
that c1g(x) < f(x) < c2g(x) for some c2 > c1 > 0 and all x > y (which
implies that f ∈ Θ(g)⇔ g ∈ Θ(f)).
1.2 Linear algebra
We represent a basis {b1, . . . ,bd} of Rd as the matrix B having the basis
vectors as rows. Given a basis B, we can derive an orthogonal basis B∗ via






j for i ∈ [d], where µi,j = 〈bi,b∗j 〉/‖b∗j‖2 for i > j.
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We may refer to the b∗i vectors as the Gram-Schmidt vectors of B. In matrix

























Given a basis B of Rd we denote by πB, k : Rd → Rd the linear operator
projecting vectors orthogonally to the subspace spanR ({b1, . . . ,bk−1}). Note
πB, 1 is the identity on Rd. We write πi when the basis is clear from context.
Given a vector space V = spanR(B), its projective subspace πk(V ) of dimension
d− k + 1 has a basis {πk(bk), . . . , πk(bd)}, where












j for i ≥ k.
By definition, this implies that πk(bk) = b
∗
k, and that πj(πk(v)) = πk(v) for
any j ≤ k. Given an orthogonal basis B∗ and a vector v = v∗1b∗1 + · · ·+ v∗db∗d,




k + · · ·+ v∗db∗d. We abuse notation and
write πk(B[i:j]) to mean the matrix with rows πk(bi), . . . , πk(bj). For example,


























For real valued, independent random variables X, Y, Z and scalars λ ∈ R, we
have the following useful identities,
E(X + Y ) = E(X) + E(Y ), E(X · Y ) = E(X) · E(Y ),
V(X) = E(X2)− E(X)2, V(λX) = λ2 V(X),




We recall the conditional probability chain rule. If E1, . . . , En are events, then
P [E1 ∩ · · · ∩ En] = P [E1|E2 ∩ · · · ∩ En]P [E2 ∩ · · · ∩ En].
1.3.1 The Gaussian distribution
We recall some properties of the continuous Gaussian distribution. We denote by
N(µ, σ2) the probability distribution over R of mean µ and standard deviation













Given a random variable X ∼ N(µX , σ2X) and a scalar λ > 0, the random
variable Y = λ ·X follows a distribution N(λµX , λ2σ2X). Given n independent
and identically distributed random variables Xi ∼ N(0, 1), the random variable
X21 + · · ·+X2n follows a chi-squared distribution χ2n over R≥0 of mean n and









tx−1e−tdt for x > 0.
Given n independent and identically distributed random variables Yi ∼ N(0, σ2),
the random variable Y 21 + · · ·+ Y 2n follows a distribution σ2 · χ2n of mean nσ2
and variance 2nσ4, that is, a chi-squared distribution where every sample is
scaled by a factor of σ2. We call this a scaled chi-squared distribution.
Discrete Gaussians. We denote by Dµ,σ the discrete Gaussian distribution
over Z with mean µ ∈ R and standard deviation σ ∈ R+. It has proba-
bility mass function fDµ,σ : Z → [0, 1], x 7→ fN(µ,σ2)(x)/fN(µ,σ2)(Z), where
fN(µ,σ2)(Z) =
∑
x∈Z fN(µ,σ2)(x). Discrete Gaussian distributions with µ = 0,
or the distributions these imply over Zq for some modulus q, are widely used in
lattice-based cryptography to sample entries of error and secret vectors from.
In our analyses in Chapters 3 and 4, we will work with vectors v sampled
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coefficient-wise from a discrete Gaussian distribution, and with their projec-
tions πi(v). We model the the squared norms ‖πi(v)‖2 as continuous1 random
variables following a scaled chi-squared distribution with the appropriate de-
grees of freedom. For example, for some vector v = (v1, . . . , vd) with each
vi ← D0,σ sampled independently, we model ‖πB,i(v)‖2 ∼ σ2 · χ2d−i+1, where
B is a lattice basis being reduced.
Rounded Gaussians. Similarly to the discrete Gaussian distribution, the
rounded Gaussian distribution of mean µ and variance σ2 is a distribution over
Z obtained by sampling x← N(µ, σ2) and returning bxe.
Centered binomial distribution. The centered binomial distribution (CBD)
was proposed for use as an alternative to discrete Gaussian distributions by
Alkim et al. [ADPS16], since it results in a similarly shaped mass cumulative
function and is faster and easier to sample in a side-channel resistant fashion.
Given a parameter η, a sample x← CBDη is distributed over [−η, η] ∩ Z, such
that x+ η follows a binomial distribution where the yes-no events have equal
probability P [yes] = P [no] = 1/2, and x + η is the number of “yes” events
after 2η fair coin flips.
1.4 Lattices
In this section we provide fundamental facts about lattices. For a more
comprehensive treatment and proofs, see [MR09, NV10, Gal12].
Definition 1 (Real and integer lattices). Let b1, . . . ,bn be n linearly inde-
pendent row vectors in Rd, which we collect into a basis B. We say that their
integer span
Λ = Λ(B) = spanZ(b1, . . . ,bn) = {x1b1 + · · ·+ xnbn : xi ∈ Z} ,
1While v has integer coefficients, its πi(v) projections will not necessarily do so.
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is a real lattice of dimension, or rank, n. If n = d we say the lattice is full-rank.
If Λ ⊂ Zd, we say that Λ is an integer lattice. It should be noted that any real
lattice is a subgroup of (Rd,+), and any integer lattice is a subgroup of (Zd,+).
In this thesis, we concern ourselves in particular with q-ary lattices.
Definition 2 (q-ary lattices). Given an integer q, Λ is a q-ary lattice if it is
an integer lattice such that qZd ⊆ Λ ⊆ Zd.
Remark 1. Since a q-ary lattice Λ has qZd as a subgroup, for any v ∈ Λ, we
have the coset v + qZd ⊆ Λ. This means that Λ can be seen as a subgroup of
Zdq rather than Zd by reducing vectors modulo q. Throughout this thesis, we
will sometimes abuse notation and make no distinction between considering
Λ ⊂ Zd and Λ ⊂ Zdq when dealing with q-ary lattices.
A given lattice Λ can have multiple different lattice bases. Indeed Λ(B) = Λ(B′)
if and only if B′ = UB for some unimodular matrix U, that is a n× n integer
matrix with determinant ±1.
Given a lattice basis, we can define its fundamental parallelepiped P (B).
Definition 3 (Fundamental parallelepiped). Given a lattice basis B, its fun-
damental parallelepiped is the set
P (B) := {x1b1 + · · ·+ xnbn : xi ∈ [0, 1)}.
An invariant of a lattice is its volume (also called covolume or determinant).





Remark 2. The volume of Λ is exactly the volume of P (B). In the case of full-
rank lattices, this is also exactly | det(B)|. Similarly, given the Gram-Schimdt
vectors b∗1, . . . ,b
∗




Definition 5 (Sublattices). Let Λ ⊂ Rn be a real lattice of rank n. We call
any subgroup Λ′ ⊂ Λ a sublattice of Λ. Sublattices may potentially have smaller
rank or larger volume than Λ.
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Example 3. Let e1, . . . , en ∈ Rn be the canonical basis of Rn, where ei
has all coefficients set to 0 except for the i-th coefficient set to 1. Let Λ =
spanZ(e1, . . . , en) be an integer lattice of rank n and volume 1.
• spanZ(e2, . . . , en) is a sublattice of rank n− 1 and volume 1.
• spanZ(2 · e1, e2, . . . , en) is a sublattice of rank n and volume 2.
• spanZ(2 · e2, e3 . . . , en) is a sublattice of rank n− 1 and volume 2.
Of particular interest to us will be working with projective sublattices.
Definition 6 (Projective sublattices). Given a lattice Λ of rank n and a basis
b1, . . . ,bn of Λ, we denote by Λ
⊥
i,j the lattice with basis πi(bi), . . . , πi(bj),
where i ≤ j. If j = n, we may write Λ⊥i instead. We say Λ⊥i,j is a projective
sublattice.
Remark 4. While we call the Λ⊥i,j projective sublattices, they are not sublattices
of Λ, but rather orthogonal projections of sublattices of Λ.
A property of interest of a lattice is the set of its successive minima.
Definition 7 (Successive minima). Let Bd(r) be the closed ball of radius r in
Rd centered around 0, and let i ∈ [d]. We define the i-th minima of Λ as
λi(Λ) = min
{
r ∈ R+ : Λ ∩Bd(r) contains i linearly independent vectors
}
.
A quantity of interest when working with worst-case bounds on the successive
minima of a lattice is Hermite’s constant.
Definition 8 (Hermite’s constant [Her50]). Let Ln be the set of real lattices







Hermite’s constant is known for a few values of n [Mar03, § 6]. In particular,
γ2 =
√




Theorem 1 (Hermite’s inequality [Her50]). Let n ≥ 2 be an integer. Then
γn ≤ γn−12 .
Corollary 2. Given any lattice Λ of rank n, it contains a vector v of norm
‖v‖ ≤ γ(n−1)/22 · vol(Λ)1/n.
A generalisation to Hermite’s inequality is given by Mordell.
Theorem 3 (Mordell’s inequality [Mor44]). Let k ≥ 2 and n ≥ k be integers.
Then
γk−1n ≤ γn−1k .
While Hermite’s and Mordell’s inequalities can be used to provide provable
bounds on the norm of the shortest vector in any lattice, these bounds are
not necessarily tight on average. However, heuristic estimates on the length
of the shortest vector in random lattices can be obtained. Indeed, a lattice
can be tessellated by centring a copy of the fundamental parallelepiped on
each lattice point, and this fact can be used to approximate the number of
lattice points in some “nice enough” measurable set. Using this intuition, the
Gaussian heuristic says that the number of lattice points in a measurable set
S is approximately vol(S)/vol(Λ). This can be used to approximate the first
minimum λ1(Λ), by assuming its value is the radius of the ball of volume
vol(Λ).
Heuristic 1 (Gaussian heuristic for the shortest vector). Given a lattice Λ
of rank n, the Gaussian heuristic approximates the first minimum of Λ as the









vol(Λ)1/n by [Fel68, §II.9].
Hermite’s constant and the Gaussian heuristic tell us something about the
first minimum of a lattice. However, in general it is not easy to find a vector
realising the first minimum from a random lattice basis. In Section 1.4.1.2 we
will look at worst-case guarantees and average-case heuristics on the norm of
vectors that can be found from a basis using lattice reduction.
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Computational problems. Various computational problems can be defined
using lattices. In this thesis we will often mention the following problems, and
we will discuss lattice reduction as a means to solve some of them.
Definition 9 (Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)). Given a lattice Λ find a vector
v ∈ Λ of norm λ1(Λ).
Definition 10 (γ-gap Shortest Vector Problem (GapSVPγ)). Given a lattice
Λ and a real d > 0, decide whether λ1(Λ) ≤ d or λ1(Λ) > γ · d.
Definition 11 (γ-unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVPγ)). Given a lattice
Λ such that λ2(Λ) > γλ1(Λ), find the unique (up to sign) vector v ∈ Λ of norm
λ1(Λ). Unless specified, γ = 1.
Definition 12 (γ-approximate Shortest Vector Problem (approx-SVPγ)).
Given a lattice Λ, find a non-zero vector v ∈ Λ of norm ≤ γ · λ1(Λ).
Definition 13 (ζ-Hermite Shortest Vector Problem (Hermite-SVPζ)). Given
a lattice Λ of rank n, find a non-zero vector v ∈ Λ of norm ≤ ζ · vol(Λ)1/n.
Definition 14 (α-Bounded Distance Decoding (BDDα)). Given a lattice basis
B and a vector v such that dist(v,B) < αλ1(B) where dist(v,B) denotes the
smallest Euclidean distance between v and any lattice point in Λ(B), find the
(unique) lattice vector t ∈ Λ(B) closest to v.
Definition 15 (γ-Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVPγ)). Given a
lattice Λ of rank n, find n linearly independent lattice vectors vi ∈ Λ of norm
at most γ · λn(Λ).
Definition 16 (β-Short Integer Solution problem (SISβ)). Given a matrix
A← U(Zn×mq ), find a non-zero vector v ∈ Zm such that Av = 0 mod q and
‖v‖p < β. Usually we consider p = 2 or ∞.
1.4.1 Lattice reduction
Informally, lattice reduction is any algorithmic technique that takes as input a
basis of a lattice and finds a basis of better quality. Many different notions of
basis reducedness exist, which usually can be intuitively captured by a basis




A fundamental notion in lattice reduction is that of a size-reduced lattice
basis. Size-reduction (Algorithm 1) is a component of many lattice reduction
algorithms. Given a lattice basis, it returns a size-reduced basis of the same
lattice.
Definition 17 (Size-reduced). Let B be a lattice basis, {b∗i }i its Gram-Schmidt
vectors and µi,j = 〈bi,b∗j 〉/‖b∗j‖2. B is size-reduced if |µi,j | ≤ 1/2 for 1 ≤ j ≤
i ≤ n.
Input: lattice basis B
1 for i← 2 to d do
2 for j ← i− 1 to 1 do
3 µij ← 〈bi,b∗j 〉/‖b∗j‖2
4 bi ← bi − bµijebj
Algorithm 1: Size-reduction.
The celebrated LLL algorithm [LLL82] (Algorithm 2) achieves the following
notion of basis reducedness, while terminating in polynomial time.
Definition 18 (LLL reduced). For δL3 ∈ (1/4, 1) a basis B is δL3-LLL reduced
if it is size-reduced and δL3 · ‖b∗i ‖2 ≤ ‖πi(bi+1)‖2 holds for all i ∈ [d−1], where
the second constraint is also called “Lovász’ condition”.
Input: lattice basis B
Input: δL3 ∈ (0.25, 1)
1 Run size-reduction on B
2 for i← 1 to d− 1 do
3 if δL3 · ‖b∗i ‖2 > ‖πi(bi+1)‖2 then
4 bi,bi+1 ← bi+1,bi
5 go to line 1
Algorithm 2: LLL.
In [SE91, SE94], Schnorr and Euchner introduced a generalisation of LLL
called BKZ (Algorithm 3). While LLL works on adjacent pairs of basis vectors,
checking where the Lovász’ condition does not hold and addressing this by
swapping the basis vectors (Lines 3 and 4 of Algorithm 2), BKZ works with
blocks of β adjacent basis vectors, and enforces the first Gram-Schmidt vector
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in the block to be the shortest in a projective sublattice spanned by orthogonal
projections of the block’s vectors (Lines 4 to 9 of Algorithm 3).2 Given a block
size β, the basis output by BKZ-β is reduced in the following sense.
Definition 19 (BKZ-β reduced). A basis B is BKZ-β reduced if it is LLL




for all i ∈ [d− 1].3
In order to do this, an oracle OSVP is used, that, given a lattice, finds a
vector attaining the lattice’s first minimum. BKZ repeatedly calls OSVP on
the projective sublattices Λ⊥i,min(i+β−1,d). If the vector v output by OSVP is
shorter than b∗i , it is “lifted” (see Line 6 of Algorithm 3) and inserted into
the basis at the beginning of the block. Then LLL is run on the basis to
remove linear dependencies introduced by this insertion. In Chapters 3 and
4 we will run several experiments to investigate the behaviour of BKZ. We
will make use of the popular implementation of BKZ 2.0 [GNR10, CN11]
found in the Fplll library [DT17], which sets δL3 = 0.99 in the underlying
calls to LLL. In its original description, BKZ terminates after a full tour
Input: LLL reduced lattice basis B
Input: block size β
1 repeat /* tour */
2 for i← 1 to d do
3 j ← min(i+ β − 1, d)
4 v = xiπi(bi) + · · ·+ xjπi(bj)← OSVP(Λ⊥i,j)
5 if ‖v‖ < ‖b∗i ‖ then
6 v′ ← xibi + · · ·+ xjbj
7 extend B by inserting v′ into B at index i
8 LLL on B to remove linear dependencies
9 drop row with all zero entries
10 if if no insertion was made then yield > else yield ⊥
11 if > for all i then return
Algorithm 3: Simplified view of the BKZ Algorithm. The instructions
inside the repeat context are called a BKZ tour.
is executed without insertions. We follow algorithmic improvements and
do not necessarily run tours until this point. In particular, the notion of
early termination (called auto-abort in some implementations [DT17]) was
2With β = 2, this would be equivalent to checking for Lovász’ condition with δL3 = 1.
However, it is not known whether LLL terminates in polynomial time for δL3 = 1 [NV10].
3The LLL parameter δL3 is left implicit in this definition.
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introduced in [HPS11]. The idea is that the majority of improvement to the
basis quality occurs in a few early tours of BKZ, whereas many tours are
required before convergence. This approach is sound, since it has been shown
that after polynomially many calls to the SVP oracle, the basis does not change
much more [HPS11, LN20]. Following experimental analysis of BKZ [Che13,
Figure 4.6], Albrecht [Alb17, §2.5] identifies τ = 16 as the number of tours after
which little improvement is made to the basis quality for cryptographically-
sized parameters. Furthermore, BKZ 2.0 [GNR10, CN11] integrates local block
re-randomisation and preprocessing into the originally proposed OSVP oracle,
enumeration. In Chapter 4 we will also consider another variant of BKZ by
Aono et al. [AWHT16] that they name Progressive BKZ. Here, the basis
is reduced using increasingly larger block sizes β, running a fixed number of
BKZ-β tours for each block size and terminating after reaching a predetermined
maximum block size.
1.4.1.2 Basis quality
As mentioned at the beginning of Section 1.4.1, lattice reduction is used to
improve the quality of a lattice basis. To better reason about basis quality, we
first introduce the notion of basis profile.
Definition 20 (Basis profile). Given a basis B of a lattice of rank n, we
define the profile of B as the set of squared norms {‖b∗i ‖2}
n
i=1 of its orthogonal
Gram–Schmidt vectors.
Two metrics are usually considered to indicate the quality of a basis: how short
its shortest vector b1 is (the shortest, the better), and how quickly the basis
profile {‖b∗i ‖2}
n
i=1 decays (the slower, the better). LLL and block reduction
algorithms affect both. In particular, the larger β is chosen in BKZ-β, the
slower these norms decay, the closer to orthogonal the basis vectors are, and
the shorter the shortest vector in the reduced basis is.
Lattice reduction algorithms usually provide worst-case guarantees and average-
case heuristics on the norm of the shortest vector returned ‖b1‖. These can be
in terms of the first minimum of the lattice or in terms of its volume.
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Definition 21 (Approximation factor). Let A be a lattice reduction algorithm
and Ln be the set of real lattices of rank n. We define the approximation factor
of A as the real-valued random variable ηA,n such that
Pr[ηA,n ≤ x] = Pr
[ ‖b1‖
λ1(Λ)




$←− Ln we mean to sample a random basis for a random lattice Λ.
We say E[ηA,n] (resp. sup ηA,n) is the average-case (resp. worst-case) approxi-
mation factor of A in rank n. We drop the subscripts when the algorithm and
the rank are understood from the context. We may abuse notation and write η
to mean either E[η] or sup η.
Definition 22 (Hermite factor). Let A be a lattice reduction algorithm and
Ln be the set of real lattices of rank n. We define the Hermite factor of A as
the real-valued random variable ζA,n such that
Pr[ζA,n ≤ x] = Pr
[ ‖b1‖
vol(Λ)1/n




$←− Ln we mean to sample a random basis for a random lattice Λ.
We say E[ζA,n] (resp. sup ζA,n) is the average-case (resp. worst-case) Hermite
factor of A in rank n. We drop the subscripts when the algorithm and the rank
are understood from the context. We may abuse notation and write ζ to mean
either E[ζ] or sup ζ.
Remark 5. The approximation factor and the Hermite factor can also be
found in the literature as the length defect and the Hermite defect of an output
basis [NV10, Chap. 3].
Remark 6. In Definitions 21 and 22, we implicitly assume a probability
distribution over the bases of lattices in Ln. While defining the notion of a
random lattice requires some care [NV10, Chap. 3], in our work we will be
concerned with q-ary lattices generated from cryptographic problems. Since for
given parameters the set of such lattices is finite, we can consider a random
lattice as a lattice being uniformly sampled from its domain, with a basis
deterministically constructed from the problem instance’s description.
We say that an algorithm has an average-case (resp. a worst-case) approxima-
tion factor η and an average-case (resp. worst-case) Hermite factor ζ if when
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provided in input a basis for a lattice Λ of rank n, it returns on average (resp.
in the worst-case) a basis containing a vector b1 (the shortest in the basis) of
norm
‖b1‖ ≈ η · λ1(Λ), ‖b1‖ ≈ ζ · vol(Λ)1/n,
with ≈ replaced by ≤ in worst-case bounds. For example, LLL with parameter
δL3 ∈ (1/4, 1) has worst-case approximation factor η = (δL3 − 1/4)−(n−1)/2 and
worst-case Hermite factor ζ = (δL3 − 1/4)−(n−1)/4 [NV10, Chap. 2, Thm. 9].
While worst-case provable bounds give us certain guarantees on the output of
lattice reduction, these may be overly pessimistic. In cryptanalysis we are often
interested in the hardness of solving an average instance of a hard problem.
We will therefore dedicate the rest of this section to discussing the average-
case output of lattice reduction algorithms. We will use this opportunity
also to discuss a small inconsistency commonly found in the lattice-based
cryptography literature, that caused an unfortunate discrepancy in one of
the papers [AGVW17, Footnote 7] that led to this thesis. In the following
discussion we will omit “average-case” when referring to the average-case
Hermite factor, and will assume that we work on lattices of rank n.
As mentioned above, a commonly used approach to measure the effectiveness of
a lattice reduction algorithm is to compute its Hermite factor ζ. The value of ζ
can be measured experimentally, or derived analytically. For example, famously
the LLL algorithm has ζ = 1.02n−1 [NS06], with recent work suggesting a possi-
ble analytical derivation of this value using abelian sandpile models [DKTW20].
Similarly, experimental observations [GN08b] on the Hermite factor of BKZ-β
are supported by the analytical result by Chen [Che13] who for BKZ-β-reduced













The fact that experimentally the Hermite factor for BKZ scales exponentially
in the rank of the lattice being reduced was noted in [GN08b, § 3.1]. There, the
authors suggest that ζ appears to scale as ean+b where a and b are constants
that depend on the lattice reduction algorithm (e.g. on the block size β in
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the case of BKZ). However, they also suggest that approximating ζ as cn for
some constant c may be sufficient to make “rough estimations”. A similar
approximation was already present in [NS06, § 4], where in the case of LLL the
authors suggest that the value of (δL3 − 1/4)−1/4 in the worst-case Hermite
factor (δL3 − 1/4)−(n−1)/4 should be replaced on the average by 1.02, “so that
the [Hermite factor] becomes ≈ 1.02n”. The exponential scaling of the Hermite
factor led to the introduction in [LP11, § 5.1] of the root-Hermite factor δ
(not to be confused with the LLL parameter δL3), a value such that ζ =: δ
n.4
Chen’s limit (1.1) was originally stated as “limn→∞ δ(n, β)”.
However, we would like to argue that a more natural definition for the root-
Hermite factor may be ζ =: δn−1. Indeed, the n − 1 exponent would better
align with Hermite’s and Mordell’s inequalities, as well as with the provable
guarantees on the output of LLL. Indeed, the value of 1.02n proposed in [NS06,
§ 4] would appear to be an approximation from 1.02n−1. Similarly, in the case
of the “rough estimations” of [GN08b, § 3.1], approximating the Hermite factor
as cn does also not necessarily appear to match the plots in [GN08b, Fig. 3]
(cn implies that the linear fit for log ζ would cross the origin, which does not
seem to be the case).
While this change in definition is a minor difference, we will show that it leads
to a more natural expression of δ under the Geometric Series Assumption
(which we will define soon), and hence allows a natural derivation of Chen’s
limit (1.1) as an application of the Gaussian heuristic and the Geometric Series
Assumption. Using δn−1 := ζ as the definition of the root-Hermite factor will
also resolve a discrepancy between [AGVW17] and [ADPS16] with respect to
the exact formula of the BKZ win condition for solving uSVP reported in
[ADPS16], and caused by the implicit assumption that ζ = δn−1 in [ADPS16].
Therefore, in the rest of this thesis we will define the root-Hermite factor δ as
δ := ζ1/(n−1).
So far we have talked about predicting the norm ‖b1‖ for bases output by lattice
reduction. However, heuristic results also exist about the profile of reduced
4To the best of our knowledge, the term “root-Hermite factor” had not been used in the
literature previous to [LP11].
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bases for random q-ary lattices. A popular such heuristic is the Geometric
Series Assumption.
Heuristic 2 (Geometric Series Assumption (GSA) [Sch03]). Given a basis B
output by a lattice reduction algorithm, the norms of the Gram-Schmidt vectors
b∗i satisfy
‖b∗i ‖ = αi−1 · ‖b1‖
for some constant α ∈ (0, 1).
A simple computation allows to deduce the Hermite factor of an algorithm in
terms of α.
Lemma 7. Under the GSA, a lattice reduction algorithm has Hermite factor
ζ = (α−1/2)n−1.
Proof. Let Λ be a lattice of rank n and let b1, . . . ,bn be a reduced basis of Λ


















Taking n-th roots and rearranging terms we get the desired result,
‖b1‖ = (α−1/2)n−1 · vol(Λ)1/n = ζ · vol(Λ)1/n.
Remark 8. Defining the root-Hermite factor as δ := ζ1/(n−1) results in δ =
α−1/2 under the GSA. Using δ := ζ1/n instead would result in a root-Hermite
factor δ = α−
n−1
2n , slightly dependent on the rank of the lattice being reduced.
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In the case of BKZ-β, α can be also heuristically estimated as a function of β.
Lemma 9. Under the GSA and the Gaussian heuristic, the basis profile output








Proof. Let Λ be a lattice of rank n and let b1, . . . ,bn be a BKZ-β reduced basis
of Λ satisfying the GSA. Let Λ⊥i = spanZ(πi(bi), . . . , πi(bn)) be a projective




























































Taking the − 2β−1 -th power we obtain the desired result.
Remark 10. It should be noted that while in the proof of Lemma 9 we focused




applies for any i ≥ n−β+1.
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GSA for ‖b∗i ‖
Average for ‖b∗i ‖
Figure 1.1: Comparison of a GSA prediction for the profile of a BKZ-β-reduced
basis for a q-ary lattice of dimension 183 and volume q117 with q = 521, to the
profile output by BKZ-β averaged over 16 bases. The block size β = 56.
However, the basis profile of a BKZ-β reduced basis stops closely following the
GSA on the last β indices, as can be seen in Figure 1.1. This means that to
determine α the most appropriate index to use is i = n− β + 1.
Remark 11. Combining Lemma 7 with Lemma 9, we can obtain the Hermite





, which is com-







We can see an example of how the GSA heuristic compares to bases profiles
output by BKZ in Figure 1.1. While the GSA provides a good approximation
of the profile of a reduced lattice basis, it does not fully capture the shape of the
initial and final indices of the basis. In the case of BKZ-reduced bases, simulator
algorithms [CN11, BSW18, LN20] have been designed, that can generate the
expected basis profile output by BKZ given an input basis profile, without
actually performing lattice reduction. We will describe these algorithms in
further detail in Chapter 4, where we will make use of them to estimate the




1.4.2 Learning With Errors
In 2005, Regev [Reg05] formalised a computational problem that has since be-
come one of the cornerstones of lattice-based cryptography, the Learning With
Errors (LWE) problem. Learning With Errors has since been used to construct
provably secure public key encryption [Reg05, LP11, ADPS16], oblivious trans-
fer [PVW08], fully homomorphic encryption [BV11, GSW13], identity-based
encryption [GPV08], attribute-based encryption [GVW13, BGG+14], digital
signatures [BG14a] and obfuscation of some families of circuits [BVWW16]
amongst others. Learning With Errors is conjectured to be average-case hard,
with a quantum reduction from worst-case SIVP [Reg05], meaning that an
algorithm solving LWE implies an efficient quantum algorithm solving SIVP,
and a classical reduction from worst-case GapSVP [Pei09, BLP+13]. We now
provide definitions and observations on LWE and its variants, to which we will
refer to in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Definition 23 (Learning With Errors (LWE) [Reg05, Reg09]). Let n, q be
positive integers, χ be a probability distribution on Z and s be a secret vector
in Znq . We denote the LWE distribution Ls,χ,q as the distribution on Znq × Zq
given by choosing a ∈ Znq uniformly at random, choosing e ∈ Z according to χ
and considering it as an element of Zq, and outputting (a, 〈a, s〉+e) ∈ Znq ×Zq.
Decision-LWE is the problem of distinguishing whether samples {(ai, bi)}mi=1
are drawn from the LWE distribution Ls,χ,q or uniformly from Znq × Zq.
Search-LWE is the problem of recovering the vector s from a collection {(ai, bi)}mi=1
of samples drawn according to Ls,χ,q.
A useful property of LWE is the polynomial-time equivalence of its decision
and search formulations [Reg05]. The distribution χ from which the error is
drawn tends to encode some notion of smallness, which is usually required
for functionality. As originally defined in [Reg05], the LWE secret vector
is sampled uniformly from Znq . A standard transformation [MR09, ACPS09]
maps m samples from an LWE distribution Ls,χ,q with s← U(Znq ) to m− n
samples from an LWE distribution Ls′,χ,q where the secret vector s
′ is sampled
coefficient-wise from χ. Such a distribution is said to be in normal form. In
general, more efficient key exchange can be built from LWE distributions where
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the secret is sampled from a narrow distribution such as χ (small secret LWE)
or from a narrow distribution also imposing or implying few non zero entries
in s (sparse secret LWE).
Given a fixed number m of LWE samples {(ai, bi)← Ls,χ,q}mi=1, these can be
written in matrix form as (A,b) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq , where the i-th row of A is
set to ai, and the i-th component of b is bi. Then b = As + e mod q, where
the i-th component of e is the error term of the i-th sample from Ln,χ,q. Note
that with high probability5 any n samples (A,b) from an LWE distribution
with prime modulus q, s← χns and e← χne can be turned into n LWE samples
(A−1,A−1b) where the roles of χe and χs are swapped. This can be useful
for creating embedding lattices when using m ≤ n samples during attacks is
optimal and n samples are available (to allow inversion of A).
1.4.2.1 Variants
Since LWE leads to public-key sizes at least quadratic in the security parameter,
many schemes are based on its ring variant, called Ring-LWE [LPR10] or
“RLWE” in short. Below, we give the definition of Polynomial-LWE [SSTX09]
(or “PLWE”) which is equivalent to the RLWE definition for power-of-two
cyclotomic rings. For e.g. prime cyclotomic ring these two definitions are
not equivalent, i.e. the geometry of the error polynomial distribution changes
somewhat between the coefficient and canonical embeddings [LPR10]. However,
as is common in the literature, we will abuse notation and refer to PLWE as
RLWE.
Definition 24 (RLWE [SSTX09, LPR10]). Let q be a positive integer, R
be a polynomial ring, χ be a probability distribution on Z and s be a secret
polynomial in Rq. We denote by Ls,χ the probability distribution on Rq ×Rq
obtained by choosing a ∈ Rq uniformly at random, choosing e ∈ R by sampling
each of its coefficients according to χ and considering it in Rq, and returning
(a, b) = (a, a · s+ e) ∈ Rq ×Rq.
Decision-RLWE is the problem of deciding whether pairs (ai, bi) ∈ Rq ×Rq are
sampled according to Ls,χ or the uniform distribution on Rq ×Rq.
5That is, the probability that a uniformly sampled matrix in Zn×nq is invertible.
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Search-RLWE is the problem of recovering s from pairs (ai, bi) = (ai, ai ·s+ei) ∈
Rq ×Rq sampled according to Ls,χ.
As in the case of LWE, decision and search variants of RLWE are polynomial-
time equivalent (for cyclotomic rings R) [LPR10].6 The increased efficiency of
RLWE compared to LWE is achieved by adding algebraic structure. Informally,
for a polynomial ring R = Z[x]/(f) with f of degree n, each RLWE sample
can be viewed as n correlated LWE samples. While, so far, no cryptanalytic
algorithm is known which exploits this additional structure for appropriate
rings [Pei16], some designs hedge against such hypothetical attacks by con-
sidering problems which require the attacker to find short vectors in a lattice
of larger module rank [SAB+17, DKRV17]. In particular, Module-LWE (or
“MLWE”) interpolates between the plain and the ring variants of LWE.
Definition 25 (MLWE [LS15]). Let q, k be positive integers, R be a polynomial
ring, χ be a probability distribution on Z and s be a secret module element
in Rkq . We denote by Ls,χ the probability distribution on R
k
q × Rq obtained
by choosing a ∈ Rkq uniformly at random, choosing e ∈ R by sampling each
of its coefficients according to χ and considering it in Rq, and returning
(a, b) = (a, 〈a, s〉+ e) ∈ Rkq ×Rq.
Decision-MLWE is the problem of deciding whether pairs (ai, bi) ∈ Rkq ×Rq are
sampled according to Ls,χ or the uniform distribution on R
k
q ×Rq.
Search-MLWE is the problem of recovering s from pairs (ai, bi) = (ai, 〈ai, s〉+
ei) ∈ Rkq ×Rq sampled according to Ls,χ.
Again, the search and the decision variants of this problem are polynomial-time
equivalent [LS15, Thm. 4.7].
One can view RLWE and MLWE instances as LWE instances by interpreting
the “e, s and b” elements in Rq as their coefficient vectors in Znq and the “a”
elements in Rq as structured matrices A ∈ Zn×nq where the i-th column of
A is the coefficient vector of a · xi mod f (such that the polynomial product
a · s can be computed as a matrix-vector product As), ignoring their algebraic
6Equivalence is true for any cyclotomic ring R when using the canonical embedding, or
for the ring R = Z[x]/(xn + 1) for n a power of 2 when using the coefficient embedding.
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structure. This identification with LWE is the standard approach to costing
the complexity of solving RLWE and MLWE due to the absence7 of known
cryptanalytic techniques exploiting the algebraic structure for appropriate
cyclotomic rings (such as Rq = Zq[x]/(xn + 1) for n a power of 2) [Pei16].
1.4.3 Solving LWE
A few approaches exist for solving the LWE problem, given access to an LWE
oracle returning samples (ai, bi)← Ls,χ,q. We will briefly describe these here.
Throughout, we assume that we are given access to m LWE samples in matrix
form (A,b), such that b = As + e mod q, where the i-th row of A is ai. It
should be noted that all these attacks use classical algorithms. Quantum
attacks can be derived essentially by speeding up any search subroutines using
Grover’s algorithm [Gro96].
The asymptotically cheapest attack on LWE is an algebraic attack by Arora











over Zq with s unknown, where Supp(χ) is the support of the error distribution
χ, and hence solve Search-LWE. While asymptotically the best approach
whenever χ has width O(
√
n), for practical parameters it is slower than other
methods.
Another method going back to the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) literature
is the BKW algorithm [BKW00]. This attack uses combinatorial techniques
to distinguish the distribution of the bi from uniform over Zq, in other words
solving Decision-LWE. Notably, BKW variants [KF15, GJS15] result in a
subexponential-time algorithm against LWE with binary secret. However,
BKW requires access to a number of samples m larger than usually available
7In recent years a rich literature on the Ideal-SVP problem has developed [CDW17,
DPW19, PHS19]. However, while Ideal-SVP is related to RLWE, it is not known whether
techniques for solving the first could be adapted to the RLWE or MLWE settings.
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in the cryptographic setting8, and often results in higher expected costs than
for lattice reduction attacks.
Finally, the most efficient attacks on LWE are lattice reduction attacks. Using
the notation of [MR09], in its basic variant the primal attack uses lattice
reduction to solve Bounded Distance Decoding with respect to b in the primal
lattice of A, that is Λq(A) := {y ∈ Zm : y = Ax mod q for x ∈ Zn}. This
results in recovering the vector v = As mod q, and hence e = b − v mod q,
solving Search-LWE. Also in its basic variant, the dual attack uses lattice
reduction to find a short vector in the dual lattice9 of A, that is Λ⊥q (A) :=
{y ∈ Zm : ytA = 0 mod q}, hence solving SIS. Such a vector can be then
multiplied with b resulting in c = 〈y,b〉 mod q. If b ← U(Zmq ), c will have
a relatively large absolute value with respect to q. If (A,b) ← Ls,χ,q, then
c = 〈y,b〉 = ytAs+yte = 〈y, e〉 mod q will be significantly smaller than q when
considering its residue class in [− q2 ,
q
2). Observing the size of c solves Decision-
LWE. Lattice reduction attacks can also be combined with combinatorial
strategies that reduce the dimensionality of the problem, resulting in hybrid
attacks [How07].
Lattice reduction attacks are practically the cheapest attacks on LWE. Given
a basis for one of the lattices described above, estimating the cost of the
corresponding attack when using block reduction algorithms such as BKZ,
requires us to find the block size necessary to sufficiently reduce the basis. In
the case of the dual attack, the state of the art analysis for doing this estimation
can be found in [Alb17]. Chapters 3 and 4 will be dedicated to explaining in
detail how this is done for the primal attack.
1.5 Quantum computation
In this section, we provide some fundamental concepts and notation for de-
scribing quantum algorithms. For a concise introduction, see Chapters 1 to
8Although these could possibly be available in a fully homomorphic encryption-with-
bootstrapping setting.
9In this paragraph we don’t mean Λ⊥q as a projective sublattice.
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4 of [KLM+07]. For a more comprehensive discussion, see [NC10]. In Chap-
ter 2, we will use these notions to investigate trade-offs in the use of the
quantum algorithm for unstructured search by Grover [Gro96] in the setting of
non-asymptotic cryptanalysis of block ciphers.
Classical algorithms can be implemented using digital circuits. These encode
information as strings of bits valued in {0, 1}n, and perform Boolean logic
by applying logic gates. Analogously to their classical counterpart, quantum
algorithms can be thought of in terms of quantum circuits. These encode
information in qubit registers valued in (C2)⊗n, and perform operations on
these by applying quantum gates.10 We will now describe the basic components
of quantum circuits.
Qubits. The fundamental unit of quantum information is the qubit. These
are unit vectors in C2 (considered with complex inner product), and their state
is usually denoted using bra-ket notation as |b〉, with the state’s adjoint |b〉†
also written as 〈b|, such that ‖b‖2 = 〈b|b〉 = 1. Qubits can be grouped into
registers by means of tensor products. For example, the state of a register with
n qubits independently set to states b1, . . . , bn is |b1〉⊗ · · ·⊗ |bn〉, or using more
compact notation, |b1〉 · · · |bn〉 or |b1 . . . bn〉. Generally speaking, the state of
an n-qubit register has value in the Hilbert space H = (C2)⊗n. As a complex
vector space, C2 can be given an explicit orthonormal basis {|0〉 , |1〉}, where the
labels 0 and 1 are used in analogy to classical bits. Then the state of any qubit
can be expressed as a linear combination |b〉 = α |0〉 + β |1〉, with α, β ∈ C
such that |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. This expression is unique up to multiplication
by a global phase eiθ with θ ∈ R. A basis for H can be constructed by
tensoring the basis of C2 with itself, resulting in the computational basis of
H, {|b1 . . . bn〉 : b1 . . . bn ∈ {0, 1}n}. A register of n qubits will have a state
|ψ〉 ∈ H described by a linear combination of the computational basis of H. If
|ψ〉 can be written as a tensor product of qubits, e.g. |ψ〉 = |00〉 where n = 2,
we say it is in a separable state. Otherwise, if |ψ〉 can’t be expressed as a tensor
product, e.g. |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), we say it is entangled.
10It should be noted that both classical and quantum circuits can also be built in terms of
d-ary logic, where information is stored in terms of digit strings in [d]n or qudit registers in
(Cd)⊗n. Without loss of generality, in this thesis we assume binary logic.
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Gates. Operations on n qubits are expressed in the form of unitary operators
acting on H. Fixing the computational basis for H, these operators can
be described as matrices U ∈ C2n×2n such that U †U = UU † = I, where
U † indicates the adjoint of U . Quantum gates are reversible, and for every
quantum gate U , its inverse gate is described as U †. This also means that in
theory no information is lost by the application of a quantum gate11. Applying
a gate with operator U on a register in state |ψ〉 results in the register being put
in state U |ψ〉. The identity matrix can be seen as the no-op operator, which
leaves the value in a register intact. Similarly to quantum states, operators
can themselves be tensored, to construct operators acting on larger registers
in parallel (an example will be given in the paragraph on circuits, below). In
the case of classical circuits, a universal set of gates is a set of logic gates such
that for every truth table a circuit can be obtained using only the gates in
the set. For example, the sets {AND,NOT} and {NAND} are two universal
sets. In the case of quantum circuits, a universal set of gates is a set of unitary
operators such that every unitary operator can be approximated to arbitrary
precision using only the gates in the set. One such set is the “Clifford+T” set of
gates, that is the set comprised of 1-qubit Clifford gates (including NOT, with
symbol ⊕), controlled-NOT (or CNOT, with symbol ), and T, the 1-qubit
gate with exp(±iπ/8) on the diagonal and 0 otherwise (up to a global phase) in
the computational basis. One quantum gate of particular interest is the Toffoli
gate, also known as the controlled-controlled-NOT gate (CCNOT). Classically,
Toffoli maps bits (b1, b2, b3) to (b1, b2, b3⊕ b1 · b2). By fixing b3 = 1, this results
in the NAND gate, which is classically universal. This means that any classical
truth table f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m can be implemented as a quantum circuit
by first transforming it into the reversible function f̂ : (x, y) 7→ (x, y ⊕ f(x))
(which is self-inverse), and then implementing f̂ using Toffoli gates.
Measurements. As we mentioned above, the state |ψ〉 of an n-qubit register
can be expressed as a linear combination of the computational basis of H,
|ψ〉 = ∑i∈{0,1}n αi |i〉 with 〈ψ|ψ〉 =
∑
i∈{0,1}n |αi|2 = 1. Whenever αi 6= 0 for
more than one index i, we say that |ψ〉 is in superposition. As part of quantum
computation, a state can be operated on in two ways. One is via quantum gates,




and the other is via state measurement. While applying a quantum operator
U on a state |ψ〉 will result in a possibly superposed state U |ψ〉, measuring
|ψ〉 will result in a non-superposed state from the computational basis |i〉, for
some i ∈ {0, 1}n. In particular, it will result in |i〉 with probability |αi|2. This
operation allows one to write non-superposed states to a classical bit string of
length n by measuring them, but will result in a loss of information whenever
|ψ〉 was in a superposed state. Measurement of part of an entangled register
will affect the other components in the register, as to satisfy the output of the
measurement. For example, if measuring the first qubit of a register in state
|ψ〉 = (|00〉+ |01〉+ |11〉)/
√
3 returned a value of |0〉, after the measurement the
register would be in the state |ψ′〉 = (|00〉+ |01〉)/
√
2, reducing the probability
of measuring |1〉 on the second qubit from 2/3 to 1/2. On the other hand, if
measuring the first qubit returned a value of |1〉, this would leave the register
in the state |ψ′〉 = |11〉, causing measurements of the second qubit to return
|1〉 with probability 1.
Circuits. Having introduced quantum registers, gates and measurements,
we can now describe a circuit. A quantum circuit consists of a register of n
qubits, or wires, usually assumed to be initially set to the state |0n〉, and a
sequence of gates and measurements performed on the wires in a given order.
We can use different metrics to describe the size of the circuit. The circuit
width is the number of wires used, the gate count is the number of gates used
(this may also include the number of measurements performed on single wires),
the depth is the maximum length of any path from an input state to an output
state when interpreting the circuit as an undirected graph with gates as its
nodes and wires as its edges. Figure 1.2 depicts a small toy circuit comprised
of three qubits on which three gates are applied (a T gate, a NOT gate, and a
controlled-NOT gate) with input state |ψ〉 and time flowing from left to right.
The circuit has width 3, gate count 3, and depth 2. It maps the input state
|ψ〉 to U |ψ〉 where U = (UCNOT ⊗ I2) · (UT ⊗ I2 ⊗UX), where UCNOT, UT and
UX are the unitary matrices for the CNOT, T, and X (also denoted as NOT
or ⊕) gates respectively. It should be noted that we will be always working on
theoretical circuits, without specific constraints on what gates can be applied








Figure 1.2: Example of a small quantum circuit.
over three “logical” qubits, likely more qubits would be necessary to implement
a noiseless version of it in the real world.
Copying information. Due to the no-cloning theorem [WZ82, Die82], given
a register in state |ψ〉, it is not possible to copy its state and obtain a second
register in state |ψ〉 un-entangled from the first. That is, given a superposed
state |ψ〉, there is no unitary transformation U such that U |ψ〉 |0〉 = |ψ〉 |ψ〉.
Rather, if two separable registers in the same state are required, these should be
independently prepared, for example by running the same circuit twice on two
different quantum registers. It is however possible to copy classical information
using the CNOT gate, which maps |x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉 |y ⊕ x〉 where x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
A simple computation using the matrix form of the CNOT gate UCNOT on a
superposed qubit state |ψ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉 demonstrates the difference between
using CNOT and cloning a state:




1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1



















= α |00〉+ β |11〉
6= |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉
= α2 |00〉+ αβ |01〉+ αβ |10〉+ β2 |11〉 .
While measuring the first register of |ψ〉 |ψ〉 would not affect the second register,
measuring the first register of UCNOT |ψ〉 |0〉 = α |00〉+ β |11〉 will collapse the




We have described the basic components used to implement quantum algorithms
as circuits. We now move our focus to a milestone algorithm in quantum
computing, Grover’s algorithm [Gro96].
Definition 26 ((N, M)-unstructured search problem). Given a randomly
sorted list L of size N and a property P such that exactly M elements of L
satisfy P , find one such element.
Classically, the best algorithm for solving the (N, 1)-unstructured search
problem has complexity O(N). Intuitively, this is because the only possible
approach is to check every element in L until we find the one satisfying P ,
since the list is not sorted in any useful way. This will have an average runtime
of N+12 checks, and a worst-case runtime of N − 1 checks. In [Gro96], Grover
proposed a solution for this problem, using quantum computation. He describes
a quantum algorithm for searching such an unstructured list with complexity
O(
√
N). Grover’s algorithm is optimal in the sense that any quantum search
algorithm needs at least Ω(
√
N) oracle queries to solve the problem [BBHT98].
In [Zal99], Zalka shows that for any number of oracle queries, Grover’s algorithm
gives the largest probability to find a solution, meaning that it is the exactly
optimal quantum search algorithm (and not just asymptotically). We now
provide a description of the algorithm and its runtime. In Chapter 2, we will
look in detail at the complexity of Grover’s algorithm from a non-asymptotic
point of view, when used to perform cryptanalysis of block ciphers.
Grover’s circuit components. For simplicity, we restrict to N = 2k and
label the elements of L by their indices in {0, 1}k. Let W ⊂ L be the set of
solutions to the unstructured search problem, with M = #W (we call this
the M -solution version of Grover’s algorithm). Let |ψ〉 = ∑i∈L |i〉 /
√
N be
the fully entangled state12 where the |i〉 form the computational basis for
(C2)⊗k. We define the superposed state with solutions to the search problem







|r〉 = Gj |ψ,ϕ〉
α
Figure 1.3: The |w,ϕ〉—|`, ϕ〉 plane P .
|w〉 := ∑i∈W |i〉 /
√
M and the state corresponding to the complement L\W ,
|`〉 := ∑i∈L\W |i〉 /
√
N −M .
Given a Boolean function f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} that marks solutions to the search
problem, i.e. f(x) = 1 if and only if x ∈W , Grover’s algorithm makes use of
an operator Uf implementing f , such that Uf maps |x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉.
When |y〉 is in the state |ϕ〉 := (|0〉 − |1〉)/
√
2, then this action can be written
as |x〉 |ϕ〉 7→ (−1)f(x) |x〉 |ϕ〉. This means that the oracle applies a phase shift
to exactly the solutions’ indices. We call Uf the “Grover oracle” for f . We also
define operators Uψ = (2 |ψ〉〈ψ| − IN )⊗ I2 and G = UψUf . Grover’s algorithm
amounts to applying j times the operator G on a quantum register |r〉 initially
set to |r〉 ← |ψ〉 |ϕ〉. The objective is to eventually attain |r〉 ≈ |w〉 |ϕ〉, so that
measuring the first k qubits of |r〉 results in a solution to the search problem
x ∈W with high probability.
The states |w〉 and |`〉 are orthogonal, 〈w|`〉 = 0, since W ∩L\W = ∅, and have
unit norm. To derive the runtime of Grover’s algorithm, we will be working
on the real plane P spanned by |w,ϕ〉 = |w〉 |ϕ〉 and |`, ϕ〉 = |`〉 |ϕ〉 when they
are identified with the canonical basis of R2, depicted in Figure 1.3. We start










By direct calculation, |ψ,ϕ〉 and |`, ϕ〉 form an angle








Applying G. As discussed above, the application of Uf maps |x〉 |ϕ〉 7→
(−1)f(x) |x〉 |ϕ〉 = (−1)Jx∈W K |x〉 |ϕ〉. When looking in particular at the basis of
the |w,ϕ〉—|`, ϕ〉 plane, we see that
Uf |`, ϕ〉 = |`, ϕ〉 and Uf |w,ϕ〉 = − |w,ϕ〉 .
This means that given |w〉 and restricting our attention to the |w,ϕ〉—|`, ϕ〉
plane, we can write Uf
∣∣
P
= (IN − 2 |w〉〈w|)⊗ I2.
By writing |ψ〉 in terms of |w〉 and |`〉 we can directly compute G’s action on












































cos 2θ |w〉〈w|+ sin 2θ |w〉〈`|
− sin 2θ |`〉〈w|+ cos 2θ |`〉〈`|
]
⊗ I2,
which rotates vectors on the |w〉 |ϕ〉—|`〉 |ϕ〉 plane by an angle 2θ. This means
that the registry |r〉 will always lie on P , since it is originally set to |ψ,ϕ〉.
Runtime of Grover’s algorithm. Given the geometric interpretation above,
after j applications of G, the register state |r〉 ← Gj |ψ,ϕ〉 will form an angle
α = (2j + 1) θ with |`, ϕ〉. Therefore, when measuring the first k qubits after
j > 0 iterations of G, the success probability p(j) for obtaining one of the
solutions is p(j) = sin2((2j + 1)θ) [BBHT98], the squared component of |r〉
along the |w,ϕ〉 direction. Since we aim to measure the state when |r〉 ≈ |w,ϕ〉,
the optimal number of iterations should be j such that α ≈ π2 ⇔ j ≈ π4θ − 12 ,
which corresponds to p(j) ≈ 1. Note that whenever M  N , sin θ will be
small, and θ ≈ sin θ =
√
M/N . This allows us to replace θ in the expression











a solution to the search problem with overwhelming probability of at least
1 − MN [BBHT98]. This results in the asymptotic cost O(
√
N), where the O
essentially hides the fixed cost of each application of G.
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Grover’s search algorithm gives a quantum attack against block ciphers by
searching for a key that matches a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
This attack uses O(
√
N) calls to the cipher to search a key space of size N .
Previous work in the specific case of AES derived the full gate cost by analysing
quantum circuits for the cipher, but focused on minimizing the number of qubits.
In this chapter, we study the cost of quantum key search attacks under a depth
restriction and introduce techniques that reduce the oracle depth, even if at the
cost of requiring more qubits. As cases in point, we design quantum circuits
for the block ciphers AES and LowMC. Our circuits give a lower overall attack
cost in both the gate count and depth-times-width cost models when compared
to those implied by circuits in the previous literature. In NIST’s post-quantum
cryptography standardisation process, security categories are defined based on
the concrete cost of quantum key search against AES. We present new, lower
cost estimates for each category, so our work has immediate implications for
the security assessment of post-quantum cryptography.
As part of the original publication of this chapter, we released Q# implemen-
tations of the full Grover oracle for AES-128, -192, -256 and for the three
LowMC instantiations used in Picnic, including unit tests and code to reproduce
our quantum resource estimates. To the best of our knowledge, these are the
first two such full implementations and automatic resource estimations.
2.1 Motivation
The prospect of a large-scale, cryptographically relevant quantum computer
has prompted increased scrutiny of the post-quantum security of cryptographic
primitives. Shor’s algorithm for factoring and computing discrete logarithms
introduced in [Sho94] and [Sho97] will completely break public-key schemes
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such as RSA, ECDSA and ECDH. But symmetric schemes like block ciphers
and hash functions are widely considered post-quantum secure. The only
caveat thus far is a security reduction due to key search or pre-image attacks
with Grover’s algorithm [Gro96]. As Grover’s algorithm only provides at most
a square root speed-up, the rule of thumb is to simply double the cipher’s key
size to make it post-quantum secure. Such conventional wisdom reflects the
asymptotic behaviour of Grover’s algorithm and only gives a rough idea of the
security penalties that quantum computers inflict on symmetric primitives. In
particular, the cost of evaluating the Grover oracle is often ignored.
In their call for proposals to the standardisation of post-quantum cryptog-
raphy [Nat16], the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
proposes security categories for post-quantum public-key schemes such as key
encapsulation and digital signatures. Categories are defined by the cost of
quantum algorithms for exhaustive key search on the block cipher AES and
collision search for the hash function SHA-3, and measure the attack cost in the
number of quantum gates. Because the total gate count of Grover’s algorithm
increases with parallelisation, they impose a total upper bound on the depth
of a quantum circuit, called MAXDEPTH. There is no bound on circuit width. A
submitted algorithm meets the requirements of a specific security category if
the best known attack uses more resources (gates) than are needed to solve
the reference problem. Hence, a concrete and meaningful definition of these
security categories depends on precise resource estimation of the size of the
Grover oracle used for key search on AES.
Security categories 1, 3 and 5 correspond to key recovery against AES-128,
AES-192 and AES-256, respectively. The NIST proposal derives gate cost
estimates from the concrete, gate-level descriptions of the AES oracle by Grassl,
Langenberg, Roetteler and Steinwandt [GLRS16]. Grassl et al. aim to minimize
the circuit width, i.e. the number of qubits needed.
Prior work. Since the publication of [GLRS16], other works have studied
quantum circuits for AES, the AES Grover oracle and its use in Grover’s algo-
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rithm1. Almazrooie, Samsudin, Abdullah and Mutter [ASAM18] improve the
quantum circuit for AES-128. As in [GLRS16], the focus is on minimizing the
number of qubits. The improvements are a slight reduction in the total number
of Toffoli gates and the number of qubits required, by using a binary field
inversion circuit that saves one multiplication. Kim, Han and Jeong [KHJ18]
discuss time-space trade-offs for key search on block ciphers in general and
use AES as an example. They discuss NIST’s MAXDEPTH parameter and hence
study parallelisation strategies for Grover’s algorithm to address the depth
constraint. They take the Toffoli gate depth as the relevant metric for the
MAXDEPTH bound arguing that it is a conservative approximation.
Recently, independent and concurrent to parts of this work, Langenberg, Pham
and Steinwandt [LPS20] developed quantum circuits for AES that demonstrate
significant improvements over those presented in [GLRS16] and [ASAM18].
The main source of optimization is a different S-box design derived from work
by Boyar and Peralta in [BP10] and [BP12], which greatly reduces the number
of Toffoli gates in the S-box as well as its Toffoli depth. Another improvement
is that fewer auxiliary qubits are required for the AES key expansion. Again,
this work aligns with the objectives in [GLRS16] to keep the number of qubits
small.
Bonnetain et al. [BNS19] study the post-quantum security of AES within a
new framework for classical and quantum structured search. The work cites
[GLRS16] for deducing concrete gate counts for reduced-round attacks.
Our contributions. We present implementations of the full Grover or-
acle for key search on AES and LowMC in Q# [SGT+18], including full
implementations of the block ciphers themselves. In contrast to previous
work [GLRS16, ASAM18, LPS20], having a concrete implementation allows us
to get more precise, flexible and automatic estimates of the resources required
to compute these operations. It also allows us to unit test our circuits, to make
sure that the implementations are correct.
1As well as for other symmetric primitives such as SHA2/3 [AMG+16].
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All of our code and data can be found at github.com/microsoft/grover-blocks.
The source code is available under a free license to allow independent verifica-
tion of our results, further investigation of different trade-offs and cost models
and re-costing as the Q# compiler improves and as automatic optimization
software becomes available. We hope that it can serve as a useful starting point
for cryptanalytic work to assess the post-quantum security of other schemes.
We review the literature on the parallelisation of Grover’s algorithm [BBHT98,
Zal99, GR04, KHJ18] to explore the cost of attacking AES and LowMC in
the presence of a bound on the total depth, such as MAXDEPTH proposed by
NIST. We conclude that using parallelisation by dividing the search space is
advantageous. We also give a rigorous justification for the number of plaintext-
ciphertext blocks needed in Grover’s oracle in the context of parallelisation.
Smaller values than those proposed by Grassl et al. [GLRS16] are sufficient, as
is also pointed out by Langenberg et al. [LPS20].
Our quantum circuit optimization approach differs from those in the previous
literature [GLRS16, ASAM18, LPS20] in that our implementations do not aim
for the lowest possible number of qubits. Instead, we designed them to minimize
the gate-count and depth-times-width cost metrics for quantum circuits under
a depth constraint. The gate-count metric is relevant for defining the NIST
security categories and the depth-times-width cost metric is a more realistic
measure of quantum resources when quantum error correction is deployed.
Favouring lower depth at the cost of a slightly larger width in the oracle circuit
leads to costs that are smaller in both metrics than for the circuits presented
in [GLRS16, ASAM18, LPS20]. Grover’s algorithm does not parallelise well,
meaning that minimizing depth rather than width is crucial to make the most
out of the available depth.
To the best of our knowledge, our work resulted in the most shallow quantum
circuit of AES at the time of publication, and the first ever for LowMC. We chose
to also implement LowMC as an example of a quantum circuit for another block
cipher. It is used in the Picnic signature scheme [CDG+17, ZCD+17], a round-2
candidate in the NIST standardisation process. Thus, our implementation
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can contribute to more precise cost estimates for attacks on Picnic and to its
post-quantum security assessment.
We present our results for quantum key search on AES in the context of the
NIST post-quantum cryptography standardisation process and derive new and
lower cost estimates for the definition of the NIST security strength categories.
We see a consistent gate cost reduction between 11 and 13 bits, making it
easier for submitters to claim a given quantum security category.
Chapter roadmap. In Section 2.2 we will review the basic idea of attack-
ing block ciphers using Grover’s algorithm. In Section 2.3 we describe the
techniques we will use for quantum circuit design and cost estimation. In
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 we will describe our implementations of AES and LowMC,
respectively. In Section 2.6 we will derive our cost estimates for key search,
compare them to previous work, and discuss their implications. In Section 2.7
we will mention developments in this field since the publication of this chapter
as a paper and future research directions.
2.2 Finding a block cipher key with Grover’s algorithm
Given plaintext-ciphertext pairs created by encrypting a small number of
messages with a block cipher under a common key, Grover’s quantum search
algorithm [Gro96] can be used to find such key [YI00].
In Section 1.5.1, we have introduced Grover’s algorithm. In this section we
describe how it can be applied to the key search problem and how it parallelises
under depth constraints.
2.2.1 Block ciphers
Block ciphers are a versatile cryptographic primitive used extensively in cryptog-
raphy. Mathematically, a block cipher can be seen as a family of permutations
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C(·) over a finite set M, indexed by elements K of a finite set K, called keys.
Usually, we let M = {0, 1}n and K = {0, 1}k, and say that C(·) has key size or
key length k and block size n. Given a key K ∈ K, the function CK : M→M
is a permutation. Ideally, block ciphers are designed such that any CK is
indistinguishable from a random permutation over M.
Block ciphers can be used to build, among others, stream ciphers [KL14,
§3.5.1], cryptographic hash functions [MVO96, §9.4.1], message authentication
codes [MVO96, §9.5.1] and pseudo-random number generators [DE05, §6.2.1],
via various modes of operation.
2.2.2 Key search for a block cipher
Let C(·) be a block cipher with block size n and key length k. For a key
K ∈ {0, 1}k denote by CK(m) ∈ {0, 1}n the encryption of message block
m ∈ {0, 1}n under the key K. Given r plaintext-ciphertext pairs {(mi, ci)}ri=1
with ci = CK(mi), we aim to apply Grover’s algorithm to find the unknown
key K [YI00]. The Boolean function f for the Grover oracle takes a key K as
input, and is defined as
f(K) =
{
1, if CK(mi) = ci for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
0, otherwise.
Possibly, there could exist other keys than K that encrypt the known plaintexts
to the same ciphertexts. We call such keys spurious keys. If their number is
known to be, say, M − 1, the M -solution version of Grover’s algorithm has the
same probability of measuring each spurious key as of measuring the correct
K.
Spurious keys. We start by determining the probability that a single mes-
sage encrypts to the same ciphertext under two different keys, for which we
make the usual heuristic assumptions about the block cipher C(·). We as-
sume that under a fixed key K, the map {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n,m 7→ CK(m) is a
pseudo-random permutation; and under a fixed message block m, the map
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{0, 1}k → {0, 1}n,K 7→ CK(m) is a pseudo-random function2. Now let K be
the correct key, i.e. the one used for the encryption. It follows that for a single
message block of length n, PrK 6=K′ (CK(m) = CK′(m)) = 2−n.
This probability becomes smaller when the equality condition is extended to
multiple blocks. Given r distinct messages m1, . . . ,mr ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
Pr
K 6=K′




2n − i , (2.1)
which is ≈ 2−rn for r2  2n. Since the number of keys different from K is
2k − 1, we expect the number of spurious keys for an r-block message to be
≈ (2k − 1)2−rn. Choosing r such that this quantity is very small ensures with
high probability that there are no spurious keys, such that we can parametrise
Grover’s algorithm for a single solution.
Remark 12. Grassl et al. [GLRS16, §3.1] work with a similar argument. They
take the probability over pairs (K ′,K ′′) of keys with K ′ 6= K ′′. Since there are
22k − 2k such pairs, they conclude that about (22k − 2k)2−rn satisfy the above
condition that the ciphertexts coincide on all r blocks. But this also counts
pairs of keys for which the ciphertexts match each other, but do not match the
images under the correct K. Thus, using the number of pairs overestimates
the number of spurious keys and hence the number r of message blocks needed
to ensure a unique key.
Based on the above heuristic assumptions, one can determine the probability
for a specific number of spurious keys. Let X be the random variable whose
value is the number of spurious keys for a given set of r message blocks and a
given key K. Then, X is distributed according to a binomial distribution:






where p = 2−rn. We use the Poisson limit theorem [Fel68, Chapter VI.5] to
conclude that this is approximately a Poisson distribution with









2Intuitively, a pseudo-random function is a function that cannot be easily distinguished
from having random output; a similar intuition holds for a pseudo-random permutation. We
refer the reader to [KL14, §3.5] for a more thorough formal discussion.
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The probability that K is the unique key consistent with the r plaintext-
ciphertext pairs is Pr(X = 0) ≈ e−2k−rn . Thus we can choose r such that rn is
slightly larger than k; rn = k + 10 gives Pr(X = 0) ≈ 0.999. In a block cipher
where k = b · n is a multiple of n, taking r = b+ 1 will give the unique key K
with probability at least 1− 2−n, which is negligibly close to 1 for typical block
sizes. If rn < k, then K is almost certainly not unique. Even rn = k − 3 gives
less than a 1% chance of a unique key. Hence, r must be at least dk/ne.
The case k = rn, when the total message length is equal to the key length,
remains interesting if one aims to minimize the number of qubits. The probabil-
ity for a unique K is Pr(X = 0) ≈ 1/e ≈ 0.3679, and the probability of exactly
one spurious key is the same. Kim et al. [KHJ18, Eq. 7] describe the success
probability after a certain number of Grover iterations when the number of
spurious keys is unknown. The optimal number of iterations gives a maximum
success probability of 0.556, making it likely that the first attempt will not
find the correct key and one must repeat the algorithm if aiming for a larger
success probability.
Remark 13. While for some cryptanalytic applications, it is important to
find the correct key, for others, any key that matches the plaintext-ciphertext
pairs can be sufficient. For example, the Picnic signature scheme [CDG+17,
ZCD+17] uses a block cipher C(·) and encrypts a message m to c, and (m, c) is
the public key. The signature is a zero-knowledge proof that the signer knows a
secret key K such that CK(m) = c. Any other key K
′ with CK′(m) = c produces
a valid signature for the original public key. Thus, to forge signatures, a spurious
key works just as well. However, since in general the number of spurious keys
for a given plaintext-ciphertext pair is unknown, Grover’s algorithm needs to
be adjusted for example as in [BBHT98, §4] or by running a quantum counting
algorithm first [BBHT98, §5]. This requires repeated runs of various Grover
instances. Under a total depth limitation, this reduces the success probability
of the attack compared to when using enough plaintext-ciphertext pairs such
that no spurious keys are present.
Depth constraints for cryptanalysis. In this chapter, we assume that
any quantum adversary is bounded by a constraint on the total depth of
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any quantum circuits they can evaluate. In its call for proposals to the post-
quantum cryptography standardisation effort [Nat16], NIST introduces the
parameter MAXDEPTH as such a bound and suggests that reasonable values3 are
between 240 and 296. Whenever an algorithm’s overall depth exceeds this bound,
parallelisation becomes necessary. We do assume that MAXDEPTH constitutes a
hard upper bound on the total depth of a quantum attack, including possible
repetitions of a Grover instance.
In general, an attacker can be assumed to have a finite amount of resources, in
particular a finite time for an attack. This is equivalent to postulating an upper
bound on the total depth of a quantum circuit as suggested by NIST. Unlike
in the classical case, the required parallelisation increases the gate cost for
Grover’s algorithm, which makes it important to study attacks with bounded
depth.
We consider it reasonable to expect that the overall attack strategy is guaranteed
to return a solution with high probability close to 1 within the given depth
bound. E.g., a success probability of 1/2 for a Grover instance to find the
correct key requires multiple runs to increase the overall probability closer
to 1. These runs, either sequentially or in parallel, need to be taken into
account for determining the overall cost and must respect the depth limit.
While this setting is our main focus, it can be adequate to allow and cost
a quantum algorithm with a success probability noticeably smaller than 1.
Where not given in this chapter, the corresponding analysis can be derived in
a straightforward manner.
2.2.3 Parallelization
Grover’s algorithm is known to parallelise badly. Indeed, Zalka [Zal99] concludes
that when using S parallel Grover oracles, the number of Grover iterations
can be at most reduced by a factor Θ(
√
S). In particular, we will aim at a
3Suggested MAXDEPTH values are justified by assumptions about the total available time
and speed of each gate. The limit 296 is given as “the approximate number of gates that atomic
scale qubits with speed of light propagation times could perform in a millennium” [Nat16].
An adversary could only run a higher-depth circuit if they were able to use smaller qubits,
faster propagation, or had more available time.
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reduction factor of exactly
√
S, which also matches the trade-off considered
by NIST (which we will discuss in Section 2.6.2). Compared to many classical
algorithms, this is an inefficient parallelisation, since we must increase the
circuit width by a factor of S to reduce the depth by a factor of
√
S.
There are different ways to parallelise Grover’s algorithm. Kim, Han, and
Jeong [KHJ18] describe two, which they denote as inner and outer paralleli-
sation. Outer parallelisation runs multiple instances of the full algorithm in
parallel. Only one instance must succeed, allowing us to reduce the necessary
success probability, and hence number of iterations, for all. Inner parallelisa-
tion divides the search space into disjoint subsets and assigns each subset to
a parallel machine. Each machine’s search space is smaller, so the number of
necessary iterations shrinks. Both methods avoid any communication, quantum
or classical, during the Grover iterations. They require communication at the
beginning, to distribute the plaintext-ciphertext pairs to each machine and to
delegate the search space for inner parallelisation, and communication at the
end to collect the measured keys and decide which one, if any, is the true key.
The next section discusses why our setting favours inner parallelisation.
Advantages of inner parallelisation. We assume the notation introduced
in Section 1.5.1. Consider S parallel machines that run for j iterations, and let
us assume for the moment that no spurious keys are present in the search space
(M = 1). For a single machine, the success probability is p(j) = sin2 ((2j + 1)θ),






. Using outer parallelisation, the probabil-
ity that at least one machine recovers the correct key is pS(j) = 1− (1− p(j))S .
We hope to gain a factor
√













Considering some small values of S, we get S = 1 : p1(j1) ≈ 1, S = 2 :
p2(j2) ≈ 0.961 and S = 3 : p3(j3) ≈ 0.945. As S gets larger, we use a series













4 ≈ 0.915. (2.3)
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This means that by simply increasing S, it is not possible to gain a factor
√
S
in the number of iterations if one aims for a success probability close to 1. In
contrast, with inner parallelisation, the correct key lies in the search space
of exactly one machine. We are running jS iterations, which is exactly the
required number of iterations to find the key in a search space of size N/S.
Therefore, this machine has near certainty of measuring the correct key, while
other machines are guaranteed not to measure the correct key. Overall, we have
near-certainty of finding the correct key. Inner parallelisation thus achieves
a higher success probability than outer parallelisation, while using the same
number S of parallel instances and the same number of iterations.
Another advantage of inner parallelisation is that dividing the search space
separates any spurious keys into different subsets and reduces the search
problem to finding a unique key. This allows us to reduce the number r of
message blocks in the Grover oracle and was already observed by Kim, Han,
and Jeong [KHJ18] in the context of measure-and-repeat methods. In fact, the
correct key lies in exactly one subset of the search space. If the spurious keys
fall into different subsets, the respective machines measure spurious keys, which
can be discarded classically after measurement with access to the appropriate
number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The only relevant question is whether
there is a spurious key in the correct key’s subset of size 2k/S. The probability
for this is
SKP(k, n, r, S) =
∞∑
t=1
Pr(X = t) ≈ 1− e− 2
k−rn
S , (2.4)
using Equation (2.2) with 2k replaced by 2k/S. If k = rn, this probability
is 1/S +O(1/S2) as S →∞. In general, high parallelisation makes spurious
keys irrelevant, and the Grover oracle can simply use the smallest r such that
SKP(k, n, r, S) is less than a desired bound.
2.3 Quantum circuit design
In Section 1.5 we introduced quantum computation in terms of the quantum
circuit model. In this section we will discuss methods and criteria for quantum
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circuit design, and cost models to estimate quantum resources, as relevant to
our application.
2.3.1 Fault-tolerant gate set and architecture assumptions
We adopt the computational model presented in [JS19]. The quantum circuits
we are concerned with in this chapter operate on qubits. They are composed of
so-called Clifford+T gates, which form a commonly used universal fault-tolerant
gate set exposed by several families of quantum error-correcting codes [Ter15].
The primitive gates consist of single-qubit Clifford gates, controlled-NOT
(CNOT) gates, T gates, and measurements. We make the standard assumption
of full parallelism, meaning that a quantum circuit can apply any number of
gates simultaneously so long as these gates act on disjoint sets of qubits [GR04,
BBG+13].
All quantum circuits for AES and LowMC described in this chapter were
designed, tested, and costed in the Q# programming language [SGT+18],
which supports all assumptions discussed here. Q# allows to describe circuits
in terms of single qubit gates (the Pauli gates X, Y , Z, the Hadamard gate
H, the phase gate S, the T gate, general rotation gates), and controlled
gates. Furthermore, it makes classical control logic around quantum operations
transparent, so that loops and conditional statements based on measurement
output can be easily expressed. The Q# compiler allows us to compute circuit
depth automatically by moving gates around through a circuit if the qubits it
acts on were previously idle. In particular, this means that the depth of two
circuits applied in series may be less than the sum of the individual depths of
each circuit. The Q# language allows the circuit to allocate auxiliary qubits
as needed, which adds new qubits initialized to |0〉. If an auxiliary qubit is
returned to the state |0〉 after it has been operated on, the circuit can release
it. Such a qubit is no longer entangled with the state used for computation
and the circuit can now maintain or measure it.
Grover’s algorithm is a far-future quantum algorithm, making it difficult to
decide on the right cost for each gate. Previous work assumed that T gates
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constitute the main cost [GLRS16, ASAM18, LPS20]. They are exceptionally
expensive for a surface code [FMMC12]; however, for a future error-correcting
code, T gates may be transversal and cheap while a different gate may be
expensive. Thus, we present costs when both costing depth in terms of T gates
only, and when costing all gates equally.
We ignore all concerns of layout and communication costs for the Grover oracle
circuit. Though making this assumption is unrealistic for a surface code, where
qubits can only interact with neighbouring ones, other codes may not have
these issues. A single oracle circuit uses relatively few logical qubits (< 220),
so these costs are unlikely to dominate. This allows us to compare our work
with previous proposals, which also ignore these costs. This also implies that
uncontrolled swaps are free, since the classical controller can simply track such
swaps and rearrange where it applies subsequent gates.
2.3.2 Realising the AND gate.
Previous work on quantum circuits for AES such as [GLRS16, ASAM18, LPS20]
mainly uses Toffoli gates to realise the functionality of the classical AND gate,
which is used as part of the AES S-box. We instead opt for a different approach,
and implement a “quantum AND” gate instead. A quantum AND gate has
the same functionality as a Toffoli gate, except the target qubit is assumed
to be in the state |0〉 on input, rather than in an arbitrary state. We use a
combination4 of Selinger’s [Sel13] and Jones’ [Jon13] circuits to express the
AND gate in terms of Clifford and T gates. This circuit uses 4 T gates and
11 Clifford gates in T -depth 1 and total depth 8. It uses one auxiliary qubit
which it immediately releases, while its adjoint circuit is slightly smaller. Of
particular interest is that the adjoint operator AND† has T -depth 0, at the
cost of requiring the use of one measurement and of executing some gates
conditioned on the output of such measurement. Diagrams of quantum AND
and its adjoint are shown in Figure 2.1. The result of the measurement in
AND† is uniformly distributed when uncomputing AND, independently of the
inputs to the AND gate. This means that for large circuits one can estimate the
4We thank Mathias Soeken for providing the implementation of the AND gate circuit.
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Figure 2.1: AND gate design used in our circuit. We notice that in Figure 2.1b,
the measurement returns a classical bit b and leaves the original qubit in the
state |b〉. The value of b is used to conditionally apply the gates inside the box.
average cost of uncomputing AND by taking the average circuit size of AND†
assuming half of the uncomputations execute the gates in box in Figure 2.1b,
and half do not.
2.3.3 Automated resource estimation and unit tests
One incentive for producing full implementations of the Grover oracle and its
components is to obtain precise5 resource estimates automatically and directly
from the circuit descriptions. Another incentive is to test the circuits for
correctness and to compare results on classical inputs against existing classical
software implementations that are known (or believed) to be correct. Yet
quantum circuits are in general not testable, since they rely on hardware yet to
be constructed. To partially address this issue the Q# compiler and runtime can
classically simulate a subset of quantum circuits, enabling partial test coverage.
We thus designed our circuits such that this tool can fully classically simulate
them, by using X, CNOT, CCNOT, SWAP, and AND gates only, together with
measurements (denoted throughout as M “gates”). This approach limits the
design space since we cannot use true quantum methods within the oracle. Yet,
5Since the publication of the paper that led to this chapter, a problem with
the ResourcesEstimator functionality in Q# was reported in https://github.com/
microsoft/qsharp-runtime/issues/192 and solved in https://github.com/microsoft/
qsharp-runtime/pull/404. Results reported in this chapter describe achievable circuits.
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it is worthwhile to implement components that are testable and can be fully
simulated to increase confidence in the validity of resource estimates deduced
from such implementations.
As part of the development process, we first implemented AES (resp. LowMC)
in Python 3, and tested the resulting code against the AES implementation
in PyCryptodome 3.8.2 [PyC19] (resp. the C++ reference implementation
in [Low19]). Then, we proceeded to write our Q# implementations (running
on the .NET Core version 3.1, using the Microsoft Quantum Development
Kit (QDK) version 0.15.21011258976), and tested these against our Python 3
implementations, by making use of the IQ# interface [Mic19a, Mic19b]. For
the Q# simulator to run, we are required to use the Microsoft QDK standard
library’s Toffoli gate for evaluating both Toffoli and AND gates, which results
in deeper than necessary circuits. We also have to explicitly SWAP values
across wires, which costs 3 CNOT gates, rather than simply keeping track of
the necessary free rewiring. Hence, to mitigate these effects, our functions
admit a Boolean flag indicating whether the code is being run as part of a
unit test by the simulator, or as part of a cost estimate. In the latter case,
Toffoli and AND gate designs are automatically replaced by shallower ones,
and SWAP instructions are disregarded as free (after manually checking that
this does not allow for incompatible circuit optimizations that could result in
lower costs than expected). All numbers reporting the total width of a circuit
include the initial number of qubits plus the maximal number of temporarily
allocated auxiliary qubits within the Q# function. For numbers describing
the total depth, all gates such as Clifford gates, CNOT and T gates as well as
measurements are assigned a depth of 1.
2.3.4 Current limitations of the Q# resource estimator
The prospect of automating resource estimation makes Q# a very interesting
tool. However, being a tool in a relatively early stage of development, issues
are to be expected. In this section we explain the issues we faced during the
6The published version of this chapter reports previous versions of the .NET Core and
Q# SDK. We report the versions used to compute the updated numbers provided in this
chapter.
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development of this chapter, how they affected previous versions of this work,
and how we work around those still present. We stress that to the best of our
knowledge the numbers output by the current QDK, using our workarounds,
faithfully represent the cost of our circuits under the assumptions previously
listed in Section 2.3.1.
Attainable depth and width. At the time of publication of this chapter
as [JNRV20], the available version of the Microsoft QDK was 0.7.1905.310. The
resource estimator at the time had an undocumented feature that would result
in the reported depth and width of a circuit not always being attainable at the
same time. As an example7, the Q# code in Figure 2.2 would be estimated
as describing a circuit of depth and width 1. A circuit of depth 1 is possible
(Figure 2.3a) and similarly a circuit of width 1 is possible (Figure 2.3b). In
order to obtain a circuit of depth and width 1 the compiler would need to start
from the circuit of width 1, ignore the release and re-allocation of the wire
between using statements and simplify T 2 = S. However, the Q# compiler
is currently unable to perform the latter simplification, therefore obtaining a
circuit of width and depth 1 starting from the given code is not possible as
far as the compiler could “see”. We stress that while for this simple example
a circuit of depth and width 1 happens to be achievable, this is not true in
general, nor what the compiler shipped in version 0.7.1905.310 of the QDK
meant by reporting such lower bound on the circuit size.
1 using(q = Qubit()) { T(q); }
2 using(q = Qubit()) { T(q); }
Figure 2.2: Example circuit reporting incompatible depth and width when
using version 0.7.1905.310 of the QDK.
As of version 0.15.2101125897, the resource estimator can be requested to
return the size of a circuit of minimal8 depth or width, with the guarantee that
the returned values will be attainable at the same time, as long as measurement
output is not used to conditionally execute other gates (see next item).
7The example used was taken from https://github.com/microsoft/qsharp-runtime/
pull/404.
8The circuits are minimal in the sense that the compiler can not find a smaller (in the
selected metric) circuit, not necessarily that a smaller one does not exist.
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(a) Depth = 1
|0〉 T |0〉 |0〉 T |0〉
using {...} using {...}
(b) Width = 1
Figure 2.3: Attainable circuits of depth 1 or width 1 corresponding to the Q#
code in Figure 2.2.
Gates conditioned on measurements. As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, in
order to optimise the depth of our AES circuits we use an implementation of the
quantum AND gate that has T -depth 1, and that can be uncomputed without
using any T gates at the cost of introducing measurements. As can be see in
Figure 2.1b, part of the uncomputation circuit is executed conditionally on the
output of a measurement. As of version 0.15.2101125897, the resource estimator
simulates the output of measurements, and is able to add the conditional gates
to the quantum circuit depending on the simulated output [Vas21, p. 5],
which will result in correct gate counts given the measurement outcomes.
However, the estimator is not able to account for the conditional gates not
being executable in parallel to the measurement. In our case, this only impacts
the uncomputation of the AND gate, since this is the only component in our
oracles using measurements to evaluate gates conditionally. In particular, this
means that whenever the measurement in Figure 2.1b returns 1, the circuit







Figure 2.4: Incorrect AND† circuit, as compiled by the QDK version
0.15.2101125897 when the output of the measurement is |1〉. The gate count is
correct, but the depth is not.
To work around this fact, when running cost estimates we add on the middle
wire a sequence of two rotation gates R and R†, to be executed (conditionally)
after the second CNOT. This results in the depth being correctly estimated as
6 by the current compiler, and since the number of rotation gates is reported
separately, it allows us to discard such gates from the total gate count.
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Probabilistic estimates. As mentioned above, the resource estimator in
the current QDK assigns measurement outputs randomly. Therefore, when
estimating the size of oracle circuits containing AND† gates, the CNOT, 1-
qubit Clifford, measurement and depth counts are probabilistic. The Q#
simulator does not currently support PRNG seeding for de-randomizing the
measurements,9 which means that re-estimating the same circuit multiple times
may result in slightly different numbers. In our case, across multiple runs of
resource estimation the final attack costs are essentially not impacted by these
lower order fluctuations.
Circuit optimization. The Q# compiler’s optimization capabilities are
currently limited [Vas21]. For example, the sequential R and R† evaluations
we artificially added to the adjoint AND gate (which essentially amount to a
no-op of depth 2), are not automatically simplified and eliminated. Reruns of
the same circuit with future improved versions of the compiler may result in
smaller estimated costs.
Large circuit compilation. The current version of the QDK struggles
compiling very large circuits10. While this is not an issue for most useful appli-
cations of quantum computing, it can hinder compiling very large cryptanalytic
circuits.
How our work is affected. The issues highlighted in this section can luckily
be worked around, making this chapter possible. We re-estimated all the circuits
in this chapter (except for the largest LowMC parameters, see below) with
the current version of the compiler in order to report attainable depth and
width values. Furthermore, we tweaked the AND† circuit as described above
to report correct depths. To address the probabilistic nature of the estimates,
we fixed the probability of values output by the measurement in AND† to be
P [|0〉] = P [|1〉] = 1/2, matching the circuit description in Section 2.3.2. The
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versions of the QDK: for our circuits the lower bound width was attainable even
when generating minimal depth circuits, and having slightly deeper (on average)
AND† gates did not impact the overall results. The only exception was the
block cipher that we call LowMC L5 (which will be described in Section 2.5).
While its circuit used to compile under version 0.7 of the QDK, it does fail under
version 0.15.2101125897. However, comparing the cost of our smaller LowMC
circuits (L1, L3) in this chapter to those originally generated with version 0.7,
they stayed essentially identical. Since the structure of LowMC L5 is identical
(only, larger) to that of its smaller parametrisations, only for LowMC L5 we
will keep reporting the numbers from our original publication [JNRV20], since
we don’t believe they would be affected by the changes made since.
2.3.5 Reversible circuits for linear maps
Linear maps f : Fn2 → Fm2 for varying dimensions n and m are essential building
blocks of AES and LowMC. In general, such a map f , expressed as multiplica-
tion of an input column vector in Fn2 by a constant matrix Mf ∈ Fm×n2 , can be
implemented as a reversible circuit on n input wires and m additional output
wires (initialized to |0〉), by using an adequate sequence of CNOT gates: if the
(i, j)-th coefficient of Mf is 1, we set a CNOT gate targeting the i-th output
wire, controlled on the j-th input wire.
Yet, if a linear map g : Fn2 → Fn2 is invertible, one can reversibly compute it
in-place on the input wires via a PLU decomposition of Mg, Mg = P · L · U .
The lower- and upper-triangular components L and U of the decomposition
can be implemented by using the appropriate CNOT gates in a similar fashion
to backward and forward substitution, while the final permutation P does not
require any quantum gates and instead is realized by appropriately keeping
track of the necessary rewiring. An example of a linear map decomposed in
both ways is shown in Figure 2.5. While rewiring is not easily supported in Q#,
the same effect can be obtained by defining a custom REWIRE operation that
computes an in-place swap of any two wires when testing an implementation,
and that can be disabled when costing it. We note that PLU decompositions are
not generally unique, but it is not clear whether sparser decompositions can be
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(c) In-place implementation of M .
Figure 2.5: Alternative circuits implementing the same linear transformation
M : F42 → F42, by using the two strategies described in § 2.3.5. Both are direct
implementations, and could potentially be reduced in size by automatic means
as in [MSR+19, MSC+19, GKMR14, ZC19], or manually. Figure 2.5b is wider
and has a larger gate count, but is shallower, than Figure 2.5c.
consistently obtained with any particular technique. For our implementations,
we perform PLU decompositions using SageMath 8.1 [S+17], which internally
relies on the M4RI [AB19] library.
2.3.6 Cost metrics for quantum circuits
For a meaningful cost analysis, we assume that an adversary has fixed con-
straints on their total available resources, and a specific cost metric they wish
to minimize. Without such limits, we might conclude that AES-128 could
be broken in under a second using 2128 machines, or broken using only a few
thousand qubits but a billion-year runtime. Most importantly, we assume a
total depth limit Dmax as explained in Section 2.2.2.
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In this chapter, we use the two cost metrics that are considered by Jaques and
Schanck in [JS19]. The first is the total number of gates, the G-cost. It assumes
non-volatile (“passive”) quantum memory, and therefore models circuits that
incur some cost with every gate, but where no cost is incurred in time units
during which a qubit is not operated on.
The second cost metric is the product of circuit depth and width, the DW -cost.
This is a more realistic cost model when quantum error correction is necessary.
It assumes a volatile (“active”) quantum memory, which incurs some cost to
correct errors on every qubit in each time step, i.e. each layer of the total
circuit depth. In this cost model, a released auxiliary qubit would not require
error correction, and the cost to correct it could be omitted. But we assume an
efficient strategy for qubit allocation that avoids long idle periods for released
qubits and thus choose to ignore this subtlety. Instead, we simply cost the
maximum width at any point in the oracle, times its total depth. For both cost
metrics, we can choose to count only T -gates towards gate count and depth,
or count all gates equally.
2.3.7 The cost of Grover’s algorithm
We will now reason on the cost of (parallelised) Grover’s algorithm, how this
behaves under a maximum depth constraint and how it compares to classical
search. We will also give a lower bound for the depth of key search. All our
results assume a straightforward11 parallel Grover strategy. We will use the
notation laid out in Section 1.5.1 for the runtime of Grover’s algorithm.
Parallel Grover circuits. Let the search space have size N = 2k, the target






. Suppose we use an
oracle G such that a single Grover iteration costs GG gates, has depth GD, and
uses GW qubits. Let S = 2
s be the number of parallel machines that are used
with the inner parallelisation method by dividing the search space in S disjoint
parts (see Section 2.2.3). In order to achieve a certain success probability p, the
11Our results do not cover any gains from the Search With Two Oracles technique
from [DP19, DP21].
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D = jp · GD ≈ cp
√
N/S · GD
(b) Parallel Grover circuit
Figure 2.6: Size of a circuit for running parallel Grover’s algorithm (right),
given the size of the function oracle used (G, left). In the case of key search,
the size of G will depend on the spurious key probability (SKP, see § 2.2.3),
which itself depends on the number of parallel computers S.
required number of iterations jp can be deduced from p = sin















N/S (see Figure 2.6).




/2, then the total depth of a jp-fold Grover iteration is
D = jpGD ≈ cp
√
N/S · GD = cp2
k−s
2 GD cycles. (2.5)
Note that for p ≈ 1 we have cp ≈ c1 = π4 . Each machine uses jpGG ≈
cp
√
N/S · GG = cp2
k−s
2 GG gates, i.e. the total G-cost over all S machines is
G = S · jpGG ≈ cp
√
N · S · GG = cp2
k+s
2 GG gates. (2.6)




N · S · GDGW = cp2
k+s
2 GDGW qubit-cycles. (2.7)
These cost expressions show that minimizing the number S = 2s of parallel
machines minimizes both G-cost and DW -cost. Thus, under fixed limits on
depth, width, and the number of gates, an adversary’s best course of action
is to use the entire depth budget and parallelise as little as possible. Under
this premise, the depth limit fully determines the optimal attack strategy for a
given Grover oracle. Limits on width or the number of gates simply become
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binary feasibility criteria and are either too tight and the adversary cannot
finish the attack with the desired success probability, or one of the limits is
loose. If one resource limit is loose, we may be able to modify the oracle to
use this resource to reduce depth, lowering the overall cost.
Optimizing the oracle under a depth limit. Grover’s algorithm par-
allelises so badly that it is generally preferable to aggressively optimise the
oracle’s depth. This allows more iterations within the depth limit, thus reducing
the necessary parallelisation.
In order to deduce the number S of parallel machines required, let Dmax be
a fixed depth limit. Given the depth GD of the oracle, we are able to run
jmax = bDmax/GDc Grover iterations of the oracle G. For a target success
probability p, we obtain the number S of parallel instances to achieve this
probability in the instance whose key space partition contains the key from




















It follows that for two oracle circuits G and F, the total G-cost is lower for G if
and only if GDGG < FDFG. That is, we wish to minimize the product GDGG.







Here, we wish to minimize G2DGW of the oracle circuit to minimize total DW -
cost, with the higher power on GD suggesting again that minimizing depth
should be prioritized over minimizing GW .
Comparing parallel Grover search to classical search. In the compu-
tational model of [JS19], each quantum gate is interpreted as some computation
done by a classical controller. For certain parameter settings, these controllers
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may find the key more efficiently through a classical search. Assume, this is
done with a brute force algorithm, which simply iterates through all potential
keys and checks if they are correct. Let C be the classical gate cost to test a
single key. Then for a search space of size N = 2k, the total cost in terms of
classical gate evaluations for the brute force attack to achieve success proba-
bility p is p2kC (where the attack is trivially parallelisable). Comparing this
cost to the gate cost for Grover’s algorithm in Equation (2.6), we conclude
that if we use S ≥ (pC/(cpGG))22k parallel machines, Grover’s algorithm will
require more quantum gates than classical gate evaluations are required to run
exhaustive search on the same hardware.
Since the Grover oracle G includes a reversible evaluation of the block cipher
and since quantum computation of a function is likely more costly than its
classical counterpart, we may assume that the classical gate cost C is smaller
than the quantum gate cost GG of the Grover oracle, i.e. C ≤ GG. From




/2 above, it holds that p/cp < 1.45, so
that (pC/(cpGG))
2 < 2.11. In particular, for p = 1 we have (pC/(cpGG))
2 =
16/π2 ·C2/G2G ≈ 1.62 ·C2/G2G ≤ 1.62. Depending on the actual cost ratio C/GG,
the resulting bound on the number of parallel quantum machines after which
classical search is cheaper may affect the viability of Grover’s algorithm for
key search. This may especially be the case when taking energy or monetary
costs per gate evaluation into consideration.
Communication cost to assemble the results. We briefly discuss the
communication cost incurred by communicating a found solution from one of
the machines in a large network of parallel computers to a central processor.
Here, each machine measures a candidate key after a specified number of Grover
iterations. The classical controller then checks this key against a small number
of given plaintext-ciphertext pairs in order to determine whether it is a valid
solution. If the key is correct, it is communicated to a central processor.
If the number of machines is small, the central processor simply queries each
machine sequentially for the correct key. For a large number of machines, we
instead assume they are connected in a binary tree structure with one machine
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Figure 2.7: H-tree arrangement of parallel machines. Given S machines, it has
area O(S · GW ) and edge O(
√
S · GW ).
designated as the root. The central processor queries this one for the final result.
If it has measured a correct key, it is returned, otherwise it asynchronously
queries two other machines which form the roots of equally-sized sub-trees, in
which the same process is repeated. For S machines this requires S requests,
but only logS must be sequential.
We assume that the spatial arrangement of the S machines is in a two-
dimensional plane in the form of an H-tree (see Figure 2.7). Assuming that in
each machine qubits are arranged on a square board, this results in a squared
arrangement with area O(S ·GW ) [Lei80]. Furthermore, it can be assumed that
communication between machines is via classical channels with very small signal
propagation times. The total distance any signal must travel is proportional to
the square root of the size of this tree, i.e.
√
S. Thus, the total time to recover
the final key is O(logS) + cS
√
SGW cycles, where cS ∼ depth√GW ∼
depth/time
length/time is a
constant to account for the ratio between quantum gate application times and
classical signal propagation speed, as to keep our unit of measure of computa-
tion time in terms of quantum gate cycles. For large S, the O(logS) term is
negligible, and therefore we ignore it.
We assume that cS  1, meaning that these classical channels can propagate
a signal across a qubit-sized distance much faster than we can apply a gate
to that qubit. This means the depth of each Grover search will dwarf the
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communication costs so long as
cS
√










Assuming equalities in place of ≤ and letting x = D = cs
√
SGW , the total cost
of the attack in terms of depth when including communication in our estimate
would become 2x. Replacing S with λ2 S for some factor λ2 would then result




x. It is easy to verify that the minimum of





gives the minimum possible depth












Unless we can construct a three-dimensional layout12, we cannot solve the
search problem with Grover’s algorithm in depth less than (2.11). Furthermore,
this requires using Θ(2k/2/cS) quantum computers. Using the values for GD
and GW listed in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 for the oracles we will design in the next









S , respectively. For LowMC-128, 192, and










2.4 A quantum circuit for AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [DR99, DR01] is a block cipher
standardized by NIST in 2001. Using the notation from the original submis-
sion [DR99], AES is composed of an S-box, a Round function (with subroutines
ByteSub, ShiftRow, MixColumn, AddRoundKey; with the last round slightly
differing from the others), and a KeyExpansion function (with subroutines Sub-
Byte, RotByte). The pseudo-code from [DR99, §4.4] is reported in simplified
fashion in Algorithm 4.
We note that the FIPS specification for AES [DR01] renamed some of the
subroutines from [DR99]. For reference, these are ByteSub to SubBytes,
12A truly three-dimensional layout seems unlikely, though an adversary with the resources
to build 264 quantum computers may also be able to launch them into orbit and assemble
them into a sphere.
13In order to provide a strict lower bound, we use numbers from the shallowest oracles,
and assume r = 1.
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ShiftRow to ShiftRows, and MixColumn to MixColumns in the Round function,
and SubByte to SubWord and RotByte to RotWord in the KeyExpansion
function. In this chapter, we keep using the names from [DR99] as we used
at the time of publication of this chapter as [JNRV20], in order to keep our





2 ek ← KeyExpansion(k)
3 s← AddRoundKey(s, k)
4 for i← 1 to total rounds− 1 do
5 s← Round(s, ek)
6 c← FinalRound(s, ek)
7 return c
Algorithm 4: AES.
Three different instances of AES have been standardized, for key lengths of
128, 192 and 256 bits. Grassl et al. [GLRS16] describe a quantum circuit im-
plementation of the S-box and other components, resulting in a full description
of all three instances of AES (but no testable code has been released). They
take care to reduce the number of auxiliary qubits required, i.e. reducing the
circuit width as much as possible. The recent improvements by Langenberg et
al. [LPS20] build on the work by Grassl et al. with similar objectives.
In this section, we describe our implementation of AES in the quantum pro-
gramming language Q# [SGT+18]. Some of the components are taken from
the description in [GLRS16], while others are implemented independently, or
ported from other sources. We take the circuit description from [GLRS16] as
the basis for our work and compare to the results in [LPS20]. In general, we
aim at reducing the depth of the AES circuit, while limitations on width are
less important. Width restrictions are not explicitly considered by the NIST
call for proposals [Nat16, § 4.A.5].
The internal state of AES contains 128 bits, arranged in four 32-bit (or 4-byte)
words. In the rest of this section, when referring to a “word”, we intend a
4-byte word. In all tables below, we denote by #CNOT, the number of CNOT
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gates, by #1qCliff the number of 1-qubit Clifford gates, by #T the number
of T gates, by #M the number of measurement operations, by D the circuit
depth when considering all gates, by T -D the circuit depth when considering
only T gates and by W the maximum number of qubits used.
2.4.1 S-box, ByteSub and SubByte
The AES S-box is an invertible non-linear transformation on a byte, that
interprets the input as an element of F256, inverts it (mapping 0 to 0), and
applies an affine transformation over F2 to the inverted output. The S-box is
the only source of T gates in a quantum circuit for AES. On classical hardware,
it can be implemented easily using a lookup-table. Yet, on a quantum computer,
this is not efficient [BGB+18, LKS18, Gid19]. Alternatively, the inversion can
be computed either by using some variant of Euclid’s algorithm (taking care of
the special case of 0), or by applying Lagrange’s theorem and raising the input
to the (|F×256|−1)-th power (i.e. the 254-th power), which incidentally also takes
care of the 0 input. Grassl et al. [GLRS16] suggest an Itoh-Tsujii inversion
algorithm [IT88], following [ARS13], and compute all required multiplications
over F2[x]/(x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1). This idea had already been extensively
explored in the vast14 literature on hardware design for AES, and requires
a different construction of F256 to be most effective. Following this lead, we
ported the S-box circuit by Boyar and Peralta from [BP12] to Q#. The
specified linear program combining AND and XOR operations can be easily
expressed as a sequence of equivalent quantum AND and CNOT operations (see
Section 2.3.2). We present cost estimates for the AES S-box in Table 2.1. We
compare our port of [BP12] to our own Q# implementation of the S-box circuits
from [GLRS16] and [LPS20]. ByteSub is a state-wide parallel application of
the S-box, requiring new output auxiliary qubits to store the result, while
SubByte is a similar word-wide application of the S-box.
Remark 14. Langenberg et al. [LPS20] independently introduced a new AES
quantum circuit design using the S-box circuit proposed in [BP10]. They also
present a ProjectQ [SHT18] implementation of the S-box, albeit without unit
14E.g. see [Rij00, SMTM01, BP10, BP+19, JKL10, NNT+10, UHS+15, RTA18, RMTA18,
WSH+19].
86
2.4 A quantum circuit for AES
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W
[GLRS16] S-box 8683 1028 3584 0 217 1692 44
[BP10] S-box 810 248 164 41 35 511 41
[BP12] S-box 660 196 136 34 6 100 137
Table 2.1: Comparison of our reconstruction of the original [GLRS16] S-box
circuit with the one from [BP10] as used in [LPS20] and the one in this work
based on [BP12]. In our implementation of [BP10] from [LPS20], we replace
CCNOT gates with AND gates to allow a fairer comparison.
tests. We ported their source code to Q#, tested and costed it. For a fairer
comparison, we replaced their CCNOT gates with the AND gate design that
our circuits use. Cost estimates can be found in Table 2.1. Overall, the [BP12]
S-box leads to a more cost effective circuit for our purposes in both the G-cost
and DW -cost metrics, and hence we did not proceed further in our analysis
of costs using the [BP10] design. Note that the results obtained here differ
from the ones presented in [LPS20, §3.2]. This is due to the difference in
counting gates and depth. While [LPS20] counts Toffoli gates, the Q# resource
estimator costs at a lower level of T gates and also counts all gates needed to
implement a Toffoli gate.
2.4.2 ShiftRow and RotByte
ShiftRow is a permutation on the full 128-bit AES state, happening across
its four words [DR99, §4.2.2]. As a permutation of qubits, it can be entirely
encoded as rewiring. As in [GLRS16], we consider rewiring as free and do not
include it in our cost estimates. Similarly, RotByte is a circular left shift of a
word by 8 bits, and can be implemented by appropriate rewiring.
2.4.3 MixColumn
The operation MixColumn interprets each word in the state as a polynomial
in F256[x]/(x4 + 1). Each word is multiplied by a fixed polynomial c(x) [DR99,
§ 4.2.3]. Since the latter is coprime to x4 + 1, this operation can be seen as an
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operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W
In-place MixColumn 1108 0 0 0 0 111 128
[Max19] MixColumn 1248 0 0 0 0 22 318
Table 2.2: Comparison of an in-place implementation of MixColumn (via PLU
decomposition) versus the recent shallow out-of-place design in [Max19].
invertible linear transformation, and hence can be implemented in place by a
PLU decomposition of a matrix in F32×322 . To simplify this tedious operation,
we use SageMath [S+17] code that performs the PLU decomposition, and
outputs equivalent Q# code. Note that Grassl et al. [GLRS16] describe the
same technique, while achieving a significantly smaller design than the one we
obtain (ref. Table 2.2), but we were not able to reproduce their results. However,
highly optimized, shallower circuits have been proposed in the hardware design
literature, such as [JMPS17, KLSW17, BFI19, EJMY19, TP19]. Hence, we
also chose to use a recent design by Maximov [Max19]. Both circuits are costed
independently in Table 2.2. Maximov’s circuit has a much lower depth, but it
only reduces the total depth, does not reduce the T -depth (which is already
0) and comes at the cost of an increased width. Our estimates show that
without a depth restriction, it seems advantageous to use the in-place version
to minimize both G-cost and DW -cost metrics, while for a depth restricted
setting, Maximov’s circuit seems better due to the square in the depth term in
Equation (2.10).
2.4.4 AddRoundKey
AddRoundKey performs a bitwise XOR of a round key to the internal AES
state and can be realized with a parallel application of 128 CNOT gates,
controlled on the round key qubits and targeted on the state qubits. Grassl et
al. [GLRS16] and Langenberg et al. [LPS20] use the same approach.
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2.4.5 KeyExpansion
Key expansion is one of the two functions in AES using S-boxes, and hence is
a source of T gates. Therefore, it might have a strong impact on the overall
efficiency of the circuit. A simple implementation of KeyExpansion would
allocate enough auxiliary qubits to store the full expanded key, including all
round keys. We call this strategy naive unrolling. This is easy to implement
with relatively low depth, but uses more qubits than necessary. The authors
of [GLRS16] amortize this width cost by caching only those key bytes that
require S-box evaluations. Instead, we minimize width by not requiring auxiliary
qubits at all (other than those used internally by the S-box). At the same time,
we reduce the depth in comparison with naive unrolling.
We now describe the design we opt for, which we call in-place KeyExpansion.
Let |k〉0 denote the AES key consisting of Nk ∈ {4, 6, 8} words and let |k〉i be
the i-th set of Nk consecutive round key words. The first such block |k〉1 can be
computed in-place as shown in Figure 2.8. The depicted circuits produce the
i-th set of Nk round key words from the (i−1)-th set. Note that for AES-128
these sets correspond to the actual round keys as the key size is equal to the
block size, while for AES-192 and AES-256 each |k〉i contains more words than
needed for a round key. Let KE denote the operation mapping |k〉i−1 7→ |k〉i.
We write KElj to denote the part of the operation KE that produces the words
j, . . . , l of the new set. KElj can be used as part of the round strategy that we
will describe in Section 2.4.6, to only compute as many words of the round key
as necessary at any given time, resulting in an overall narrower and shallower
circuit.
Remark 15. In addition to improving the S-box circuit over [GLRS16], Lan-
genberg et al. [LPS20, §4] demonstrate significant savings by reducing the
number of qubits and the depth of key expansion. This is achieved by an
improved scheduling of key expansion during AES encryption, namely by com-
puting round key words only at the time they are required and uncomputing
them early. While their method is based on the one in [GLRS16] using auxiliary
qubits for the round keys, the approach we use works in place and reduces width
and depth at the same time.
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(c) AES-256 in-place key expansion step producing the i-th set of 8 round key words.
Figure 2.8: In-place AES key expansion for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256,
deriving the i-th set of Nk round key words from the (i− 1)-th set. Each |kj〉i
represents the j-th word of |k〉i. SubByte takes the input state on the top
wire, and returns the output on the bottom wire, while l SubByte takes inputs
on the bottom wire, and returns outputs on the top. Dashed lines indicate
wires that are not used in the l SubByte operation. RC is the round constant
addition (labelled Rcon in [DR99, DR01]), implemented by applying X gates
as appropriate.
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operation KE #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W
AES-128 in-place 291420 83656 54400 13600 120 2827 1785
AES-192 in-place 328490 92916 60928 15232 120 2976 2105
AES-256 in-place 403040 115102 75072 18768 126 3356 2425
AES-128 naive 293694 83084 54400 13600 132 2986 3065
AES-192 naive 331448 92944 60928 15232 132 3133 3577
AES-256 naive 406304 114974 75072 18768 138 3384 4089
Table 2.3: Size comparison for AES quantum circuits using in-place KeyEx-
pansion vs naive unrolling. In both cases, an “in-place” MixColumn circuit
is used. We notice that the difference in width between equivalent circuits
corresponds to 4 · 32 · (Nr + 1)− 32 ·Nk qubits, where Nr (resp. Nk) is the
number of AES rounds (resp. words in the AES key), see [DR99].
In-place KeyExpansion vs. naive unrolling. While in-place KeyExpan-
sion clearly saves width by not requiring auxiliary qubits for the expansion, it
may look as going against our design choice of minimizing depth. In particular,
one may think that a naive design where a register of enough auxiliary qubits
is allocated such that the whole key expansion can be performed before any
rounds are run could save in depth, given that it does not need to handle
any particular previous state on the qubits. In Table 2.3, we report numbers
comparing the sizes of our AES circuits, with the only difference being the naive
vs the in-place designs for KeyExpansion, showing that the latter is shallower
(and of course narrower). The reason for this is that when using in-place Key
expansion, we are able to perform the gates for the KE operations in parallel
to the gates used in the round circuit. In particular, the S-box computations
required to expand the key can be run in parallel to those executed on the
state by ByteSub.
2.4.6 Round, FinalRound and full AES
To encrypt a message block using AES-128 (resp. -192, -256), we initially XOR
the input message with the first 4 words of the key, and then execute 10 (resp.
12, 14) rounds consisting of ByteSub, ShiftRow, MixColumn (except in the
final round) and AddRoundKey.
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The quantum circuits for AES we propose follow the same blueprint with the
exception that key expansion is interleaved with the algorithm in such a way
that the operations KElj only produce the key words that are immediately
required. The resulting circuits are shown in Figures 2.9 and 2.10. For
formatting reasons, we omit the repeating round pattern, and only represent a
subset of the full set of qubits used. In AES-128, each round is identical until
round 9. In AES-192 rounds 5, 8 and 11 use the same KE call and order as
round 2; rounds 6 and 9 do as round 3; rounds 7 and 10 do as round 4. In
AES-256, rounds 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 (resp. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13) use the same KE call and
order as round 2 (resp. 3). Cost estimates for the resulting AES encryption
circuits are in Table 2.4. In contrast to [GLRS16] and [LPS20], we aim to
reduce circuit depth, hence uncomputing of rounds is delayed until the output
ciphertext is produced. For easier testability and modularity, the Round circuit
is divided into two parts: a ForwardRound operator that computes the output
state but does not clean auxiliary qubits, and its adjoint. For unit-testing
Round in isolation, we compose ForwardRound with its adjoint operator. For
testing AES, we first run all ForwardRound instances without auxiliary qubit
cleaning, resulting in a similar ForwardAES operator, copy out the ciphertext,
and then undo the ForwardAES operation.
Table 2.4 presents circuit size results for the AES circuit for both versions of
MixColumn, the in-place implementation using a PLU decomposition as well as
Maximov’s out-of-place but lower depth circuit. We use both because each has
advantages for different applications. The full depth corresponds to GD as in
Section 2.3.6 and Section 2.2.3, while width corresponds to GW . While for AES-
128 and AES-192, GDGW is smaller for the in-place implementation, G
2
DGW
is smaller for Maximov’s circuit. Hence, Section 2.2.3 indicates Maximov’s
circuit gives a lower DW -cost under a depth restriction. If there is no depth
restriction or if we only consider T -depth rather than depth, the in-place design
has a lower DW -cost.
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2.4 A quantum circuit for AES
operation MC #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W
AES-128 in-place 291420 83656 54400 13600 120 2827 1785
AES-192 in-place 328490 92916 60928 15232 120 2976 2105
AES-256 in-place 403040 115102 75072 18768 126 3356 2425
AES-128 [Max19] 293716 83208 54400 13600 120 2085 2937
AES-192 [Max19] 331462 92700 60928 15232 120 1878 3513
AES-256 [Max19] 406638 115018 75072 18768 126 1954 4089
Table 2.4: Circuit size estimates for the AES operator using the [BP12] S-box,
for MixColumn design (“MC”) either in-place or out-of-place [Max19]. The
apparently inconsistent T -depth is discussed in § 2.4.7.
2.4.7 T -depth
Every round of AES (as implemented in Figures 2.9 and 2.10) computes at
least one layer of S-boxes as part of ByteSub, which must later be uncomputed.
We would thus expect the T -depth of n rounds of AES to be 2n times the
T -depth of the S-box. Instead, Table 2.4 shows smaller depths. We find
this effect when using either the AND circuit or the unit-testable CCNOT
implementation. To test if this is a bug, we used a placeholder S-box circuit
which has an arbitrary T -depth d for which the compiler cannot parallelise
uses of the T gate (see Figure 2.11 for the design). This “dummy” AES
design shows the expected T -depth of 2n · d. Thus we believe the Q# compiler
found a non-trivial parallelisation between components of the S-box and the
surrounding circuit. This provides a strong case for full explicit implementations
of quantum cryptanalytic algorithms in Q# or other languages that allow
automatic resource estimates and optimizations; in our case the T -depth of
AES-256 is 25% less than naively expected. Unfortunately, Q# cannot yet
generate full circuit diagrams for depth-optimized circuits, so we do not know
exactly where the parallelisation takes place15.
15https://github.com/microsoft/Quantum/issues/462.
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Figure 2.11: Dummy S-box design, that tries to forcefully avoid non-parallel
calls to the S-box to be partially executed at the same time.
2.5 A quantum circuit for LowMC
LowMC [ARS+15, ARS+16] is a family of block ciphers aiming for hav-
ing circuits with low multiplicative complexity. Originally designed to re-
duce the high cost of binary multiplication in the MPC and FHE scenarios,
it has been adopted as a fundamental component by the Picnic signature
scheme [CDG+17, ZCD+17]) proposed for standardisation as part of the NIST
process for standardizing post-quantum cryptography.
To achieve low multiplicative complexity, LowMC uses an S-box layer of
AND-depth 1, which contains a user-defined number of parallel 3-bit S-box
computations. In general, any instantiation of LowMC comprises a specific
number of rounds. Each round calls an S-box layer, an affine transformation,
and a round key addition. Key-scheduling can either be precomputed or
computed on the fly. We give in Algorithm 5 a pseudo-code description of the
LowMC encryption algorithm.
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2 rk0 ← KeyExpansion(k, 0)
3 s← KeyAddition(s, rk0)
4 for i← 1 to total rounds do
5 s← S-boxLayer(s)
6 s← AffineLayer(s)
7 rki ← KeyExpansion(k, i)




In this work, we study the original LowMC design. This results in a sub-
optimal circuit, which can clearly be improved by porting the more recent
design from [DKP+19] instead. Even for the original LowMC description, our
work shows that the overhead from the cost of the Grover oracle is very small,
in particular under the T -depth metric. Since LowMC could be standardized
as a component of Picnic, we deem it appropriate to point out the differences
in Grover oracle cost between different block ciphers and that generalization
from AES requires caution.
In this section we describe our Q# implementation of the LowMC instances
used as part of Picnic. In particular, Picnic proposes three parameter sets, with
(key size, block size, rounds) ∈ {(128, 128, 20), (192, 192, 30), (256, 256, 38)}, all
with 10 parallel S-boxes per substitution layer.
2.5.1 S-box and S-boxLayer
The LowMC S-box can be naturally implemented using Toffoli (CCNOT) gates.
In particular, a simple in-place implementation with depth 5 (T -depth 3) is
shown in Figure 2.12, alongside a T -depth 1 out-of-place circuit, both of which
were produced manually. Costs for both circuits can be found in Table 2.5.
We use the CCNOT implementation with no measurements from [Sel13]. For
LowMC inside of Picnic, the full S-boxLayer consists of 10 parallel S-boxes run
on the 30 low order bits of the state.
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(b) LowMC T -depth 1 S-box.
Figure 2.12: Alternative quantum circuit designs for the LowMC S-box. The
in-place design requires auxiliary qubits as part of the concrete CCNOT
implementation.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W
In-place S-box 50 6 21 0 3 23 7
Shallow S-box 60 6 21 0 1 11 13
Table 2.5: Cost estimates for a single LowMC S-box circuit, following the two
designs proposed in Figure 2.12. We note that Figure 2.12 does not display
the concrete implementation of CCNOT.
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operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W
AffineLayer L1 R1 8093 60 0 0 0 2365 128
AffineLayer L3 R1 18080 90 0 0 0 5301 192
AffineLayer L5 R1 32714 137 0 0 0 8603 256
Table 2.6: Costs for in-place circuits implementing the first round (R1)
AffineLayer transformation for the three instantiations of LowMC used in
Picnic.
2.5.2 LinearLayer, ConstantAddition and AffineLayer
AffineLayer is an affine transformation applied to the state at every round.
It consists of a matrix multiplication (LinearLayer) and the addition of a
constant vector (ConstantAddition). Both matrix and vector are different for
every round and are predefined constants that are populated pseudo-randomly.
ConstantAddition is implemented by applying X gates for entries of the vector
equal to 1. In Picnic, for every round and every parameter set, all LinearLayer
matrices are invertible (due to LowMC’s specification requirements), and hence
we use a PLU decomposition for matrix multiplication (Section 2.3.5). Cost
estimates for the first round affine transformation in LowMC as used in Picnic
are shown in Table 2.6.
2.5.3 KeyExpansion and KeyAddition
To generate the round keys rki, in each round i the LowMC key k is multiplied
by a different key derivation pseudo-random matrix KMi. For Picnic, each
KMi is invertible, so we compute rki from rki−1 as rki = KMi ·KM−1i−1 · rki−1.
We compute this in-place using a PLU decomposition of KMi ·KM−1i−1. This
saves matrix multiplications and qubits compared to computing rki directly
from k. We call this operation KeyExpansion. KeyAddition is equivalent to
AddRoundKey in AES, and is implemented the same way. Cost estimates for
the first round key expansion in LowMC as used in Picnic can be found in
Table 2.7.
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operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W
KeyExp. L1 R1 8104 0 0 0 0 2438 128
KeyExp. L3 R1 18242 0 0 0 0 4896 192
KeyExp. L5 R1 32525 0 0 0 0 9358 256
Table 2.7: Costs for in-place circuits implementing the first round (R1) Key-
Expansion (KeyExp.) operation for the three instantiations of LowMC used in
Picnic.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W
LowMC L1 689944 4932 8400 0 40 98699 991
LowMC L3 2271870 9398 12600 0 60 319317 1483
LowMC L5 5070324 14274 15960 0 76 693471 1915
Table 2.8: Costs for the full encryption circuit for LowMC as used in Picnic.
2.5.4 Round function and full LowMC
The LowMC round function sequentially applies S-boxLayer, AffineLayer and
KeyAddition to the state. Our implementation also runs KeyExpansion before
AffineLayer. For a full LowMC encryption, we first add the LowMC key k
to the message to produce the initial state, then run the specified number
of rounds on it. Costs of the resulting encryption circuits are reported in
Table 2.8.
Remark 16. Contrary to what was noticed in the case of AES in Section 2.4.7,
the T -depth reported in Table 2.8 is proportional to the number of rounds used
in the LowMC instances implemented. This may be due to the simpler S-box
and round structure in LowMC being less amenable to compiler optimizations.
2.6 Grover oracles and resource estimates for key search
Equipped with Q# implementations of the AES and LowMC encryption circuits,
this section describes the implementation of full Grover oracles for both block
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Figure 2.13: Grover oracle construction from AES using two message-ciphertext
pairs. FwAES represents the ForwardAES operator described in § 2.4.6. The
middle operator “=” compares the output of AES with the provided ciphertexts
and flips the target qubit if they are equal.
ciphers. Eventually, based on the cost estimates obtained automatically from
the Q# implementations of the oracles, we provide quantum resource estimates
for full key search attacks via Grover’s algorithm. Beyond comparing to
previous work, our emphasis is on evaluating algorithms that respect a total
depth limit, for which we consider NIST’s values for MAXDEPTH from [Nat16].
This means we must parallelise. We use inner parallelisation via splitting up
the search space, as described in Section 2.2.3.
2.6.1 Grover oracles
As discussed in Section 2.2.2 and Section 2.2.3, we must determine the param-
eter r, the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs that are required for a
successful key-recovery attack. The Grover oracle encrypts r plaintext blocks
under the same candidate key and computes a Boolean value that encodes
whether all r resulting ciphertext blocks match the given values. A circuit for
the block cipher allows us to build an oracle for any r by simply fanning out the
key qubits to the r instances and running the r block cipher circuits in parallel.
Then a comparison operation with the classical ciphertexts conditionally flips
the result qubit and the r encryptions are uncomputed. Figure 2.13 shows
the construction for AES and r = 2, using the ForwardAES operation from
Section 2.4.6.
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The required number of plaintext-ciphertext blocks. In the case of
Grover key search with no constraint on circuit depth, the explicit computation
of the probabilities in Equation (2.1) shows that using r = 2 (resp. 2, 3)
for AES-128 (resp. -192, -256) guarantees a unique key with overwhelming
probability. The probabilities that there are no spurious keys are 1− ε, where
ε < 2−128, 2−64, and 2−128, respectively. Grassl et al. [GLRS16, § 3.1] used
r = 3, r = 4 and r = 5, respectively. Hence, their values are too large and the
Grover oracle can work correctly with fewer full AES evaluations.
If one is content with a success probability lower than 1, it suffices to use
r = dk/ne blocks of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In this case, it is enough to use
r = 1, 2, and 3 for AES-128, -192, -256, respectively. Langenberg et al. [LPS20]
also propose these values. As an example, if we use r = 1 for AES-128, the
probability of not having spurious keys is 1/e ≈ 0.368, which could be a high
enough chance for a successful attack in certain scenarios, e.g., when there is
a strict limit on the width of the attack circuit. Furthermore, when a large
number of parallel machines are used in an instance of the attack, as discussed
in Section 2.2.3, even the value r = 1 can be enough in order to guarantee with
high probability that the relevant subset of the key space contains the correct
key as a unique solution.
The LowMC parameter sets we consider here all have k = n. Therefore, r = 2
plaintext-ciphertext pairs are enough for all three sets (k ∈ {128, 192, 256}).
Then, the probability that the key is unique is 1− ε, where ε < 2−k, i.e. this
probability is negligibly close to 1. With high parallelisation, r = 1 is sufficient
for a success probability very close to 1.
Grover oracle cost for AES. Table 2.9 shows the resources needed for the
full AES Grover oracle for the relevant values of r ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Even without
parallelisation, more than 2 pairs are never required for AES-128 and AES-192.
The same holds for 3 or more pairs for AES-256.
Grover oracle cost for LowMC. The resources required for our imple-
mentation of the full LowMC Grover oracle for the relevant values of r ∈ {1, 2}
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operation MC r #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W
AES-128 IP 1 292213 84228 54908 13727 121 2830 1665
AES-192 IP 1 329779 94480 61436 15359 120 2986 1985
AES-256 IP 1 403895 115798 75580 18895 126 3346 2305
AES-128 IP 2 584567 168216 109820 27455 121 2830 3329
AES-192 IP 2 659623 188312 122876 30719 120 2994 3969
AES-256 IP 2 808371 231724 151164 37791 126 3343 4609
AES-256 IP 3 1212773 347502 226748 56687 126 3348 6913
AES-128 M 1 294453 83668 54908 13727 121 2074 2817
AES-192 M 1 332765 94292 61436 15359 120 1884 3393
AES-256 M 1 407401 115530 75580 18895 126 1943 3969
AES-128 M 2 589879 168760 109820 27455 121 2093 5633
AES-192 M 2 665843 188432 122876 30719 120 1886 6785
AES-256 M 2 815639 231700 151164 37791 126 1953 7937
AES-256 M 3 1223521 347158 226748 56687 126 1957 11905
Table 2.9: Costs for the AES Grover oracle operator for r = 1, 2 and 3
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. “MC” is the MixColumn design, either in-place
(“IP”) or Maximov’s [Max19] (“M”).
are shown in Table 2.10. No setting needs more than r = 2 plaintext-ciphertext
pairs. Note that although the circuits in Section 2.5.4 for computing the
LowMC cipher do not use AND gates, the comparison operator used to con-
struct the Grover oracle does. This explains why in Table 2.10 a small number
of measurements is reported.
2.6.2 Cost estimates for block cipher key search
Using the cost estimates for the AES and LowMC Grover oracles from Sec-
tion 2.6.1, this section provides cost estimates for full key search attacks on
both block ciphers. For the sake of a direct comparison to the previous results
in [GLRS16] and [LPS20], we first ignore any limit on the depth and present
the same setting as in these works. Then, we provide cost estimates with
imposed depth limits and the consequential parallelisation requirements.
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operation r #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W
LowMC L1 1 690959 5948 8908 127 41 98705 1585
LowMC L3 1 2273401 10934 13364 191 61 319323 2377
LowMC L5 1 5072343 16209 16980 372 77 693477 3049
LowMC L1 2 1382179 11896 17820 255 41 98711 3169
LowMC L3 2 4547147 21780 26732 383 61 319329 4753
LowMC L5 2 10145281 32567 33964 783 77 693483 6097
Table 2.10: Cost estimates for the LowMC Grover oracle operator for r = 1
and 2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs. LowMC parameter sets are as used in Picnic.
Comparison to previous work. Table 2.11 shows cost estimates for a full






iterations of the AES Grover
operator without parallelisation. We only take into account the costs imposed
by the oracle operator Uf (in the notation of Section 1.5.1) and ignore the
costs of the operator Uψ = 2 |ψ〉〈ψ| − I. If the number of plaintext-ciphertext
pairs ensures a unique key, this number of operations maximizes the success
probability psucc to be negligibly close to 1. For smaller values of r such as
those proposed in [LPS20], the success probability is given by the probability
that the key is unique16.
The G-cost is the total number of gates, which is the sum of the first three
columns in the table, corresponding to the numbers of 1-qubit Clifford and
CNOT gates (both under “Clifford” to more easily compare with other works
which similarly collect both numbers), T gates and measurements. Table 2.11
shows that the G-cost is always better in our work when comparing values for
the same AES instance and the same value for r and the same holds for the
DW -cost.
Table 2.12 shows cost estimates for LowMC in the same setting. Despite
LowMC’s lower multiplicative complexity and a relatively lower number of
T gates, the large number of CNOT gates leads to overall higher G-cost and
DW -cost than AES, as we count all gates.
16Technically, this results in an approximate lower bound to the success probability.
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Grassl et al. [GLRS16]
log2 log2
scheme r #Clifford #T #M T -D D W G-cost DW -cost ≈ ps
AES-128 3 86.63 86.25 — 80.08 81.21 2 953 87.45 92.74 1
AES-192 4 119.23 118.86 — 112.28 113.41 4 449 120.06 125.53 1
AES-256 5 151.87 151.50 — 144.53 145.65 6 681 152.70 158.36 1
extrapolation of Grassl et al. [GLRS16] to lower r
AES-128 1 85.04 84.67 — 80.08 81.21 984 85.87 91.15 1/e
AES-192 2 118.23 117.86 — 112.28 113.41 2 224 119.06 124.53 1
AES-256 2 150.55 150.18 — 144.53 145.65 2 672 151.38 157.03 1/e
Langenberg et al. [LPS20]
AES-128 1 82.55 81.56 — 77.53 79.48 865 83.14 89.23 1/e
AES-192 2 115.77 114.75 — 109.33 111.30 1 793 116.34 122.11 1
AES-256 2 148.04 147.03 — 141.73 143.69 2 465 148.62 154.96 1/e
this work (with “in-place” MixColumn)
AES-128 1 82.17 79.40 77.40 70.57 75.12 1665 82.42 85.82 1/e
AES-128 2 83.17 80.40 78.40 70.57 75.12 3329 83.42 86.82 1
AES-192 2 115.35 112.56 110.56 102.56 107.20 3969 115.59 119.15 1
AES-256 2 147.64 144.86 142.86 134.63 139.36 4609 147.88 151.53 1/e
AES-256 3 148.22 145.44 143.44 134.63 139.36 6913 148.47 152.12 1
this work (with “in-place” MixColumn), using Grassl et al. [GLRS16] values for r
AES-128 3 83.76 80.98 78.98 70.57 75.12 4993 84.00 87.40 1
AES-192 4 116.35 113.56 111.56 102.56 107.20 7937 116.59 120.15 1
AES-256 5 148.96 146.18 144.18 134.63 139.36 11521 149.20 152.85 1






AES oracle iterations for attacks with high success probability, disregarding
MAXDEPTH. CNOT and 1-qubit Clifford gate counts are added to allow easier
comparison to the previous work from [GLRS16, LPS20], who report both
kinds of gates under “Clifford”. [LPS20] uses the S-box design from [BP10].
In this table we only use the in-place MixColumn design (see § 2.4.3). The
circuit sizes for AES-128 (resp. -192, -256) in the second block have been
extrapolated from Grassl et al. by multiplying gate counts and circuit width
by 1/3 (resp. 1/2, 2/5), while keeping depth values intact. ps reports the
approximate success probability.
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log2 log2
scheme r # CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -D D W G-cost DW -cost ≈ ps
LowMC L1 1 83.05 76.19 76.77 70.64 69.01 80.24 1585 83.08 90.87 1/e
LowMC L3 1 116.77 109.07 109.36 103.23 101.58 113.94 2377 116.78 125.15 1/e
LowMC L5 1 149.93 141.63 141.70 136.19 133.92 147.06 3049 149.93 158.63 1/e
LowMC L1 2 84.05 77.19 77.77 71.65 69.01 80.24 3169 84.08 91.87 1
LowMC L3 2 117.77 110.06 110.36 104.23 101.58 113.94 4753 117.78 126.15 1
LowMC L5 2 150.93 142.64 142.70 137.26 133.92 147.06 6097 150.93 159.63 1







iterations for attacks with high success probability, without a depth restriction.
Cost estimates under a depth limit. Tables 2.14 and 2.15 show cost
estimates for running Grover’s algorithm against AES and LowMC under a
given depth limit. This restriction is proposed in the NIST call for proposals for
standardisation of post-quantum cryptography [Nat16]. We use the notation
and example values for MAXDEPTH from the call. Imposing a depth limit
forces the parallelisation of Grover’s algorithm, which we assume uses inner
parallelisation, see Section 2.2.3.
The values in the table follow Section 2.3.6. Given cost estimates GG, GD and
GW for the oracle circuit, we determine the maximal number of Grover iterations
that can be carried out within the MAXDEPTH limit. Then the required number
S of parallel instances is computed via Equation (2.8) and the G-cost and
DW -cost follow from Equations (2.9) and (2.10). The number r of plaintext-
ciphertext pairs is the minimal value such that the probability SKP for having
spurious keys in the subset of the key space that holds the target key is less
than 2−20.
The impact of imposing a depth limit on the key search algorithm can directly
be seen by comparing, for example Table 2.14 with Table 2.11 in the case of
AES. Key search against AES-128 without depth limit has a G-cost of 283.42
gates and a DW -cost of 286.82 qubit-cycles. Now, setting MAXDEPTH = 240
increases both the G-cost and the DW -cost by a factor of roughly 234 to 2117.09
gates and 2120.80 qubit-cycles. For MAXDEPTH = 264, the increase is by a factor
of roughly 210. We note that for MAXDEPTH = 296, key search on AES-128 does
not require any parallelisation.
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Implications for post-quantum security categories. The security strength
categories 1, 3 and 5 in the NIST call for proposals [Nat16] are defined by the
resources needed for key search on AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256, respec-
tively. For a cryptographic scheme to satisfy the security requirement at a
given level, the best known attack must take at least as many resources as key
search against the corresponding AES instance.
As guidance, NIST provides a table with gate cost estimates via a formula
depending on the depth bound MAXDEPTH. This formula is deduced as follows:
assume that non-parallel Grover search requires a depth of D = x · MAXDEPTH
for some x ≥ 1 and that the circuit has G gates. Then, about x2 machines
are needed, each running for a fraction 1/x of the non-parallel runtime and
using roughly G/x gates, in order for the quantum attack to fit within the
depth budget given by MAXDEPTH while attaining the same attack success
probability. Hence, the total gate count for a parallelised Grover search is
roughly (G/x) · x2 = G ·D/MAXDEPTH. The cost formula reported in the NIST
table (also provided in Table 2.13 for reference) is deduced by using the values
for G-cost and depth D from Grassl et al. [GLRS16].
However, the above formula does not take into account that parallelisation
often allows us to reduce the number of required plaintext-ciphertext pairs,
resulting in a G-cost reduction for search in each parallel Grover instance by a
factor larger than x. Note also that [Nat16, Footnote 5] mentions that using
the formula for very small values of x (corresponding to very large values
of MAXDEPTH such that x = D/MAXDEPTH < 1 and that no parallelisation is
required) underestimates the quantum security of AES. This is the case for
AES-128 with MAXDEPTH = 296.
In Table 2.13, we compare NIST’s numbers with our gate counts for parallel
Grover search. Our results for each specific setting incorporate the reduction
of plaintext-ciphertext pairs through parallelisation, provide the correct cost if
parallelisation is not necessary and use improved circuit designs. The table
shows that for most situations, AES is less quantum secure than the NIST
estimates predict. For each category, we provide a very rough approximation
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formula that could be used to replace NIST’s formula. We observe a consistent
reduction in G-cost for quantum key search by 11-13 bits.
Since NIST clearly defines its security categories 1, 3 and 5 based on the
computational resources required for key search on AES, the explicit required
gate counts should be lowered to account for any cheaper attacks (in the same
computational model), such as our. This would mean that it is now easier
for submitters to claim equivalent security, with the exception of category 1
with MAXDEPTH = 296. A possible consequence of our work is that some of the
NIST submissions might profit from slightly tweaking certain parameter sets
to allow more efficient implementations, while at the same time satisfying the
(now weaker) requirements for their intended security category.
Remark 17. The G-cost results in Table 2.15 show that key recovery against
the LowMC instances we implemented requires at least as many gates as key
recovery against AES with the same key size. If NIST replaces its explicit gate
cost estimates for AES with the ones in this work, these LowMC instances meet
the post-quantum security requirements as defined in the NIST call [Nat16].
On the other hand, the same results show that they do not meet the explicit
gate count requirements for the original NIST security categories. For example,
LowMC L1 can be broken with an attack having G-cost 2123.32 when MAXDEPTH =
240, while the original bound in category 1 requires a scheme to not be broken
by an attack using less than 2130 gates. In all settings considered here, a
LowMC key can be found with a slightly smaller G-cost than NIST’s original
estimates for AES.17 The margin is relatively small. However, we cannot finalize
conclusions about the relative security of LowMC and AES until quantum
circuits for LowMC are optimized as much as the ones for AES.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter’s main focus was on exploring the setting proposed by NIST where
quantum attacks are limited by a total bound on the depth of quantum circuits.
17Except for the case of LowMC L1 in MAXDEPTH = 296, where the criterium for being in
Category 1 appears to be too relaxed due to NIST underestimating the security of AES-128.
108
2.7 Conclusions
NIST Security G-cost for MAXDEPTH (log2)
Category source 240 264 296 approximation
1 AES-128
[Nat16] 130.0 106.0 74.0 2170/MAXDEPTH
this work 117.1 93.1 ∗83.4 ≈ 2157/MAXDEPTH
3 AES-192
[Nat16] 193.0 169.0 137.0 2233/MAXDEPTH
this work 181.1 157.1 126.1 ≈ 2221/MAXDEPTH
5 AES-256
[Nat16] 258.0 234.0 202.0 2298/MAXDEPTH
this work 245.5 221.5 190.5 ≈ 2285/MAXDEPTH
Table 2.13: Comparison of our cost estimate results with NIST’s approximations
based on Grassl et al. [GLRS16]. The approximation column displays NIST’s
formula from [Nat16] and a rough approximation to replace the NIST formula
based on our results. Under MAXDEPTH = 296, AES-128 is a special case
as the attack does not require any parallelisation and the approximation
underestimates its cost.
Previous works [GLRS16, ASAM18, LPS20] aim to minimize cost under a
trade-off between circuit depth and a limit on the total number of qubits
needed, say a hypothetical bound MAXWIDTH. Depth limits are not discussed
when choosing a Grover strategy. Since it is somewhat unclear what exact
characteristics and features a future scalable quantum computer might have,
quantum circuit and Grover strategy optimization with the goal of minimizing
different cost metrics under different constraints than MAXDEPTH could be an
interesting avenue for future research.
We have studied key search problems for a single target. In classical cryptanaly-
sis, multi-target attacks have to be taken into account for assessing the security
of cryptographic systems. We leave the exploration of estimating the cost of
quantum multi-target attacks, for example using the algorithm by Banegas
and Bernstein [BB17] under MAXDEPTH (or alternative regimes), as future work.
Further, implementing quantum circuits for cryptanalysis in Q# or another
quantum programming language for concrete cost estimation could be worth-
while to increase confidence in the security of proposed post-quantum schemes.
For example, quantum lattice sieving and enumeration appear to be prime
candidates.
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log2
scheme MC r MD S SKP D W G-cost DW -cost
AES-128 M 1 40 69.34 −69.34 40.00 80.80 117.09 120.80
AES-192 M 1 40 133.06 −69.06 40.00 144.79 181.13 184.79
AES-256 M 1 40 197.15 −69.15 40.00 209.11 245.46 249.11
AES-128 M 1 64 21.34 −21.34 64.00 32.80 93.09 96.80
AES-192 M 1 64 85.06 −21.06 64.00 96.79 157.13 160.79
AES-256 M 1 64 149.15 −21.15 64.00 161.11 221.46 225.11
AES-128 IP 2 96 — — 75.12 11.70 83.42 86.82
AES-192 M 2 96 21.07 — 96.00 33.79 126.13 129.79
AES-256 M 2 96 85.17 −85.17 96.00 98.12 190.47 194.12
(a) The depth cost metric is the full depth D.
log2
scheme MC r MD S SKP T -D W G-cost T -DW -cost
AES-128 IP 1 40 61.14 −61.14 40.00 71.84 112.99 111.84
AES-192 IP 1 40 125.12 −61.12 40.00 136.07 177.14 176.07
AES-256 IP 1 40 189.26 −61.26 40.00 200.43 241.51 240.43
AES-128 IP 2 64 13.14 — 64.00 24.84 89.99 88.84
AES-192 IP 2 64 77.12 — 64.00 89.07 154.14 153.07
AES-256 IP 2 64 141.26 −141.26 64.00 153.43 218.51 217.43
AES-128 IP 2 96 — — 70.57 11.70 83.42 82.27
AES-192 IP 2 96 13.12 — 96.00 25.07 122.14 121.07
AES-256 IP 2 96 77.26 −77.26 96.00 89.43 186.51 185.43
(b) The depth cost metric is the T -depth T -D only.
Table 2.14: Cost estimates for parallel Grover key search against AES under
a depth limit MAXDEPTH with inner parallelisation (see § 2.2.3). MC is the
MixColumn circuit used (in-place or Maximov’s [Max19]), r is the number of
plaintext-ciphertext pairs used in the Grover oracle, MD is MAXDEPTH, S is the
number of subsets into which the key space is divided, SKP is the probability
that spurious keys are present in the subset holding the target key, W is the
qubit width of the full circuit, D the full depth, T -D the T -depth, DW -cost
uses the full depth and T -DW -cost the T -depth. After the Grover search is
completed, each of the S measured candidate keys is classically checked against




scheme r MD S SKP D W G-cost DW -cost
LowMC L1 1 40 80.48 −80.48 40.00 91.11 123.32 131.11
LowMC L3 1 40 147.87 −147.87 40.00 159.09 190.72 199.09
LowMC L5 1 40 214.11 −214.11 40.00 225.68 256.99 265.68
LowMC L1 1 64 32.48 −32.48 64.00 43.11 99.32 107.11
LowMC L3 1 64 99.87 −99.87 64.00 111.09 166.72 175.09
LowMC L5 1 64 166.11 −166.11 64.00 177.68 232.99 241.68
LowMC L1 2 96 — — 80.24 11.63 84.08 91.87
LowMC L3 1 96 35.87 −35.87 96.00 47.09 134.72 143.09
LowMC L5 1 96 102.11 −102.11 96.00 113.68 200.99 209.68
(a) The depth cost metric is the full depth D.
log2
scheme r MD S SKP T -D W G-cost T -DW -cost
LowMC L1 1 40 58.02 −58.02 40.00 68.65 112.09 108.65
LowMC L3 1 40 123.16 −123.16 40.00 134.38 178.37 174.38
LowMC L5 1 40 187.84 −187.84 40.00 199.41 243.85 239.41
LowMC L1 2 64 10.02 — 64.00 21.65 89.09 85.65
LowMC L3 1 64 75.16 −75.16 64.00 86.38 154.37 150.38
LowMC L5 1 64 139.84 −139.84 64.00 151.41 219.85 215.41
LowMC L1 2 96 — — 69.01 11.63 84.08 80.64
LowMC L3 2 96 11.16 — 96.00 23.38 123.37 119.38
LowMC L5 1 96 75.84 −75.84 96.00 87.41 187.85 183.41
(b) The depth cost metric is the T -depth T -D only.
Table 2.15: Cost estimates for parallel Grover key search against LowMC under
a depth limit MAXDEPTH with inner parallelisation (see § 2.2.3). r is the number
of plaintext-ciphertext pairs used in the Grover oracle, MD is MAXDEPTH, S is the
number of subsets into which the key space is divided, SKP is the probability
that spurious keys are present in the subset holding the target key, W is the
qubit width of the full circuit, D the full depth, T -D the T -depth, DW -cost
uses the full depth and T -DW -cost the T -depth. After the Grover search is
completed, each of the S measured candidate keys is classically checked against
2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
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2.7.1 Developments since publication
Since the publication of this chapter as [JNRV20], a few papers covering related
topics have been made available that we would like to mention here. In the
space of Grover cost estimates, some works have used a similar methodology
to ours to estimate attacks against other symmetric primitives. In particular,
[AMM20b, CS20, Sch20, AMM+20c] looked at the SIMON, ARIA, Gimli and
FSR-based constructions respectively, providing implementations and cost esti-
mates in Qiskit [AAA+19], while [JCKS20, JCK+20] looked at SPECK and at
various Korean block ciphers respectively, with implementations and estimates
using ProjectQ [SHT18]. [LY20, AMM20a] combined a similar methodology
to compare Grover key search on SIMON and SPECK to quantum-aided
differential cryptanalysis (with the latter paper providing an implementation
in Qiskit). In the space of Grover search against AES specifically, [ZWS+20]
introduced a new S-box design requiring fewer qubits, [CLLc20] investigates
depth–width trade-offs for the S-box circuit, [DP21] implements the Search
With Two Oracles technique from [DP19] in Q#. [HJN+20, BJ20] focused on
Shor’s and Simon’s algorithms against elliptic curves and other symmetric prim-
itives respectively, while still providing Q# implementations of the attacked
primitives. Finally, [AGPS20] designed Nearest-Neighbour Search quantum
circuits to investigate the crossover point between classical and quantum lattice
sieving in the depth-unbounded setting.
Acknowledgements. We thank Chris Granade and Bettina Heim for their
help with the Q# language and compiler, Mathias Soeken and Thomas Häner
for general discussions on optimizing quantum circuits and Q#, Mathias Soeken
for providing the quantum AND gate circuit we use, and Daniel Kales and
Greg Zaverucha for their input on Picnic and LowMC.
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Reducing the Learning with Errors problem (LWE) to the unique Shortest Vector
Problem (uSVP) and then applying lattice reduction is a commonly relied-upon
strategy for estimating the cost of solving LWE-based constructions. In the
literature, two different conditions are formulated under which this strategy
is successful. One going back to Gama & Nguyen’s work on predicting lattice
reduction (Eurocrypt 2008) and the other outlined by Alkim et al. (USENIX
2016). Since these two estimates predict significantly different costs for solving
LWE parameter sets from the literature, we revisit the uSVP strategy. We
present empirical evidence from lattice reduction experiments exhibiting a
behaviour in line with the latter estimate. However, we also observe that in
some situations lattice reduction behaves somewhat better than expected from
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Alkim et al.’s work and explain this behaviour under standard assumptions.
Finally, we show that the security estimates of some LWE-based constructions
from the literature need to be revised and give refined expected solving costs.
3.1 Motivation
The Learning with Errors problem (LWE) has attained a central role in cryp-
tography as a key hard problem for building quantum-safe cryptographic
constructions, from public key encryption [Reg05, LP11, ADPS16] to obfusca-
tion of some families of circuits [BVWW16].
Recalling from Section 1.4.2, LWE asks to recover a secret vector s ∈ Znq , given
a matrix A ∈ Zm×nq and a vector b ∈ Zmq such that As + e = b mod q for a
short error vector e ∈ Zmq sampled coordinate-wise from an error distribution
χ. The decision variant of LWE asks to distinguish between an LWE instance
(A,b) and uniformly random (A,b) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq . To assess the security
provided by a given set of parameters n, χ, q, two strategies are typically
considered: the dual strategy finds short vectors in the lattice
{
x ∈ Zmq | x A ≡ 0 mod q
}
,
i.e. it solves the Short Integer Solutions problem (SIS). Given such a short vector
v, we can decide if an instance is LWE by computing 〈v,b〉 = 〈v, e〉 mod q
which is short whenever v and e are sufficiently short [MR09]. This strategy
was revisited for small, sparse secret instances of LWE [Alb17]. The primal
strategy finds the closest vector to b in the integral column span of A mod
q [LP11], i.e. it solves the corresponding Bounded Distance Decoding problem
(BDD) directly. Writing [In|A′] for the reduced row echelon form of At ∈ Zn×mq
(with high probability and after appropriate permutation of columns), this task
can be reformulated as solving the unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP) in
the m+ 1 dimensional q-ary lattice
Λ = Zm+1 ·










by Kannan’s embedding [Kan87] with embedding coefficient c.1 Indeed,
BDD and uSVP are polynomial-time equivalent for small approximation fac-
tors [LM09]. The lattice Λ has volume c · qm−n and contains a vector of norm
√
‖e‖2 + c2 which is unusually short, i.e. the gap between the first and second
lattice minimum λ2(Λ)/λ1(Λ) is large.
Alternatively, if the secret vector s is also short, there is a second established
embedding reducing LWE to uSVP (cf. (3.7)). When the LWE instance under
consideration is in normal form, i.e. the secret s follows the noise distribution,
the geometries of the lattices in (3.1) and (3.7) are the same, which is why
without loss of generality we only consider (3.1) in this work save for Section 3.4.
To find short vectors, lattice reduction [LLL82, Sch87, GN08a, HPS11, CN11,
MW16] can be applied. Thus, to establish the cost of solving an LWE instance,
we may consider the cost of lattice reduction for solving uSVP.
Two conflicting estimates for the success of lattice reduction in solving uSVP
are available in the literature. The first is going back to [GN08b] and was
developed in [AFG14, APS15, Gö16, HKM17] for LWE. This estimate is
commonly relied upon by designers in the literature, e.g. [BG14a, CHK+17,
CKLS18, CLP17, ABB+17]. The second estimate was outlined in [ADPS16]
and is relied upon in [BCD+16, BDK+18]. We will use the shorthand 2008
estimate for the former and 2016 estimate for the latter. As illustrated in
Figure 3.1, the predicted costs under these two estimates differ greatly. For
example, considering n = 1024, q ≈ 215 and χ a discrete Gaussian with
standard deviation σ = 3.2, the former predicts a cost of ≈ 2355 operations,
whereas the latter predicts a cost of ≈ 2287 operations in the same cost model
for lattice reduction.2
1Alternatively, we can perform lattice reduction on the q-ary lattice spanned by At,
i.e. the lattice spanned by the first m rows of (3.1), followed by an enumeration to find the
closest (projected) lattice point to (the projection of) c [LP11, LN13].
2Assuming that an SVP oracle call in dimension β costs 20.292 β+16.4 [BDGL16, APS15],
where +16.4 takes the place of o(β) from the asymptotic formula and is based on experiments
in [Laa15].
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Figure 3.1: Required block size β according to the estimates given in [AFG14]
and [ADPS16] for modulus q = 215, standard deviation σ = 3.2 and increasing
n; for [AFG14] we set τ = 0.3 and c = 1. Lattice reduction runs in time 2Ω(β).
Contribution and chapter roadmap. Relying on progress made in pub-
licly available lattice reduction libraries [DT17, FPY17], we revisit the embed-
ding approach for solving LWE resp. BDD under some reasonable assumptions
about the LWE error distribution. In Section 3.2 we recall the two competing
estimates for the cost of such approach from the literature. Then, in Section 3.3,
we expand on the exposition from [ADPS16] followed by presenting the results
of running 23,000 core hours worth of lattice reduction experiments in medium
to larger block sizes β. Our results confirm that lattice reduction largely
follows the behaviour expected from the 2016 estimate [ADPS16]. However,
we also find that in our experiments the attack behaves somewhat better than
expected.3 In Section 3.3.3, we then explain the observed behaviour of the
BKZ algorithm under the Geometric Series Assumption (GSA) and under the
assumption that the unique shortest vector is distributed in a random direction
relative to the rest of the basis. Finally, using the 2016 estimate, in Section 3.4
we show that some proposed parameters from the literature need to be updated
to maintain the originally claimed level of security. In particular, we give
reduced costs for solving the LWE instances underlying TESLA [ABB+17] and
the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme in [BCIV17]. We also show
3We note that this deviation from the expectation has a negligible impact on security
estimates for cryptographic parameters.
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that under the revised, corrected estimate, the primal attack performs about
as well on SEAL v2.1 parameter sets as the dual attack from [Alb17].
All of our code and data can be found at github.com/fvirdia/agvw17-code-data.
3.2 Choosing BKZ block sizes
In this section we illustrate the two approaches used in the lattice literature to
estimate the cost of using BKZ (cf. Algorithm 3 in Section 1.4.1) to solve uSVP
over full-rank lattices of dimension d. The runtime of BKZ-β is dominated by
that of the SVP oracle subroutine OSVP, that repeatedly solves the Shortest
Vector Problem in β-dimensional projective sublattices. The SVP oracle is often
implemented using lattice point enumeration with preprocessing, which has
time complexity 2Θ(β log β) [HS07, GNR10, ABF+20], or lattice sieving, which
has time and memory complexity 2Θ(β) [AKS01, NV08, BDGL16]. Therefore,
to estimate the complexity of solving uSVP using lattice reduction, it is crucial
to estimate the smallest block size β sufficient to recover the unique shortest
vector v ∈ Λ.
3.2.1 2008 Estimate
In [GN08b], Gama and Nguyen present a systematic experimental investigation
into the behaviour of lattice reduction algorithms LLL, DEEP4 and BKZ.
In particular, they investigate the behaviour of these algorithms for solving
Hermite-SVP, approx-SVP and unique-SVP for various families of lattices.
For unique-SVP, the authors performed experiments in small block sizes on
two classes of semi-orthogonal lattices and on Lagarias-Odlyzko lattices [LO83],
which permit to estimate the gap λ2(Λ)/λ1(Λ) between the first and second
minimum of the lattice. For all three families, [GN08b] observed that LLL and
BKZ seem to recover a unique shortest vector with high probability whenever
λ2(Λ)/λ1(Λ) ≥ τδd−1, where τ < 1 is an empirically determined constant that
4That is, LLL with deep insertions [SE94].
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depends on the lattice family and algorithm used, and δ is the root-Hermite
factor of the algorithm over the lattice family.
In [AFG14] an experimental analysis of solving LWE based on the same
estimate was carried out for lattices of the form (3.1). As mentioned above,
this lattice contains an unusually short vector v = (e | c) of squared norm
λ1(Λ)
2 = ‖v‖2 = ‖e‖2 + c2. Thus, when c = ‖e‖ resp. c = 1 this implies
λ1(Λ) ≈
√
2mσ resp. λ1(Λ) ≈
√
mσ, with σ the standard deviation of ei
$←− χ.
The second minimum λ2(Λ) is assumed to correspond to the Gaussian Heuristic
for the lattice. Experiments in [AFG14] using LLL and BKZ (with block sizes
5 and 10) confirmed the 2008 estimate, providing constant values for τ for
lattices of the form (3.1), depending on the chosen algorithm, for a 10% success
rate. Overall, τ was found to lie between 0.3 and 0.4 when using BKZ.
Still focusing on LWE, in [APS15] a closed formula for the root-Hermite factor
δ required by an algorithm to solve LWE is given in function of n, σ, q, τ , which
implicitly assumes c = ‖e‖. In [Gö16] a bound for δ in the [GN08b] model
for the case of c = 1, which is usually used in practice, is given. In [HKM17],
a related closed formula is given, directly expressing the asymptotic running
time for solving LWE using this approach.
3.2.2 2016 Estimate
In [ADPS16], Alkim et al. outline an alternative estimate when using BKZ-β,
which predicts that e can be found if5
√
βσ ≤ δ2β−d−1 Vol(Λ(B))1/d, (3.2)
under the assumption that the Geometric Series Assumption holds (until a
projection of the unusually short vector is found). The brief justification for
this estimate given in [ADPS16] notes that this condition ensures that the
projection of e orthogonally to the first d − β basis vectors is shorter than
5In the published version of this chapter [AGVW17], the exponent of δ in (3.2) is reported
as 2β − d. This was obtained by assuming the “δn” definition of the root-Hermite factor
from [LP11]. Changing the definition to “δn−1” as argued in § 1.4.1, the 2β − d− 1 exponent
present in [ADPS16] follows. We have therefore amended this chapter to incorporate the
change.
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the expectation for ‖b∗d−β+1‖ under the GSA and thus would be found by
the SVP oracle when called on the last block of size β. Hence, for any β
satisfying (3.2), the actual behaviour would deviate from that predicted by the
GSA. The argument can be completed by appealing to the intuition that in
principle detecting this deviation would suffice for solving Decision-LWE. We
will see in Section 3.3.1 that this also results in a solution to uSVP and hence
Search-LWE.
To derive (3.2), we express their argument in general terms. Their approach
consists of finding the smallest β such that in the final full sized block starting




resulting in OSVP recovering the projection of v at index d−β+1. In [ADPS16],
the authors consider normal form LWE, and assume the secret distribution χ
to be centred around 0. Using Kannan’s embedding (3.1), the uSVP solution
will be an embedded vector v = (e | c) of dimension d = m+ 1 for which each
entry is drawn i.i.d. from a distribution of standard deviation σ and mean
µ = 0, with the addition of one final constant entry c, usually set to 1. The
squared norm ‖v‖2 may be modelled as a random variable following a scaled
chi-squared distribution σ2 · χ2d−1 with d− 1 degrees of freedom, plus a fixed
contribution from c, resulting in E(‖v‖2) = (d− 1)σ2 + c2, since χ is close
to a discrete Gaussian distribution (in their case, it is a centered binomial
distribution).






by using6 E(‖v‖) ≈ E(‖v‖2)1/2 ≈ σ
√
d and rescaling by
√
β/d to account for
the orthogonal projection from a d-dimensional vector space to a β-dimensional
subspace. To approximate the right hand side of (3.3), Alkim et al. make use
of the GSA. Assuming that BKZ-β returns a first basis vector of length `1(β)
and that it outputs a basis with GSA factor α(β), this becomes
∥∥b∗d−β+1
∥∥ ≈ α(β)d−β · `1(β),
6The error in this assumption tends to 0 as d → ∞, so we ignore it. The E(‖v‖) ≈
E(‖v‖2)1/2 approximation can be avoided altogether by working with squared norms.
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which using Lemma 7 and the definition of the root-Hermite factor δ, can be
estimated as
α(β)d−β · `1(β) = δ2β−2d · δd−1 Vol(Λ(B))1/d = δ2β−d−1 Vol(Λ(B))1/d.
Putting both approximations together, this results in condition (3.2), that β
must satisfy for solving uSVP using BKZ-β. We note that technically Alkim et
al. define δ directly using the formula that results from Lemma 9, rather than
as the (d−1)-th root of the Hermite factor. This does not affect our analysis,
since our definition of δ together with assuming that the GSA holds, implies
their definition of δ by using Lemma 9.
3.3 Solving uSVP
Given the significant differences in expected solving time under the two es-
timates, cf. Figure 3.1, and the progress made in publicly available lattice
reduction libraries enabling experiments in larger block sizes [DT17, FPY17],
we conduct a more detailed examination of BKZ’s behaviour on uSVP instances.
For this, we establish the behaviour we would expect during lattice reduc-
tion if the intuition from [ADPS16] is correct, which we then experimentally
investigate in Section 3.3.2. Overall, our experiments generally confirm the
correctness of the approach from [ADPS16]. However, BKZ behaves somewhat
better than expected, as we will explain in Section 3.3.3.
For the rest of this section, let v be a unique shortest vector in some lattice
Λ ⊂ Rd, i.e. in case of (3.1) we have v = (e | c) where we pick c = 1.
3.3.1 Prediction
Projected norm. In what follows, we assume the unique shortest vector v is
drawn from a spherical distribution or is at least “not too skewed” with respect
to the current basis. As a consequence, following [ADPS16], we assume that all





k/d ‖v‖. Note that this assumption can be dropped by adapting (3.2)
to ‖v‖ ≤ δ2β−d−1 Vol(Λ) 1d since ‖πd−β+1(v)‖ ≤ ‖v‖.
Finding a projection of the short vector. Assume that β is chosen
minimally such that (3.2) holds. When running BKZ-β the length of the Gram-
Schmidt basis vectors of the current basis converge to the lengths predicted
by the GSA. Therefore, at some point BKZ will find a basis B = {b1, . . . ,bd}
of Λ for which we can assume that the GSA holds with root Hermite factor
δ, that is ‖b∗i ‖ = αi−1‖b∗1‖ where δ = α−1/2 by Remark 8. Now, consider the
stage of BKZ where the SVP oracle is called on the last full projected block of
size β with respect to B. Note that the projection πd−β+1(v) of the shortest
vector is contained in the lattice









By (3.2), the projection πd−β+1(v) is in fact expected to be the shortest








‖v‖ ≤ αd−β · ‖b∗1‖ = δ−2(d−β) · δd−1Vol(Λ)
1
d .





into the basis B at position d − β + 1, as already outlined in [ADPS16]. In
other words, by finding ±πd−β+1(v), BKZ recovers the last β coefficients
νd−β+1, . . . , νd of v with respect to the basis B.
Finding the short vector. As hinted in Section 3.2.2, the above argument
can be extended to an argument for the full recovery of v. Consider the case
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that in some tour of BKZ-β, a projection of v was found at index d− β + 1.
Then in the following tour, by arguments analogous to the ones above, a
projection of v will likely be found at index d− 2β + 2, since now it holds that
πd−2β+2(v) ∈ Λ
(





Repeating this argument for smaller indices shows that after a few tours v
will be recovered. Potentially, once πd−β+1(v) is recovered by BKZ-β at index
d− β + 1, recovery of v could be obtained using BKZ-β′ with a smaller block
size β′  β using the same argument as above (since the basis is already BKZ-β
reduced), as to make this step into a significantly cheaper post-processing phase.
Furthermore, noting that BKZ calls LLL which in turn calls size-reduction,
i.e. Babai’s nearest plane [Bab86], at some index i > 1 size-reduction alone
will recover v from πi(v). In particular, it is well-known (eg. [DD18]) that
size-reduction (Algorithm 1) will succeed in recovering v whenever














The above discussion naturally suggests a strategy to verify the expected
behaviour. We have to verify that the projected norms ‖πi(v)‖ = ‖πi(e | 1)‖
do indeed behave as expected and that πd−β+1(v) is recovered by BKZ-β for
the minimal β ∈ satisfying (3.2). Finally, we have to measure when and how
v = (e | 1) is eventually recovered.
Thus, we ran lattice reduction on many lattices constructed from LWE instances
using Kannan’s embedding. In particular, we picked the entries of s and A
uniformly at random from Zq, the entries of e from a discrete Gaussian
distribution with standard deviation σ = 8/
√
2π, and we constructed our basis
as in (3.1) with embedding coefficient c = 1. For parameters (n, q, σ), we then
estimated the minimal pair (in lexicographical order) (β,m) to satisfy (3.2).
Implementation. To perform our experiments, we used SageMath 7.5.1 [S+17]
in combination with the fplll 5.1.0 [DT17] and fpylll 0.2.4dev [FPY17] li-
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braries. All experiments were run on a machine with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E5-2667 v2 @ 3.30GHz cores (“strombenzin”) resp. Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E5-2690 v4 @ 2.60GHz (“atomkohle”). Each instance was reduced on a single
core, with no parallelisation.
Our BKZ implementation inherits from the implementation in fplll and
fpylll of BKZ 2.0 [CN11, Che13] algorithm. As in BKZ 2.0, we restricted the
enumeration radius to be approximately the size of the Gaussian Heuristic for
the projected sublattice, apply recursive BKZ-β′ preprocessing with a block
size β′ < β, make use of extreme pruning [GNR10] and terminate the algorithm
when it stops making significant progress. We give simplified pseudo-code
of our implementation in Algorithm 6. We ran BKZ for at most 20 tours
using fplll’s default pruning and preprocessing strategies and, using fplll’s
default auto-abort strategy, terminated the algorithm whenever the slope of the
Gram-Schmidt vectors did not improve for five consecutive tours. Additionally,
we aborted if a vector of length ≈ ‖v‖ was found in the basis (after line 14 of
Algorithm 6).
Implementations of block-wise lattice reduction algorithms such as BKZ make
heavy use of LLL [LLL82] and size-reduction. This is to remove linear dependen-
cies introduced during the algorithm, to avoid numerical stability issues [PS08]
and to improve the performance of the algorithm by moving short vectors to
the front earlier. The main modification in our implementation is that calls
to LLL during preprocessing and post-processing are restricted to the current
block, not touching any other vector, to aid analysis. That is, in Algorithm 6,
LLL is called in lines 7 and 12 and we modified these LLL calls not to touch
any row with index smaller than κ, not even to perform size-reduction.
As a consequence, we only make use of vectors with index smaller than κ
in lines 3 and 14. Following the implementations in [DT17, FPY17], we
call size-reduction from index 1 to κ before (line 3) and after (line 14) the
innermost loop with calls to the SVP oracle. These calls do not appear in the
original description of BKZ. However, since the innermost loop re-randomises
the basis when using extreme pruning, the success condition of the original
BKZ algorithm needs to be altered. That is, the algorithm cannot break the
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Data: LLL-reduced lattice basis B
Data: block size β, preprocessing block size β′
1 repeat // tour
2 for κ← 1 to d do // stepκ
3 size-reduction from index 1 to κ (inclusive)
4 `← ‖b∗κ‖
// extreme pruning + recursive preprocessing
5 repeat until termination condition met
6 rerandomise πκ(bκ+1, . . . ,bκ+β−1)
7 LLL on πκ(bκ, . . . ,bκ+β−1)
8 BKZ-β′ on πκ(bκ, . . . ,bκ+β−1)
9 v← SVP on πκ(bκ, . . . ,bκ+β−1)
10 if v 6= ⊥ then
11 extend B by inserting v into B at index κ+ β
12 LLL on πκ(bκ, . . . ,bκ+β) to remove linear dependencies
13 drop row with all zero entries
14 size-reduction from index 1 to κ (inclusive)




19 if > for all κ then
20 return;
Algorithm 6: Simplified BKZ 2.0 Algorithm as used in this chapter’s
experiments, see § 3.3.2.
outer loop once it makes no more changes as originally specified. Instead,
the algorithm terminates if it does not find a shorter vector at any index κ.
Now, the calls to size-reduction ensure that the comparison at the beginning
and end of each step κ is meaningful even when the Gram-Schmidt vectors
are only updated lazily in the underlying implementation. That is, the calls
to size-reduction trigger an internal update of the underlying Gram-Schmidt
vectors and are hence implementation artefacts. The reader may think of these
size-reduction calls as explicating calls otherwise hidden behind calls to LLL
and we stress that our analysis applies to BKZ as commonly implemented, our
changes merely enable us to more easily predict and experimentally verify the
behaviour.
We note that the break condition for the innermost loop at line 5 depends
on the pruning parameters chosen, which control the success probability of
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enumeration. Since it does not play a material role in our analysis, we simply
state that some condition will lead to a termination of the innermost loop.
Finally, we recorded the following information. At the end of each step κ
during lattice reduction, we recorded the minimal index i such that πi(v) is in
spanR(b1, . . . ,bi) and whether ±v itself is in the basis. In particular, to find
the index i in the orthogonalised basis B∗ of πi(v) given v, we compute the
coefficients of v in basis B∗ (at the current step) and pick the first index i such
that all coefficients with larger indices are zero. Then, we have πi(bi) = λ ·πi(v)
for some λ ∈ R. From the algorithm, we expect to have found ±πi(bi) = πi(v)
and call i the index of the projection of v.
Results. In Figure 3.2, we plot the average norms of πi(v) against the
expectation
√





m · σ2 + 1, indicating that
√
d− i+ 1σ
is a close approximation of the expected lengths except perhaps for the last
few indices.


















Figure 3.2: Expected and average observed norms ‖πi(v)‖ for 16 bases (LLL-
reduced) and vectors v of dimension d = m+ 1 and volume qm−n with LWE
parameters n = 65,m = 182, q = 521 and standard deviation σ = 8/
√
2π.
Recall that, as illustrated in Figure 3.3, we expect to find the projection
πd−β+1(v) when (β, d) satisfy (3.2), eventually leading to a recovery of v
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GSA for ‖b∗i ‖
Average for ‖b∗i ‖
Expectation for ‖πi(v)‖
Figure 3.3: Expected and observed norms for lattices of dimension d = m+1 =
183 and volume qm−n after BKZ-β reduction for LWE parameters n = 65,m =
182, q = 521 and standard deviation σ = 8/
√
2π and β = 56 (minimal (β,m)
such that (3.2) holds). Average of Gram-Schmidt lengths is taken over 16
BKZ-β reduced bases of random q-ary lattices, i.e. without an unusually short
vector.
by, say, an extension of the argument for the recovery of πd−β+1(v). Our
experiments, summarised in Table 3.1, show a related, albeit not identical
behaviour. Defining a cut-off index coff = d− 0.9β + 1 and considering πκ(v)
for κ < coff, we observe that the BKZ algorithm typically first recovers πκ(v)
which, unlike what we predicted in Section 3.3.1, is immediately followed by
the recovery of v in the same step, as in without need to further tours or
calls to OSVP. In more detail, in Figure 3.4 we show the measured probability
distribution of the index κ such that v is recovered from πκ(v) in the same
step. Note that the mode of this distribution is smaller than d− β + 1. We
explain this bias in Section 3.3.3.
The recovery of v from πκ(v) can be effected by one of three subroutines:
either by a call to LLL, by a call to size-reduction, or by a call to enumeration
that recovers v directly (due to hypothetically having v = πκ(v)). Since
LLL itself contains many calls to size-reduction, and enumeration being lucky
is rather unlikely, size-reduction is a good place to start the investigation.
Indeed, restricting the LLL calls in Algorithm 6 as outlined in Section 3.3.2,
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Probability mass function for κ
d− β + 1
dd− 0.9β + 1e
Figure 3.4: Probability mass function of the index κ from which size-reduction
recovers v, calculated over 10,000 lattice instances with LWE parameters
n = 65,m = 182, q = 521 and standard deviation σ = 8/
√
2π, reduced using
β = 56. The mean of the distribution is ≈ 124.76 while d− β + 1 = 128.
identifies that size-reduction suffices. That is, to measure the success rate
of size-reduction recovering v from πκ(v), we observe size-reduction acting
on πκ(v). Here, we consider size-reduction to fail in recovering v if it does
not recover v given πκ(v) for κ < coff with coff = d − 0.9β + 1, regardless of
whether v is finally recovered at a later point either by size-reduction on a new
projection, or by some other call in the algorithm such as an SVP oracle call
at a smaller index. As shown in Table 3.1, size-reduction’s success rate is close
to 1. Note that the cut-off index c serves to limit underestimating the success
rate: intuitively we do not expect size-reduction to succeed when starting from
a projection with larger index, such as πd−γ+1(v) with γ < 10. We discuss this
in Section 3.3.3.
Overall, Table 3.1 confirms the prediction from [ADPS16]: picking β = β2016 to
be the block size predicted by the 2016 estimate leads to a successful recovery
of v with high probability.
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n q β2016 m2016 β # v same step time
κ < coff κ = d−β+1
65 521 56 182 56 104 93.3% 99.7% 99.7% 1,131.4
51 52.8% 98.8% 97.3% 1,359.3
46 4.8% 96.4% 85.7% 1,541.2
80 1031 60 204 60 103 94.2% 99.6% 100.0% 2,929.0
55 60.6% 99.3% 96.5% 2,458.5
50 8.9% 97.6% 100.0% 1,955.0
45 0.2% 100.0% — 1,568.1
100 2053 67 243 67 500 88.8% 99.8% 100.0% 28,803.7
62 39.6% 99.5% 100.0% 19,341.9
57 5.8% 100.0% 100.0% 7,882.2
52 0.2% 0.0% — 3,227.0
108 2053 77 261 77 5 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 351,094.2
110 2053 78 272 78 5 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1,012,634.8
Table 3.1: Overall success rate (“v”) and success rate of size-reduction
(“same step”) for solving LWE instances characterised by n, σ, q with m
samples, standard deviation σ = 8/
√
2π, minimal (β2016,m2016) such that√
β2016 σ ≤ δ2β2016−(m2016+1)−1q(m2016−n)/(m2016+1) with δ in function of β2016
following [Che13], see § 1.4.1.2. The column “β” gives the actual block size
used in experiments. The “same step” rate is calculated over all successful
instances where v is found before the cut-off point coff and for the instances
where exactly πd−b+1(v) is found (if no such instance is found, we do not report
a value). In the second case, the sample size is smaller, since not all instances
recover v from exactly κ = d− β + 1. The column “time” lists average solving
CPU time for one instance, in seconds. Note that our changes to the algorithm
and our extensive record keeping lead to an increased running time of the
BKZ algorithm compared to [DT17, FPY17]. Furthermore, the occasional
longer running time for smaller block sizes is explained by the absence of early




As noted above, our experiments indicate that the algorithm behaves better
than expected by (3.2). Firstly, the BKZ algorithm does not necessarily recover
a projection of v at index d − β + 1. Instead, the index κ at which we
recover a projection πκ(v) follows a distribution with a centre below d− β + 1,
cf. Figure 3.4. Secondly, size-reduction usually immediately recovers v from
πκ(v). This is somewhat unexpected, since we do not have the guarantee
that |ci| ≤ 1/2 as required in the success condition of size-reduction given
in (3.4). Thirdly, as it can be seen in Table 3.1, picking β as suggested by
the 2016 estimate results in recovery of the target vector about 90% of the
time. However, somewhat smaller block sizes also present some relatively high
success probability.
Finding the projection. To explain the bias towards a recovery of πκ(v)
for some κ < d− β + 1, note that if (3.2) holds then for the parameter sets in
our experiments the lines for ‖πi(v)‖ and ‖b∗i ‖ intersect twice (cf. Figure 3.3).
Let d− γ + 1 be the index of the second intersection. Thus, there is a good
chance that ‖πd−γ+1(v)‖ is a shortest vector in the lattice spanned by the last
projected block of some small rank γ and will be placed at index d − γ + 1.
As a consequence, all projections πi(v) with i > d − γ + 1 will be zero and
πd−β−γ+1(v) will be contained in the β-dimensional lattice
Λ (πd−β−γ+1(bd−β−γ+1), . . . , πd−β−γ+1(bd−γ+1)) ,
enabling it to be recovered by BKZ-β at an index d− β − γ + 1 < d− β + 1
during the successive tour. Thus, BKZ in our experiments behaves better than
predicted by (3.2). We note that another effect of this second intersection is that,
for very few instances, it directly leads to a recovery of v from πd−β−γ+1(v).
Giving a closed formula incorporating this effect akin to (3.2) would entail to
predict the index γ and then replace β with β + γ in (3.2), while keeping δ the
root-Hermite factor of BKZ-β. However, as illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3,
neither the prediction
√
d− i+ 1σ for ‖πd−1+1(v)‖ nor the GSA hold for the
last 50 or so indices of the basis [CN11, Che13]. Furthermore, we stress that
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while the second intersection often occurs for parameter sets within reach of
practical experiments, it does not always occur for all parameter sets. That is,
for many large parameter sets (n, σ, q), e.g. those in [ADPS16], a choice of β
satisfying (3.2) does not lead to a predicted second intersection at some larger
index. Thus, this effect may highlight the pitfalls of extrapolating experimental
lattice reduction data from small instances to large instances, and not an
inherent property of the primal attack using BKZ.
Finding the short vector. As noticed before, from our experiments it seems
that size-reduction is able to recover v from πd−β+1(v) with high probability.
From the point of view of costing the primal attack, a conservative choice would
be that of assuming that this happens with 100% probability, ignoring the cost
of any hypothetical post-processing tours needed to recover v. In addition, it
is possible to give a heuristic argument justifying the high success probability
of size-reduction under a certain independence assumption, similar to those
already used in the study of decoding [LP11, §4] and hybrid attacks [BGPW16,
Heuristic 4] and compared in [Wun18, §5.3.2]. In what follows, we assume
that the GSA exactly holds and that the projected norms ‖πi(v)‖ are equal
to their expected value (cf. Figure 3.2). Under these assumptions, we show
that size-reduction recovers the short vector v with high probability. More
precisely, we show:
Claim 1. Let v ∈ Λ ⊂ Rd be a unique (up to sign) shortest vector and β > 2 be
an integer. Assume that (3.2) holds, that the current basis is B = {b1, . . . ,bd}
such that b∗k = πk(v) for k = d− β + 1 and










i /‖b∗i ‖ (3.5)
for some νi ∈ Z and ν∗i ∈ R, that ‖πi(v)‖ =
√
d− i+ 1σ for i ≤ k, and that
the GSA holds for B until index k. If the size-reduction step of BKZ-β is called
on bk, it recovers v with high probability over the randomness of the basis.
Note that if BKZ has just found a projection of v at index k, the current basis
is as required by Claim 1. Now, let νi ∈ Z denote the coefficients of v with
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respect to the basis B, i.e.




We proceed to size-reduce bd−β+1 with the basis vectors bi for i = d− β, d−
β − 1, . . . , 1. Let b(d−β+1)d−β+1 = bd−β+1, where the superscript denotes a step




















i + · · ·+ µ(i+1)k,k−1b∗k−1 + b∗k
bi = µi,1b
∗
1 + · · ·+ µi,i−1b∗i−1 + b∗i ,
where no changes are being made to the basis vectors bi for i < k, such that
the basis with respect to which projections πi are made can be left implicit.









i 〉|/‖b∗i ‖2 = |µ
(i+1)
k,i + λ| ≤ 1/2. Projecting orthogonally to
spanR(b1, . . . ,bi−1), we can see that, equivalently, during step i size-reduction
is finding the shortest vector in the coset Li := πi(b
(i+1)
k ) + Zb
∗
i .




















k ) + νib
∗
i by Ci+1 and b
∗
i = πi(bi)
∈ πi(b(i+1)k ) + Zb∗i = Li.
Let Ei be the event that πi(v) is the shortest element in the Li coset. Then,
the i-th step of size-reduction will recover the νi coefficient and set b
(i)
k so that
condition Ci is satisfied. By induction, if πi(v) is the shortest element in Li
for all i (which happens with probability P [E1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ek−1]), size-reduction
finds the shortest vector v = b
(1)
d−β+1 and inserts it into the basis at position
d − β + 1, replacing bd−β+1. If the adversary checks the status of the basis
after each call to size-reduction, they can easily detect this event and solve
Search-LWE.
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It remains to argue that the probability p = P [E1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ek−1] is high. Let
pi = P [Ei] = Pr [πi(v) is the shortest element in Li] .
Following the analysis of the success probability of the nearest plane algorithm
in [LP11, BGPW16], we assume that the events Ei are independent when v
is (nearly) spherically distributed, as in our case. Hence, we can proceed to
compute p =
∏d−β
i=1 pi. For each i the probability pi is equal to the probability
that
‖πi(v)‖ < min{‖πi(v) + b∗i ‖ , ‖πi(v)− b∗i ‖}








Figure 3.5: Illustration of a case such that πi(v) is the shortest element on Li.
To approximate the probabilities pi, we model them as follows. By assumption,
we have




d) ‖v‖ and Ri := ‖b∗i ‖ = δ−2(i−1)+d−1Vol(Λ)
1
d ,
and that πi(v) is uniformly distributed with norm ri. We can therefore model
pi as described in the following and illustrated in Figure 3.6.
Pick a point w with norm ri uniformly at random. Then the probability pi
is approximately the probability that w is closer to 0 than it is to b∗i and to
−b∗i , i.e.
ri < min{‖w − b∗i ‖ , ‖w + b∗i ‖}.
Calculating this probability leads to the following approximation of pi
pi ≈
{
1− 2Ad−i+1(ri,hi)Ad−i+1(ri) if Ri < 2ri













Figure 3.6: Illustration of the success probability pi in R2. If w is on the thick
part of the circle, step i of size-reduction is successful.
where Ad−i+1(ri) is the surface area of the sphere in Rd−i+1 with radius ri
and Ad−i+1(ri, hi) is the surface area of the hyperspherical cap of the sphere
in Rd−i+1 with radius ri of height hi with hi = ri −Ri/2. Using the formulas














if Ri < 2ri
1 if Ri ≥ 2ri
, (3.6)
where B(·, ·) denotes the Euler beta function. Note that if we assume equality
holds in (3.2), the success probability p only depends on the block size β and
not on the specific lattice dimension, volume of the lattice, or the length of
the unique short vector. Indeed, assuming equality in (3.2), the ratios between
the predicted norms ‖πd−β+1−j(v)‖ and ‖b∗d−β+1−j‖ only depend on β for all


































On the Expected Cost of Solving uSVP





















Figure 3.7: Number of size-reduction steps where P [Ei] < 1, as a function of β.






on d− i, for i ≤ d−β. The size-reduction steps are indexed by i = d−β, . . . , 1.
This means that pi depends on d− i = β, β + 1, . . . , until index i such that
Ri ≥ 2 ri, from which point onward P [Ei] = 1. The number of steps of size-
reduction where P [Ei] < 1 is then bsc such that Rd−β+1−s = 2 rd−β+1−s, and




β + s δ−2s. As
long as d − β + 1 − bsc > 0 (that is, index i such that P [Ei] = 1 is reached
during size-reduction), p is therefore independent of d. In Figure 3.7 we plot
the number of steps bsc as a function of the block size, and show that for
cryptanalytic block sizes bsc < β/2, meaning that likely for any embedding
lattice d− β + 1− bsc < d and P [E1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ek−1] only depends on β.
Estimated success probabilities p for different block sizes β are plotted in
Figure 3.8. The prediction given in Figure 3.8 is in line with the measured
probability of finding v in the same step when its projection πd−β+1(v) is
found, as reported in Table 3.1 for β = β2016 and m = m2016. Since these
probabilities were already very close to 1, we added three more experimental
data points by running our code on parameter sets targetting smaller block
sizes (q = 97, σ = 1, varying n, m). We can see that experimentally the success
probability seems to grow slower than our formula predicts. However, it should
be noticed that our formula is plotted also for small block sizes, where lattice
heuristics are known not to hold [GN08b, §4.2], [CN11, §6.1].
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Figure 3.8: Estimated and experimentally measured success probability p for
varying block sizes β, assuming β is chosen minimal such that (3.2) holds.
The three rightmost data points are from column “same step, κ = d−β+1” of
Table 3.1, the three leftmost points were generated using parameters targetting
smaller block sizes by picking q = 97, σ = 1 and varying n, m.
Finally, note that by the above analysis we do not expect to recover v from
a projection πd−γ+1(v) for some small γ  β except with small probability.
Indeed, if we were to follow the analysis of Claim 1 starting at index k = d−γ+1,
at step i = d− γ of size-reduction we would need πd−γ(v) being the shortest
vector in Ld−γ = Zb∗d−γ + πd−γ(v). However, by definition of the second
intersection ‖πi(v)‖ > ‖b∗i ‖ for indices i ∈ [d− β + 2, d− γ] (c.f. Figure 3.3).
This means that likely shorter vectors than πi(v) are present in Li for some
such index i, stopping size-reduction from recovering v.
Smaller block sizes. In Section 3.2.2, we explained the reasoning behind
the 2016 estimate. In such model, Condition (3.2) provides a clear cut answer
to what is the smallest viable block size to solve uSVP. In practice however,
BKZ 2.0 is a randomised algorithm working on random uSVP instances. While
our experiments indicate the overall validity of the 2016 estimate, this does not
incorporate the probabilistic nature of the computational problem. In Chapter 4
we will investigate this issue, expanding on work initiated by Dachman-Soled et
al. [DDGR20] for predicting the expected behaviour of Progressive BKZ, and
will produce simulator algorithms that allow to explain the observed success
probability of smaller block sizes at solving uSVP.
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3.4 Applications
Section 3.3 indicates that (3.2) is a reliable indicator for when lattice reduction
will succeed in recovering an unusually short vector. Furthermore, as illustrated
in Figure 3.1, applying (3.2) lowers the required block sizes compared to the
2008 model which is heavily relied upon in the literature. Thus, in this section
we evaluate the impact of applying the revised estimates to various parameter
sets from the literature. Indeed, for many schemes we find that their parameters
need to be adapted to maintain the level of security claimed at the time of
their publication.
Many of the schemes considered below feature an unusually short secret s where
si ← U({−B, . . . , B}) for some small B ∈ Z. Furthermore, some schemes pick
the secret to also be sparse such that most components of s are zero. Thus,
before we apply the revised 2016 estimate, we briefly recall the alternative
embedding due to Bai and Galbraith [BG14b] which takes these small (and
sparse) secrets into account.
3.4.1 Bai and Galbraith’s embedding
Consider an LWE instance in matrix form (A,b) ≡ (A,A ·s+e) ∈ Zm×nq ×Zmq .
By inspection, it can be seen that the vector (ν s | e | c), for some non-zero ν
and c, is contained in the lattice
Λ =
{









≡ 0 mod q
}
, (3.7)
where ν allows to balance the size of the secret and the noise. An (n+m+



























qIm | At −At | b− b
)t ≡ 0 mod q.
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Therefore, given any basis C ∈ R(n+m+1)×(n+m+1) of Λ, we must have B = MC
for some integer matrix M. The dimensions of B imply that M is also
(n+m+1)×(n+m+1). Finally, we can see that B is exactly a basis for Λ (and
not for a strict sublattice), by using the fact that |det(B)| = |det(M)| · |det(C)|,
and that |det(B)| = vol(Λ) = |det(C)| by direct calculation [MR09], implying
that M is unimodular. Using this basis we can find our target vector as
(∗ | s | 1) ·B = (ν s | e | c), for suitable values of ∗.
Small secrets. If s is small and/or sparse such that its coefficients’ distribu-
tion χs is narrower than the error distribution χe, by choosing ν = c = 1 the




≈ σ, where σ is the standard
deviation of χe. We may then want to rebalance it by choosing an appro-
priate value of ν such that ‖(ν s | e | 1)‖ ≈ σ√n+m. Rebalancing preserves
(ν s | e | 1) as the unique shortest vector in the lattice, while at the same time
increasing the volume of the lattice being reduced, hence reducing the block
size required by (3.2) when compared to Kannan’s embedding (3.1). The same
reasoning could also be used in favour of setting c = σ as embedding coefficient.
If s




to obtain ‖ν s‖ ≈ σ√n, so that ‖(s | e | 1)‖ ≈ σ√n+m. Similarly, if exactly




wσ, we obtain a vector ν s of length σ
√
n. In general, assuming a secret
distribution χs with mean E(χs) = 0, we can compute
E(‖νs‖2) = n · ν2 · E(s2i ) = n · ν2 · V(χs).
In order to balance such a secret vector, the optimal scaling factor can be
deduced as ν =
√
V(χe)/V(χs).
Non-integer scaling factors. In theory, the optimal value of ν could be
any real not smaller than 1. In practice however, lattice reduction libraries
such as Fplll [DT17] require input bases to have integer coefficients. In the
experimental setting, this issue can be avoided by “clearing denominators”.
The idea is to use a rational approximation ν ≈ x/y, with x, y ∈ Z≥1. Then,
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 ≈ y ·B.
This has the effect of scaling every lattice vector in Λ(B) by y ≥ 1, keeping
the geometry unaltered while resulting in an integer basis.
Centering distributions. In the case of secret distributions with non-zero
mean µs, two simple approaches can be used to generate an embedding with a
target vector containing a recentered version of s. This can be useful since it
allows for a more aggressive choice of ν. For example, this is what we assume
would be done by an attacker when we investigate the cost of solving uSVP
with binary secrets. The first approach is to map any LWE samples (A,b) into
samples (A,b−Aµs), where µs = (µs, . . . , µs)t. This works since





0 bt − µstAt c

 = (ν (s− µs) | e | c).
Recovering the target vector on the right hand side results in solving the
original LWE instance, while the first n coefficients in the target vector are
now centred around 0 rather than µs. For example, applying this method with
ν = 2 to a binary secret, i.e. one sampled from U({0, 1}), means the first n
coefficients of the target vector will be distributed uniformly in the set {−1, 1}.
The second approach for centring the secret distribution is to use the basis







 = (ν (s− µs) | e | c).
In cases where error distribution has mean µe 6= 0, one can center the error
distribution by mapping samples (A,b) into samples (A,b− µe).
Of course, one can center error and secret distributions at the same time, if
needed. For example, if χe has mean µe and χs has mean µs, mapping samples
(A,b) into (A,b−µe−Aµs) will result in a centered shortest embedded vector.
An integer basis can be obtained by appropriately clearing the denominators
of any rational approximations of ν, µe and µs.
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Sparse secrets. In the case of sparse secrets, combinatorial techniques can
also be applied [How07, BGPW16, Alb17]. Given a secret s with at most
w < n non-zero entries, we guess k entries of s to be 0, therefore decreasing
the dimension of the lattice to consider. For each guess, we then apply lattice
reduction to recover the remaining components of the vector (s | e | 1).
Therefore, when estimating the overall complexity of solving such instances,
we find k minimising C(n − k)/pk, where C(n) is the cost of solving uSVP
for a lattice of dimension n and pk is the probability of guessing correctly.
We note that after any coefficient guessing is applied, the target vector is a
lower dimensional (s′ | e′ | 1). It may then be optimal to compute the scaling
factor ν and the recentering strategy using the distributions χs′ and χe′ of the
coefficients of s′ and e′ respectively, since these may differ from χs and χe.
3.4.2 Estimates
In what follows, we assume that the geometry of (3.7) is sufficiently close
to that of (3.1) so that we transfer the analysis as is. Furthermore, we will
denote applying (3.2) from [ADPS16] for Kannan’s embedding as “Kannan”
and applying (3.2) for Bai and Galbraith’s embedding [BG14b] as “Bai-Gal”.
Unless stated otherwise, we will assume that calling BKZ with block size β in
dimension d costs 8 d 20.292β+16.4 operations [BDGL16, Alb17].
Lizard. Proposed in [CKLS16, CKLS18], Lizard is a PKE scheme based on
the Learning With Rounding problem using small, sparse secrets. The authors
provide a reduction to LWE, and security parameters against classic and
quantum adversaries, following their analysis. In particular, they cost BKZ by
a single call to sieving on a block of size β. They estimate this call to cost β 2γ β
CPU cycles where γ = 0.292 for classical adversaries, γ = 0.265 for quantum
ones and γ = 0.2075 as a lower bound for sieving (“paranoid”). Applying the
revised 2016 cost estimate for the primal attack to the parameters suggested
in [CKLS16] (using their sieving cost model as described above) reduces the
expected costs, as shown in Table 3.2. We note that after private communication
the authors of Lizard have updated their parameters in [CKLS18].
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Classical Quantum Paranoid
n, log2 q, σ 386, 11, 2.04 414, 11, 2.09 504, 12, 4.20
Cost β d λ β d λ β d λ
[CKLS16] 418 — 130.8 456 — 129.7 590 — 131.6
Kannan 372 805 117.2 400 873 114.6 567 1120 126.8
Bai-Gal 270 646 88.5 297 692 86.9 372 833 85.9
Table 3.2: Bit complexity estimates λ for solving Lizard PKE [CKLS16] as
given in [CKLS16] and using Kannan’s resp. Bai and Galbraith’s embedding
under the 2016 estimate. The dimension of the LWE secret is n. In all cases,
BKZ-β is estimated to cost β 2γ β operations.
HElib. Introduced in [GHS12], HElib is a Fully-Homomorphic Encryption
(FHE) library implementing the BGV scheme [BGH13]. Albrecht [Alb17]
provides revised security estimates for HElib by employing a dual attack
exploiting the small and sparse secret, using the same cost estimate for BKZ
as given at the beginning of this section. In Table 3.3 we provide costs for a
primal attack using Kannan’s and Bai and Galbraith’s embeddings. Primal
attacks perform worse than the algorithm described [Alb17], but, as expected,
under the 2016 estimate the gap narrows.
SEAL. Introduced in [CLP17], SEAL is an FHE library by Microsoft, based
on the FV scheme [FV12]. Up to date (at the time of publication) parameters
are given in [CLP17], using the same cost model for BKZ as mentioned at
the beginning of this section. In Table 3.4, we provide complexity estimates
for Kannan’s and Bai and Galbraith’s embeddings under the 2016 estimate.
Note that the gap in solving time between the dual and primal attack reported
in [Alb17] is closed for SEAL v2.1 parameters.
TESLA. Described in [BG14a, ABB+17], TESLA is a signature scheme
based on LWE. Post-quantum secure parameters in the quantum random
oracle model were proposed in [ABB+17]. In Table 3.5, we show that these
parameters need to be increased to maintain the currently claimed level of















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































≈ log2 n bits of security between the best known attack on LWE and claimed
security to account for a loss of security in the reduction.
TESLA-0 TESLA-1 TESLA-2
n, log2 q, σ 644, 31, 55 804, 31, 57 1300, 35, 73
Cost β d λ β d λ β d λ
Classical
[ABB+17] — — 110.0 — — 142.0 — — 204.0
[ABB+17]+ 255 — 110.0 358 — 140.4 563 — 200.9
Kannan 248 1514 102.4 339 1954 129.3 525 3014 184.3
Post-Quantum
[ABB+17] — — 71.0 — — 94.0 — — 142.0
[ABB+17]+ 255 — 68.5 358 — 90.7 563 — 136.4
Kannan 248 1415 61.5 339 1954 81.1 525 3014 122.4
Table 3.5: Bit complexity estimates for solving TESLA parameter
sets [ABB+17]. The entry “[ABB+17]+” refers to reproducing the estimates
from [ABB+17] using a current copy of the estimator from [APS15] which uses
c = 1 instead of c = ‖e‖. As a consequence the values in the respective rows are
slightly lower than in [ABB+17]. We compare with Kannan’s embedding under
the 2016 estimate, Bai and Galbraith’s embedding is not necessary since TESLA
uses normal form LWE. Classically, BKZ-β is estimated to cost 8d 20.292β+16.4




BCIV17. [BCIV17] is a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme ob-
tained as a simplification of the FV scheme [FV12] and proposed as a candi-
date for enabling privacy friendly energy consumption forecast computation
in smart grid settings. The authors propose parameters for obtaining 80 bits
of security, derived using the estimator from [APS15] available at the time of
their publication. As a consequence of applying (3.2), we observe a moderate
loss of security, as reported in Table 3.6.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have experimentally compared the two approaches [GN08b,
ADPS16] used in the lattice-based cryptography literature to choose the block
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80 bit security
n = 4096, log2 q = 186, σ = 102
Embedding β d λ Embedding β d λ
Kannan 156 8105 77.9 Bai-Gal 147 7818 75.3
Table 3.6: Solving costs for proposed Ring-LWE parameters in [BCIV17] using
Kannan’s resp. Bai and Galbraith’s embedding under the 2016 estimate. In
both cases, BKZ-β is estimated to cost 8d 20.292β+16.4 operations.
size when solving the unique-SVP problem using BKZ. We have verified that
the estimate proposed in [ADPS16] closely matches our observations, which
means that lattice reduction attacks will be cheaper than previously predicted
(cf. Figure 3.1). Hence, we have re-estimated the security of a few encryption
and signature schemes proposed in the literature to measure this impact.
However, we have also observed that [ADPS16]’s success condition for BKZ, (3.2),
does not capture entirely the probabilistic nature of the attack; e.g. slightly
smaller block sizes than predicted have non-negligible probability of solving
uSVP (c.f. Table 3.1). In the next chapter we will extend the recent techniques
introduced by Dachman-Soled et al. [DDGR20] to try and compute the exact
probability that a given block size successfully solves uSVP.
3.5.1 Developments since publication
Since this chapter was published as [AGVW17], a few related works have ap-
peared further analysing, using or extending the model from [ADPS16]. First,
our changes to the LWE estimator [APS15] were integrated in the estimator’s
code base, meaning that security estimates generated with it, such as those
in the Homomorphic Encryption Security Standard [ACC+18], automatically
adopted the 2016 estimate. At Africacrypt 2019, Bai et al. [BMW19] published
more experiments further confirming the assumptions used in the 2016 estimate,
and confirming that the second intersection between the basis profile and the
norms of the target vector’s projections discussed in Section 3.3.3 should not
affect cryptographic parameters. Finally, Dachman-Soled et al. [DDGR20]
extended the 2016 model to provide a probabilistic estimator of the success
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probability of solving uSVP using Progressive BKZ that returns precise predic-
tions also in the small block size regime. This became the basis for Chapter 4
of this thesis (published as [PV21]), where we modify Dachman-Soled et al.’s
simulator to output more fine-grained results on the success probability of solv-
ing uSVP, verify the validity of the approach experimentally, and investigate
the accuracy of the 2016 model and its extensions when applied to LWE with
non-Gaussian secret and error distributions.
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As lattice-based key encapsulation, digital signature, and fully homomorphic
encryption schemes near standardisation, ever more focus is being directed
to the precise estimation of the security of these schemes. The primal attack
reduces key recovery against such schemes to instances of the unique Shortest
Vector Problem (uSVP). Dachman-Soled et al. (Crypto 2020) recently proposed
a new approach for fine-grained estimation of the cost of the primal attack when
using Progressive BKZ for lattice reduction. In this chapter we review and
extend their technique to BKZ 2.0 and provide extensive experimental evidence
of its accuracy. Using this technique we also explain results from the primal
attack experiments presented in Chapter 3, where attacks often succeeded with
smaller than expected block sizes. Finally, we use our simulators to re-estimate
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the cost of attacking the three lattice KEM finalists of the NIST Post Quantum
Standardisation Process.
4.1 Motivation
A popular computational problem chosen to design lattice-based schemes is the
Learning With Errors (LWE) problem (with its ring and module variants). As
mentioned in Section 1.4.3, a variety of attack strategies against this problem
exist, with the practically better performing being the primal, dual and hybrid
attacks. All three rely on lattice reduction algorithms, such as BKZ [SE91, SE94,
CN11], Progressive BKZ [AWHT16], Self-Dual BKZ [MW16], G6K [ADH+19]
and Slide Reduction [GN08a], to find either a unique (up to sign) embedded
shortest vector, or more generally a good lattice basis. In particular, the primal
attack is often estimated as the cheapest option [ACD+18].
The primal attack against LWE consists of using lattice reduction to solve an
instance of the unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP). The most popular
lattice reduction algorithm is BKZ. In Chapter 3, we discussed how compliexity
estimates for solving uSVP directly depend on estimating the smallest block
size β such that BKZ-β successfully recovers the unique shortest vector. This
β is commonly found by following the methodology introduced in [ADPS16],
which we experimentally investigated in Chapter 3.
While we confirmed the overall validity of the approach in [ADPS16], in our
experiments reported in Table 3.1, we noticed that smaller than expected block
sizes can result in a non-negligible probability of solving uSVP instances arising
from the primal attack, when using BKZ. The same phenomenon was later
observed in similar experiments run by Bai et al. [BMW19]. Some concerns
were raised [BCLv19] that this could indicate an overestimate of the complexity
of the primal attack for cryptographically sized instances. Furthermore, the
experiments carried out in Chapter 3 only focused on recovering a unique
shortest vector sampled coefficient-wise from a discrete Gaussian distribution.
While we claimed that the [ADPS16] methodology would also hold for binary
and ternary distributions, we did not provide experimental evidence. Recent
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Input: LLL reduced lattice basis B of rank n
Input: τ ∈ Z+
1 β ← 3
2 while β ≤ n do /* round */
3 run τ tours of BKZ-β on basis B
4 β ← β + 1
Algorithm 7: Progressive BKZ Algorithm, as used
in this chapter.
work [CCLS20] revisited the binary and ternary case in the small block size
regime β ≤ 45 and concluded that discrete Gaussian errors are more secure.
We disagree, and discuss [CCLS20] further in Section 4.4.2.
Dachman-Soled et al. [DDGR20] recently proposed an approach for estimating
the complexity of the primal attack that makes use of probability distributions
for the norms of particular projections of the unique shortest vector, rather
than only expected values. This results in a new approach that allows one to
better predict the behaviour of the attack when considering block sizes smaller
than those expected to be successful by the [ADPS16] methodology. The
authors of [DDGR20] use this approach to develop a simulator that predicts
the expected block size by which Progressive BKZ (PBKZ) [AWHT16] will
solve an isotropic uSVP instance, that is an instance where the shortest vector
(up to sign) in the lattice is spherically distributed, as if sampled from a
Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ = 1. In this work, we call
such a simulator a uSVP simulator. They use this uSVP simulator in the
setting of solving LWE instances with extra hints about the secret, and verify
the accuracy of their predictions as the number of hints varies.
For the purposes of this chapter, we define Progressive BKZ as in Algorithm 7.
Progressive BKZ consists in running τ tours of BKZ-β for progressively larger
block sizes β, until β = n. We call each step of the loop on Line 2 a “round”
of PBKZ, to distinguish them from the “tours” run inside the BKZ subroutine.
In our experiments we do not let β increase further than some βmax < n. When
using PBKZ to solve uSVP, at the end of each round we check for whether a
solution was found, and in case break out of the loop before reaching β = βmax.
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Our contributions. Our first contribution is the implementation of a variant
of the uSVP simulator for Progressive BKZ, and the development of a new uSVP
simulator for BKZ 2.0. Rather than only returning the expected successful block
size, we extract full probability mass functions for successful block sizes, which
allow for a more direct comparison to experimental results. Our simulators
are also faster than that in [DDGR20], simulating success probabilities for
Kyber1024 in 31 seconds against the 2 hours of [DDGR20]. This allows for
potentially easier inclusion in parameter selection scripts, such as the LWE
estimator [APS15]. We note that since the time of writing, the latest version
of the simulator proposed in [DDGR20] adopted some of the techniques we use
for the speed-up.
Our second contribution is extensive experiments on the success probability
of different block sizes for BKZ 2.0 and Progressive BKZ, on uSVP lattices
generated from LWE instances with discrete Gaussian, binary or ternary secret
and error distributions. Our experiments show that the uSVP simulators
accurately predict the block sizes needed to solve uSVP instances via lattice
reduction for all distributions tested, and further explain the phenomenon of
smaller-than-expected block sizes solving uSVP noticed in Chapter 3.
As a final contribution, we re-estimate the security of the three lattice KEM
finalists of the NIST PQC process [Nat16] using our uSVP simulators. We
compare the expected block sizes they return to those predicted by the origi-
nal methodology of [ADPS16]. We note that our uSVP simulators estimate
that a slightly larger average block size than predicted is required, meaning
that [ADPS16] likely resulted in an underestimate of their security.1 We also
observe that this phenomenon can, in large part, be attributed to the origi-
nal [ADPS16] methodology using the Geometric Series Assumption. Replacing
this assumption with the output of the [CN11] BKZ simulator reduces the
predictive gap between the [ADPS16] methodology and our uSVP simulators.
All of our code and data can be found at github.com/fvirdia/usvp-simulation.
1A similar phenomenon had also been observed in [DDGR20] for NTRU-HPS.
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Related work. The Geometric Series Assumption (GSA), used to predict
the output quality of lattice reduction, was introduced in [Sch03]. A simulator,
specifically for the output quality of BKZ, was introduced in [CN11]. This
simulator more accurately predicts the final, or tail, region of the basis profile of
a BKZ reduced lattice, improving over the GSA. A refined BKZ simulator was
presented in [BSW18], which improves over the [CN11] simulator in the first
region, or head, of the basis profile. Alkim et al. [ADPS16] introduced a BKZ
specific method for estimating the block size required to solve uSVP instances
arising from the primal attack; its accuracy was investigated in [AGVW17,
BMW19] (the first being the published version of Chapter 3). This method,
combined with basis profile simulation after BKZ reduction and arguments
about distributions describing the norms of projections of the unique short
vector, is extended in [DDGR20] to predict the expected block size by which
Progressive BKZ will solve isotropic uSVP instances.
Chapter roadmap. In Section 4.2 we review the available methods for sim-
ulating the profiles of BKZ- and LLL-reduced lattice bases with more accuracy
than the GSA provides. In Section 4.3 we review the approach of [DDGR20]
and use it to propose uSVP simulators for BKZ 2.0 and Progressive BKZ. In
Section 4.4 we describe our experiments and results. In Section 4.5 we use our
uSVP simulators to provide preliminary estimates of the block sizes required to
successfully perform key recovery attacks on the three NIST PQC lattice KEM
finalists, and compare this to predictions using the [ADPS16] methodology.
4.2 Simulating BKZ and LLL
In Chapter 1 we introduced the Geometric Series Assumption (GSA), a heuristic
that suggests that the shape of a reduced lattice basis profile follows a geometric
progression, where the common ratio depends on the lattice reduction algorithm
used. Given a lattice Λ, the GSA together with the constraint that
∏ ‖b∗i ‖ =
vol(Λ) can be used to approximate the profile of a reduced basis for Λ.
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As we mentioned when introducing the GSA, its output represent only a first
approximation of a reduced basis profile. In this section we discuss some
simulators that can be used to more accurately describe the profile of BKZ-
and LLL-reduced lattice bases.
BKZ. The GSA’s output can be seen as a global view of a reduced lattice
basis, using only the constant volume of the full lattice Λ to estimate the basis
profile. However, the volume of local blocks is not constant as LLL or BKZ is
run on a basis. Chen and Nguyen propose a BKZ simulator [CN11] that takes
this intuition into account to improve on the GSA in the case of BKZ. It takes
as input a basis profile {‖b∗i ‖2}i and simulates a tour of BKZ-β by calculating,
block by block, the Gaussian heuristic of the current block, “inserting” a vector
of that length at the beginning of said block, and redistributing the necessary
length to the subsequent Gram–Schmidt vectors to keep vol(Λ) constant. Since
projected sublattices of small rank, e.g. smaller than 45, do not behave as
random lattices [GN08b, CN11], in order to simulate the profile for the final
indices of the basis the BKZ simulator stops using the Gaussian heuristic and
instead uses experimentally generated average norms for unit volume lattices
(scaled appropriately). This design also allows for one to simulate a fixed
number of tours, rather than assuming convergence, as in the GSA. In practice,
the [CN11] simulator better captures the shape of a reduced basis profile over
the last few indices.
The simulation process can be made probabilistic by “inserting” a vector with
length drawn from a probability distribution centred on the length suggested
by the Gaussian heuristic. This is done by Bai et al. [BSW18], whose simulator
further improves the predictions of [CN11] by better capturing the shape of
reduced basis profiles over the first few indices.
Throughout our work we make use of the Chen–Nguyen simulator as imple-
mented in Fpylll [FPY17]. In Algorithm 8 we define a BKZSim subroutine
that returns a [CN11] simulation for an input basis profile. Here LWEn,q,χ,m is
a basis produced as in (3.8) with c = 1, assuming normal form so that ν = 1
and χ = χs = χe.
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Input: (n, q, χ,m) or profile {‖b∗i ‖2}i
Input: β, τ
1 if {‖b∗i ‖2}i not provided as input then
2 {‖b∗i ‖2}i ← simulated profile of LLL reduced LWEn,q,χ,m instance
3 {‖b∗i ‖2}i ← [CN11] simulation of τ tours of BKZ-β on {‖b∗i ‖
2}i
4 return {‖b∗i ‖2}i
Algorithm 8: BKZSim subroutine.
LLL. As part of our uSVP simulations, we will require in input the profile
of LLL-reduced bases. To produce these we considered three options. We
compare the output for the three approaches in Figure 4.1.
The first option is to run LLL on an example basis. In the case of the instances
used in the experiments which we will be describing in Section 4.4, such a
reduction can be easily performed on any particular embedding basis. However,
this is not the case for cryptographically sized embeddings, where Fplll’s
implementation of LLL can only run with high enough floating point precision
by using MPFR [FHL+07], which becomes impractically slow.
The second option is to use a GSA slope corresponding to LLL reduction,
by setting α = δ−2 = 1.02−2 as the GSA factor. This correctly predicts the
slope of the main section of the profile, but does not account for the role
played by the q-vectors2 in the embedding basis, which are short enough to
not be affected by LLL [How07], resulting in the characteristic “Z-shape” of
LLL-reduced bases for q-ary lattices.
The third option is to use a specific basis profile simulator for LLL that captures
the effect of the q-vectors. We opt for the third option. While the approach
to simulating the Z-shape immediately follows from the observation that the
vectors in the middle of the basis follow the GSA [How07], we provide below a
full description of how we do it.
2That is, vectors with one coefficient valued q and all the others zero.
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Figure 4.1: Comparison between the output profile of LLL averaged over 25
input bases, the output of the LLL simulator used for our estimates, and the
GSA. The input bases being reduced are for q-ary lattices corresponding to
embeddings of “n = 100” LWE instances as parametrised in Table 4.1
4.2.1 LLL “Z-shape” simulation
The Z-shape nickname refers to the shape of the log-plot for the profile of
an LLL-reduced basis B when providing in input a q-ary lattice basis such
as (3.8), with the q-vectors set as the first basis vectors.3 In such cases, most
of the q-vectors will not be altered by LLL, since they are orthogonal and
short. This results in the basis profile having a flat head corresponding to
the first Gram–Schmidt vectors b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . being q-vectors. Depending on the
lattice’s volume and rank, the final Gram–Schmidt vectors will be 1-vectors
obtained from the identity matrix minor in the basis, resulting in a flat tail
in the profile. The middle indices of the log-plot of the basis profile will be
located along a straight line with the slope predicted by the GSA for LLL with
logα = −2 log δ, where δ is LLL’s root-Hermite factor δ ≈ 1.02 [NS06]. An
example of the Z-shape can be seen in Figure 4.1.
3While a similar Z-shaped profile will result even if the q-vectors are not at the beginning
of the basis, the effect will be more pronounced if they are.
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In the most straightforward case, given a normal-form LWE lattice with volume
qm, dimension d and basis (3.8), the LLL simulator predicts the Z-shape by
first computing the GSA slope section of the profile. This is achieved by
noticing that vectors in this section will have log-norm log ‖b∗i ‖ ∈ (0, log q),
decreasing by logα at each index by the GSA. Then the head section will have
enough q-vectors so that the output profile describes a lattice with volume qm,
and the remaining vectors will be 1-vectors in the tail. This procedure may
result in a volume that is not exactly equal to qm. In this case, we pick the
maximum number of q-vectors such that the implied volume is < qm, and shift
the slope up to match qm. In practice this effect is minimal. This description
matches all cases used in this chapter, the resulting pseudo-code can be found
in Algorithm 9. Some corner cases, including ν 6= 1 in (3.8), can arise and are
dealt with in our Python implementation of the simulator.
4.3 Simulating solving uSVP
In this section, we review and extend recent work on capturing the probabilistic
nature of the described uSVP win condition. In [DDGR20], Dachman-Soled et
al. revisit the [ADPS16] heuristic methodology described in Section 3.2.2. The
authors are concerned with accurately predicting the effects that introduc-
ing side channel information to their lattice embedding has on the success
probability of solving uSVP using Progressive BKZ, while also maintaining
accuracy in the small block size regime, β ≤ 45. The authors describe a uSVP
simulator (not to be confused with the BKZ simulator of [CN11]), designed to
predict the success probability of Progressive BKZ solving an isotropic uSVP
instance by a specific block size.4 Using their uSVP simulator, they predict the
expected successful block size for a series of experiments they run, and verify
the accuracy of their predictions. We start by simplifying the [DDGR20] uSVP
simulator for Progressive BKZ, and then develop a similar uSVP simulator for
BKZ 2.0. We focus on the simulator as described in [DDGR20] at the time of
release. Since the time of writing of this chapter as [PV21], the latest version of
the simulator proposed in [DDGR20] adopted some of the techniques described
below, for allowing τ > 1 and faster simulations.
4Any uSVP instance used in the primal attack can be made isotropic, where σ = 1.
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Input: m, q, d // m q-vectors, dimension d
// δ is LLL’s root-Hermite factor ≈ 1.02
// qm is the lattice’s volume
1 logα← −2 log δ
// compute the profile’s slope
2 slope← [log q + logα, log q + 2 logα, . . . , ε] s.t. ε+ logα ≤ 0
3 if #slope ≥ d then
4 slope← last d entries of slope
5 shift slope vertically such that
∑





9 v ←∑i slopei
// compute the profile’s head
10 head← []
11 while v +
∑
i headi + log q < log q
m and `+ #head < d do
12 head← head ∪ [log q]
13 `← `+ #head
14 v ← v +∑i headi
// compute the profile’s tail
15 tail← []
16 while `+ #tail < d do
17 tail← tail ∪ [0]




i slopei = log q
m
19 log-profile← head ∪ slope ∪ tail
20 return log-profile
Algorithm 9: LLL Z-shape simulator, assuming a basis as in (3.8) with
ν = 1. Returns the logarithm of the basis profile, {log ‖b∗i ‖}i.
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Notation. In Algorithms 10, 11, and 12 below, given a (possibly estimated)
lattice basis profile “profile = {‖b∗i ‖2}i”, we refer to exact or estimated
values for ‖b∗i ‖2 as profile[i].
4.3.1 Progressive BKZ
The approach proposed in [DDGR20] to estimate the required block size to
solve a uSVP instance is to simulate the status of a lattice basis as it is being
reduced, and with it the probability at each step of the lattice reduction
algorithm that the target vector is recovered.
Input: d
1 ptot ← 0, β̄ ← 0
2 profile← GSA profile of an LLL reduced, rank d, isotropic uSVP
instance basis
3 for β ← 3 to d do /* PBKZ round */
4 profile← BKZSim(profile, β, 1)
5 plift ← P [v rec. in bd/βc rounds | πd−β+1(v) rec. this round]
6 prec ← P [x← χ2β : x ≤ profile[d− β + 1]]
7 pnew ← (1− ptot) · prec · plift
8 β̄ ← β̄ + β · pnew
9 ptot ← ptot + pnew
10 if ptot ≥ 0.999 then break
11 return β̄
Algorithm 10: Isotropic uSVP simulator for Progressive BKZ with τ = 1,
as proposed in [DDGR20]. We omit the details of computing plift for
simplicity and note that prec represents P [πd−β+1(v) recovered this round].
Returns the expected block size β̄ required to solve uSVP.
Let W be the event of solving uSVP during the run of Progressive SVP, Wβ the
probability of being able to solve uSVP during the round with block size β, and
Fβ = ¬Wβ . Following the notation in Algorithm 7, we assume τ = 1, meaning
that for each block size β exactly one tour of BKZ-β is run. Dachman-Soled et
al. implicitly partition W as follows











Their computation of the expected winning block size β̄ amounts to implicitly
defining a probability mass function for the random variable B representing the
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first viable block size to solve the uSVP instance, and computing its expected
value. In the case of Progressive BKZ, a block size β being the first viable
means that it is the round of BKZ run with block size β (i.e. the tour of Line 3
of Algorithm 7 with block size β) and not any earlier round using a smaller
block size, that will solve the uSVP instance. The resulting probability mass
function for the distribution of B can be modelled as








The probability P [Wβ] is itself modelled as the product of the probability of
successfully recovering πd−β+1(v) by calling OSVP on the last full size block,
P [πd−β+1(v) recovered using block size β] ≈ P [x← χ2β : x ≤ profile[d−β+1]],
and the probability of successfully lifting the projection over subsequent rounds,
plift. In their implementation of Algorithm 10, Dachman-Soled et al. use a
chain of conditional probabilities to compute plift. Events Wi and Fj for
i 6= j are considered to be independent since every round of lattice reduction












We introduce two simplifications to the above uSVP simulator. Firstly, we
noticed experimentally that running BKZ with block sizes smaller than 40 will
not solve instances for which the [ADPS16] approach predicts a winning block
size of β & 60, where most cryptographic applications (and our experiments)
reside. Therefore, we skip probability computations for any block sizes smaller
than 40. Furthermore, values of plift approach 1 quickly as β increases, such
that one can simply assign plift = 1 for β ≥ 40; a similar phenomenon is
noted in Section 3.3.3. Finally, by allowing multiple tours per block size, we
define a uSVP simulator, Algorithm 11, for Progressive BKZ as described
in Algorithm 7 where τ may be greater than 1. A comparison between
the output of Algorithms 10 and 11 can be found in Figure 4.2 for four
isotropic LWE instances, where τ = 1. To produce Figure 4.2, we tweaked
the original [DDGR20] code in order to extract the implicit probability mass
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this work (GSA for LLL)
[DDGR20]
(a) n = 72, ∆E(β) = 0.60














this work (GSA for LLL)
[DDGR20]
(b) n = 93, ∆E(β) = 0.92














this work (GSA for LLL)
[DDGR20]
(c) Kyber 512, ∆E(β) = 0.20














this work (GSA for LLL)
[DDGR20]
(d) Kyber 1024, ∆E(β) = 0.09
Figure 4.2: Comparison between the output of Algorithm 10 [DDGR20] and
Algorithm 11 (this work) for isotropic parameters (σ = 1) from Table 4.1, and
on Kyber 512 and 1024 [SAB+19]. The difference in predicted mean first viable
block size between the two simulators is reported as ∆E(β), and is always
smaller than 1.
function P [B = β]. Our simplifications significantly speed up the simulation
by avoiding the expensive computation of plift. In particular, our simulations
for Kyber 512 (resp. 1024) take 4 seconds (resp. 31 seconds) against the 20
minutes (resp. 2 hours) of [DDGR20]. We can see that the output probabilities
P [B ≤ β] and the expected successful block sizes differ only slightly and
optimistically for the attacker on low dimensional instances when using our
simulator, with this difference shrinking for cryptographically sized problems.
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4.3 Simulating solving uSVP
Input: (n, q, χ,m), τ
1 ptot ← 0, P ← {}, β ← 3
2 d← n+m+ 1, σ2 ← V(χ)
3 profile← simulated profile of LLL reduced LWEn,q,χ,m instance
4 while β < 40 do
5 profile← BKZSim(profile, β, τ)
6 β ← β + 1
7 while β ≤ d do /* PBKZ rounds */
8 for tour← 1 to τ do /* BKZ tours */
9 profile← BKZSim(profile, β, 1)
10 pnew ← P [x← σ2χ2β : x ≤ profile[d− β + 1]]
11 P [β]← (1− ptot) · pnew
12 ptot ← ptot + P [β]
13 if ptot ≥ 0.999 then break
14 β ← β + 1
15 return P
Algorithm 11: Unique-SVP success probability simulator for Progressive
BKZ, running τ tours for each block size, then increasing the block size by
1. Returns the probability mass function P [B = β] of solving uSVP in the
round using block size β.
4.3.2 BKZ
Using the same approach as for Algorithm 10 and Algorithm 11, we implemented
a uSVP simulator for BKZ, described in Algorithm 12. In this case, the basis
profile after a number of tours of BKZ-β is simulated in one shot using
the [CN11] simulator. Given that the block size is fixed, the probabilities are
only accumulated over tours. It should be noted that the event of β being the
first viable block size changes in the case of BKZ. In this case, no unsuccessful
tours with a smaller block size are run by the algorithm. Instead, we consider
β being first viable if running BKZ-(β − 1) for τ tours would not result in a
solution to the uSVP instance but running BKZ-β would.
Algorithm 12 returns the probability that τ tours of BKZ-β will solve uSVP,
but does not exclude the possibility of winning with a smaller block size. We
assume in our model that if τ tours of BKZ-β solve a given uSVP instance, then
τ tours of BKZ-β′, for β′ > β, also will. The values output by Algorithm 12 for
a given instance can therefore be interpreted as a cumulative mass function for
the first viable block size, i.e. P [B ≤ β]. By running the simulator for increasing
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block sizes until it outputs probability 1, one may recover the probability mass
function P [B = β] as
P [B = β] = P [B ≤ β]− P [B ≤ β − 1].
Input: (n, q, χ,m), β, τ
1 ptot ← 0, σ2 ← V(χ)
2 d← n+m+ 1
3 for tour← 1 to τ do /* BKZ tours */
4 profile← BKZSim((n, q, χ,m), β, tour)
5 pnew ← P [x← σ2χ2β : x ≤ profile[d− β + 1]]
6 ptot ← ptot + (1− ptot) · pnew
7 return ptot
Algorithm 12: Unique-SVP success probability estimator when running
τ tours of BKZ-β. Returns the probability of solving the uSVP instance.
4.4 Experiments
In this section, we describe the experiments we run to check the accuracy of
Algorithms 11 and 12, and discuss the results. We start by describing our
original batch of experiments in Section 4.4.1. In Section 4.4.2 we make some
observations about our experimental results, and describe further tweaked
experiments that we run to verify our understanding of the results.
4.4.1 Initial experiments
Our aim in this section is threefold: first, we want to provide experimental
evidence for the accuracy of our BKZ and Progressive BKZ uSVP simulators
when predicting the success probability of the primal attack against LWE with
discrete Gaussian secret and error for different block sizes; second, we want to
compare our experiments in Chapter 3 to our uSVP simulations; and finally, we
want to explore the effect that using binary or ternary distributions has on the
primal attack. Throughout our experiments, we use BKZ 2.0 as implemented
in Fpylll [FPY17] version 0.5.1dev, writing our own Progressive BKZ script by
using Fpylll’s BKZ 2.0 as a subroutine.
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For our first goal, we choose three different parametrisations of the LWE
problem, for which the [ADPS16] approach predicts an expected successful
block size of either 60 or 61. The parameters can be found in Table 4.1. All
parameter sets in these batches use discrete Gaussian secret and error with
V(χs) = V(χe) = σ2. The number of LWE samples used, m, is determined by
what the LWE estimator [APS15] predicts to be optimal, using (3.2). For each
parameter set we generate 100 instances, and reduce them using either BKZ
or Progressive BKZ. We then check whether lattice reduction positioned the
embedded shortest target vector in the first index of the reduced basis.
In the case of BKZ, for each basis we run a number of tours of BKZ with block
size β = 45, . . . , 65. The number of tours, τ , takes the values 5, 10, 15, 20, 30.
This results in a total of 100 bases, reduced independently 21× 5 times each,
once for every combination of β and τ . For every set of 100 reductions, we
record the success rate by counting the number of solved instances. We run
a similar set of experiments using Progressive BKZ, allowing τ ≥ 1 tours per
block size, in order to see at what point running extra tours per block size
becomes redundant. For this reason, we reduce each basis 5 times, once per
value of τ in 1, 5, 10, 15, 20. After every call to the BKZ subroutine, we check
whether the instance is solved. If not, we increase the block size by 1 and run
a further round of PBKZ.
The resulting success rates for BKZ and Progressive BKZ (with τ = 1) are
plotted in Figure 4.3, together with the output of our uSVP simulators, in-
terpolated as curves. Figure 4.4 contains similar plots for Progressive BKZ
with τ ≥ 1. In Figure 4.6 we plot the differences ∆E and ∆
√
V between the
mean and standard deviation for the simulated and experimentally measured
probability distributions for the first viable block size, for both Progressive
BKZ and BKZ,








For our second goal, we take the success probabilities reported Table 3.1 of
Chapter 3. In Figure 4.5 we report the measured success rates at optimal
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n q σ m2016 β2016
72 97 1 87 61




Table 4.1: List of LWE parameters used for testing our uSVP simulators.
The instances are in normal form. We use the Bai–Galbraith embedding and
the number of samples used, m2016, is given by the LWE estimator (commit
428d6ea).
and smaller than optimal block sizes, and we superimpose our BKZ success
probability simulations for the same lattice parameters.
Finally, for our third goal, we run Progressive BKZ experiments for τ in
1, 5, 10, 15, 20 on three parameter sets using bounded uniform secrets. In
particular, we pick the n = 72 and n = 93 parameters from Table 4.1 but
sample secret s and error e coefficients uniformly from the set {−1, 1}, and the
n = 100 parameters with secret and error coefficients sampled uniformly from
{−1, 0, 1}. This preserves the same standard deviations as in Table 4.1, while
adding more structure to the target vector. In the first case, the s and e are
equivalent to those of a scaled and centred LWE instance with binary secret
and error (using a centered and scaled embedding as in Section 3.4.1), while
in the second case, the problem is LWE with ternary s and e. The resulting
success probability plots can be found in Figure 4.7.
4.4.2 Observations
Experimental success rates for both BKZ and Progressive BKZ are in line with
the output of the simulators described in Section 4.3. We now look at the
results.
4.4.2.1 Progressive BKZ
In the case of Progressive BKZ, simulations seem to predict accurately the
success probabilities for τ ≤ 10 and all secret and error distributions used.
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Prog. BKZ, τ = 1
BKZ, τ = 5
BKZ, τ = 10
BKZ, τ = 15
BKZ, τ = 20
BKZ, τ = 30
(a) n = 72













Prog. BKZ, τ = 1
BKZ, τ = 5
BKZ, τ = 10
BKZ, τ = 15
BKZ, τ = 20
BKZ, τ = 30
(b) n = 93













Prog. BKZ, τ = 1
BKZ, τ = 5
BKZ, τ = 10
BKZ, τ = 15
BKZ, τ = 20
BKZ, τ = 30
(c) n = 100
Figure 4.3: Comparison of simulated success
probabilities with experimental results for
BKZ and Progressive BKZ (with τ = 1).
Dashed lines are simulations, crosses are ex-
periments. In the case of Progressive BKZ,
100 total instances are reduced. In the case
of BKZ, each experimental result is averaged
over 100 instances, with experiments using
up to block size 65.
Throughout our experiments reported in Figure 4.4, we observe two ways in
which experiments slightly deviate from predictions.
Redundant tours. Firstly, the success probability appears to stop signif-
icantly increasing for τ > 10, even when the simulation does predict some
improvement. We expect this to be a consequence of the large amount of
lattice reduction being performed. Indeed, whenever the BKZ-β subroutine
is called, the basis has already been reduced with τ tours of BKZ-(β − j) for
j = 1, . . . , β − 3. This suggests that only little progress on the basis profile can
be made with each new tour of BKZ-β. In our experiments, we use Fpylll’s
BKZ 2.0 implementation with auto-abort, which triggers by default after the
slope of the basis profile does not improve for five tours, the slope being com-
puted using a simple linear regression of the logarithm of the basis profile. This
means that if it is the case that little progress can be made, fewer than τ tours
will be run.
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n = 72, τ = 1
n = 72, τ = 5
n = 72, τ = 10
n = 72, τ = 15
n = 72, τ = 20
(a) n = 72













n = 93, τ = 1
n = 93, τ = 5
n = 93, τ = 10
n = 93, τ = 15
n = 93, τ = 20
(b) n = 93













n = 100, τ = 1
n = 100, τ = 5
n = 100, τ = 10
n = 100, τ = 15
n = 100, τ = 20
(c) n = 100
Figure 4.4: Comparison of simulated success
probabilities with experimental results for
Progressive BKZ with τ ≥ 1 on instances
with discrete Gaussian secret and error dis-
tributions. Dashed lines are simulations,
crosses are experiments.









] n = 65, τ = 20
n = 80, τ = 20
n = 100, τ = 20
Figure 4.5: Comparison of simulated BKZ success probabilities with experi-
















(a) Progressive BKZ, n = 72
τ












(b) BKZ, n = 72
τ












(c) Progressive BKZ, n = 93
τ












(d) BKZ, n = 93
τ












(e) Progressive BKZ, n = 100
τ












(f) BKZ, n = 100
Figure 4.6: The measured difference ∆E(β) (resp. ∆
√
V(β)) between the simu-
lated and experimental successful block size mean (resp. standard deviation),
as τ grows.
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n = 72, τ = 1
n = 72, τ = 5
n = 72, τ = 10
n = 72, τ = 15
n = 72, τ = 20
(a) n = 72













n = 93, τ = 1
n = 93, τ = 5
n = 93, τ = 10
n = 93, τ = 15
n = 93, τ = 20
(b) n = 93













n = 100, τ = 1
n = 100, τ = 5
n = 100, τ = 10
n = 100, τ = 15
n = 100, τ = 20
(c) n = 100
Figure 4.7: Comparison of simulated suc-
cess probabilities with experimental results
for Progressive BKZ on LWE instances with
scaled and centred binary secret and error
(Figures 4.7a and 4.7b), and ternary secret
and error (Figure 4.7c). Dashed lines are
simulations, crosses are experiments. Each
experimental result is averaged over 100 in-































τ = 5 τ = 10
τ = 15 τ = 20
Figure 4.8: Measured number of tours run by the BKZ 2.0 subroutine of
Progressive BKZ with τ ≥ 5 for each round of reduction with block size β.
Numbers are from experiments using the n = 100 parameters from Table 4.1,
with discrete Gaussian secret and error. Values are averaged over 100 instances.
Less than τ tours are run if either BKZ-β does not change the basis or auto-
abort triggers.
To verify this, we rerun experiments while measuring the number of tours run
by the BKZ subroutine. The data for the n = 100 experiments can be found
in Figure 4.8, and seems to confirm that auto-abort for β > 20 is much more
frequently triggered for τ > 10. This problem does not affect Progressive BKZ
with τ = 1 since even with auto-abort one tour is always run, and only slightly
affects τ = 5 and τ = 10.5 Indeed, predictions match experiments well in the
τ ≤ 10 cases (cf. Figure 4.4).
Sample variance. The other phenomenon is the presence of a slight plateau
in the probability plots as P [B ≤ β] ≥ 0.8. In the case of n = 72 we also see that
smaller than predicted block sizes accumulate a significant success probability.
Interestingly, this effect does not appear to be present in the case of binary secret
and error LWE, see Figures 4.7a and 4.7b. We expect that this phenomenon is
caused by the slight variation in sample variance throughout our experiments.
Indeed, if we think of our target vector v = (v1, . . . , vd) as sampled coefficient-
5Auto-abort will also not trigger for τ = 5, however in this case sometimes the BKZ-β
subroutine with β ≤ 10 returns after only one tour due to not making any changes to the
basis.
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wise from some distribution χ with variance σ2, in practice the resulting
sample variance for each particular LWE instance s2 := 1d
∑d
i=1 (vi − v̄)2, with
v̄ := 1d
∑
vi the sample mean, will likely slightly deviate from σ
2. We would
therefore expect ‖πi(v)‖2 to follow a distribution slightly different to σ2 ·χ2d−i+1.
However, in the case of χ = U({−1, 1}), the distribution resulting from scaled
and centred binary LWE embeddings, this distribution has a very small variance
of s2, i.e. V(s2),6 meaning that most sampled target vectors will have sample
variance almost exactly V(χ) = 1.
To verify this hypothesis, we run a set of n = 72 and n = 100 discrete Gaussian
experiments from Table 4.1, where we resample each LWE instance until
the target vector’s sample variance is within a 2% error of σ2, and then run
Progressive BKZ with τ in 1, 5, 10. The resulting experimental probability
distributions, shown in Figure 4.9, do not present plateaus (and in the case of
n = 72, they also do not present the high success probability for small block
sizes), supporting our hypothesis. In practice, this effect should not significantly
affect cryptographic parameters, as V(s2) ∈ O(1d) [KK51, Eq. 7.20], keeping
the effect of fluctuations in ‖πd−β+1(v)‖2 small as the embedding dimension d
increases.
Binary and ternary distributions. Our uSVP simulators output similarly
accurate simulations for scaled and centred binary and ternary secret and errors,
as seen in Figure 4.7, without making any alterations. This is in line with the
notion that the hardness of solving uSVP via lattice reduction depends on the
standard deviation of the target vector’s coefficients rather than on their exact
distribution. In recent work [CCLS20], Chen et al. run small block size (β ≤ 45)
experiments and from their results conclude that the [ADPS16] methodology
may be overestimating the security of binary and ternary secret LWE instances,
and that discrete Gaussian secrets offer “greater security levels”. We believe
their conclusions to be incorrect. First, their experiments are exclusively
run in the small block size regime, where it is known that lattice heuristics
often do not hold [GN08b, §4.2], [CN11, §6.1]. Second, their methodology
6Following [KK51], we compute V(s2) as approximately 0.00995, 0.00112, and 0.00005
for a discrete Gaussian with σ2 = 1, U({−1, 0, 1}) and U({−1, 1}) respectively, for sets of
200 (≈ d) samples.
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n = 72, τ = 1
n = 72, τ = 5
n = 72, τ = 10
(a) n = 72













n = 100, τ = 1
n = 100, τ = 5
n = 100, τ = 10
(b) n = 100
Figure 4.9: Progressive BKZ success probability against LWE instances with
discrete Gaussian secret and error and (n, σ2) ∈ {(72, 1), (100, 2/3)}, such that
their sample variance is within 2% of σ2.
does not take into account the norm of their embedded shortest vector. In
their experiments they compare LWEn,q,χ,m instances where χ is swapped
between several distributions with different variances. They use the [BG14b]
embedding, which results in target vectors whose expected norms grow with
the variance of χ. This means instances with narrower χ will be easier to
solve, something that can already be predicted by running the LWE estimator
using the secret distribution parameter (which will also implicitly account
for any advantageous secret vector coefficient guessing, as to reduce the LWE
instance’s dimensionality). This however does not mean that Gaussian secrets
offer inherently “greater security levels” than binary and ternary secrets, but
rather that given two LWE instances (where any useful coefficient guessing has
already occurred) with the same values for n, q and m, the larger the secret
variance, the harder the instance. Gaussian secrets with variance smaller than
1/4 would result in lower security than binary secrets in such a setting. We
think the experiments to determine whether discrete Gaussian secrets are more
secure than binary or ternary secrets should therefore compare LWE instances
with different secret distributions, but equal variances, as done in this section,
and that parameter selection for small secret LWE should take the secret’s
variance into consideration.
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4.4.2.2 BKZ
In the case of BKZ, simulations seem to stay similarly accurate across all secret
dimensions n, as reported in Figure 4.3. It should be noted that, even though
a larger gap than for Progressive BKZ can be seen between predictions and
experiments in the case of τ = 5, this predictive gap in expected block size of
less than 3 corresponds to about 1 bit in a core-sieve cost model [ADPS16].
Furthermore, this gap narrows as τ increases. Following experimental results
from [Che13, Figure 4.6] and [Alb17], designers often [ACD+18] consider it
sufficient to reduce a basis using τ = 16 tours of BKZ when specifying BKZ
cost models, due to the basis quality not improving significantly after 16 tours.
Our simulators seem accurate for values of τ in such a regime.
Another observation is that Progressive BKZ with τ = 1 outperforms BKZ
with τ = 5. Indeed, the earlier performs approximately β tours of increasing
block size versus the latter’s five tours of block size β. It seems therefore that
for these lattice parameters Progressive BKZ applies “more” lattice reduction.
We do not attempt to give a closed formula for the minimum block size for
which BKZ outperforms Progressive BKZ in output quality, and keep in mind
that a direct comparison of first viable block sizes does not alone capture the
relative cost of the two algorithms due to Progressive BKZ also performing
tours with smaller block sizes.
We also see that the phenomenon of success probabilities not increasing when
τ ≥ 10 that was observed for Progressive BKZ does not appear to occur in the
case of BKZ. This is compatible with our understanding of this phenomenon
in the case of Progressive BKZ. Indeed, BKZ-β will not auto-abort as often
due to the input basis not having already been reduced with, for example, τ
tours of BKZ-(β − 1).
However, a different interesting phenomenon can be observed. Sometimes,
as the block size is increased, the experimental success probability of BKZ
lowers, see the BKZ experiments in Figure 4.3. For example, this happens
between block sizes 60 and 61 in Figure 4.3a when running τ = 5 tours of BKZ.
Originally we believed this to be caused by the preprocessing strategies used
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in Fpylll. Indeed, at the time of writing, preprocessing strategies for block size
β (resp. β + 1) could include running BKZ-β′ (resp. BKZ-β′′), with β′ > β′′,
resulting in inferior quality preprocessing for BKZ-(β + 1) than for BKZ-β.
We replaced the default preprocessing strategies with a custom one such that
preprocessing block sizes are non-decreasing as a function of β, however this
did not remove the effect.
A possible cause for this phenomenon could be that basis profiles output by
the [CN11] simulator do not capture the possibility that Gram–Schmidt vector
norms can be non decreasing as a function of their index. This means that
one could have a BKZ-β reduced basis such that ‖b∗d−β‖ < ‖b∗d−β+1‖.7 This
event happening across instances or block sizes could be a potential cause
for the phenomenon. The probabilistic BKZ simulator developed in [BSW18]
seems to better capture this phenomenon, when run with a fixed PRNG seed.
An example of the output of our uSVP simulator for BKZ when replacing
the [CN11] simulator with the [BSW18] simulator can be found in Figure 4.10.
However, our experimental measurements are averaged over 100 runs. Running
our uSVP simulator with the [BSW18] simulator, and averaging its output,
results in a simulation with strictly increasing probabilities, unlike our measure-
ments. In any case, the overall success probability predictions stay reasonably
accurate.
Finally, looking at Figure 4.5, it seems that our simulations are consistent with
the measurements reported in Table 3.1 of Chapter 3. The simulators therefore
seem to explain the reported success probabilities of lower than expected block
sizes in Chapter 3.
4.5 Cryptographically sized LWE instances
In previous sections we developed simulators for the success probability of
solving uSVP instances and tested them against uSVP embedding lattices
7In general, by Definition 19 of BKZ-β reducedness we have ‖b∗i ‖2 = θ · ‖πi(bi+1)‖2 ≤
‖πi(bi+1)‖2 for some θ ∈ (0, 1]. Then ‖b∗i ‖2 < ‖b∗i+1‖2 iff (1 + µ2i+1,i) · θ < 1 where
µi+1,i = 〈bi+1,b∗i 〉/‖b∗i ‖2 ∈ [−1/2, 1/2].
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n = 100, τ = 5
n = 100, τ = 10
n = 100, τ = 15
n = 100, τ = 20
n = 100, τ = 30
(a) [BSW18]













n = 100, τ = 5
n = 100, τ = 10
n = 100, τ = 15
n = 100, τ = 20
n = 100, τ = 30
(b) Averaged [BSW18]
Figure 4.10: Both figures show BKZ experiments and uSVP simulations for
n = 100 instances with Gaussian secret and error, where the calls to the [CN11]
simulator made in Algorithm 12 are replaced. The left plot shows simulations
where the [BSW18] simulator is used with a fixed PRNG seed. The right plot
shows the same experimental data with with simulations obtained by averaging
the output of the [BSW18] simulator over 10 different seeds.
generated from small LWE instances that could be solved in practice. An
immediate application could be to use such simulators to estimate the behaviour
of lattice reduction when used against cryptographically sized instances.
Here we use the simulator to compute the expected first viable block sizes
required to solve LWE and NTRU instances proposed for the NIST PQC
standardisation process. In particular we look at the second round versions
of the three lattice KEM finalists; Kyber [SAB+19], NTRU [ZCH+19], and
Saber [DKRV19]. An interesting option would be to use the simulators to
predict what block size is required to solve an instance with a target low
success probability. However, as we discuss in Section 4.4.2, the simulations
are not necessarily fully accurate for smaller or larger block sizes, due to the
fluctuations in sample variance that an instance can have. While the effect
should be minor for cryptographically sized instances, low probability attacks
may also include combinatorial techniques not captured by our simulators.
Therefore, extracting block sizes for low probability attacks from the simulated
probabilities may not capture all of the necessary subtleties. Furthermore, we
will see that the window of block sizes predicted to be first viable is relatively
narrow, so that lower success probability attacks without combinatorial tricks
should not be significantly cheaper than higher success probability attacks.
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In Table 4.2, we look at parameter sets from the lattice KEM finalists in the
third round of the NIST PQC standardisation process [Nat16], as specified
during the second round. We provide expected first viable block sizes E(succ. β)
(and their standard deviations
√
V(succ. β)) when using 15 tours of BKZ, and
Progressive BKZ with τ = 1 or 5 (see Algorithm 7). We choose τ = 15 for BKZ
due to our experiments seemingly confirming the accuracy of our estimator
for this value and its closeness to 16, which is commonly found in BKZ cost
models. We choose τ = 1 and τ = 5 in the case of Progressive BKZ since
our experiments suggest both cases are accurately predicted by the uSVP
simulator; this allows us to see if running more tours in the BKZ subroutine
has any effect on the complexity of cryptographically sized parameters.
Two clear disclaimers should be made. First, in Table 4.2 we list the expected
block size required to solve uSVP instances for the primal attack. While in an
aggressive cost model for these algorithms, such as core-SVP [ADPS16], one
could be tempted to make direct cost comparisons between algorithms based
only on β, in the case of BKZ we assume that τ tours of BKZ-β are run, while
in the case of Progressive BKZ about τβ tours of varying block size are run.
Second, for both algorithms we fixed the same number of samples m, chosen
with the aid of the LWE estimator as the optimal number of samples when
using the “2016 estimate” (except in the case of NTRU, where we assume
m = n samples). This is not necessarily the optimal number of samples for
each specific block size when computed using a uSVP simulator. We therefore
avoid making claims and comparisons regarding the exact cost of solving uSVP
using the two algorithms, and propose our results as an intermediate step
between using the current LWE estimator and finding a theoretically cheapest
attack using our simulators.
4.5.1 Observations
In almost all cases the mean required block size E(succ. β) is predicted to
be larger than the LWE estimator currently suggests. Our results for using
Progressive BKZ with τ = 1 against NTRU-HPS are in line with what Dachman-
Soled et al. [DDGR20, Table 5] predict (NTRU-HPS being the only examined
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scheme in common). The increase in E(succ. β) may seem counter-intuitive.
The [ADPS16] already aims to recover E(succ. β), with the simulators described
in Section 4.3 capturing the success probability of smaller block sizes, possibly
reducing the value of E(succ. β). Indeed, the increase seems to be mainly due
to the use of the [CN11] simulator rather than the GSA for predicting the
profile of a BKZ reduced basis (i.e. the right hand side of (3.2)). An illustrative
example of this happening in the case of Kyber 512 can be see in Figure 4.11.
Indeed, patching the LWE estimator to partially8 use the [CN11] simulator, we
obtain E(succ. β) of Kyber 512 (resp. Kyber 768, Kyber 1024) of 390 (resp. 636,
890), narrowing the gap with the predictions obtained in Table 4.2 by using
our uSVP simulators. The small standard deviations reported in Table 4.2
suggest that the success probability of block sizes below E(succ. β) decrease
quickly.
4.6 Conclusions
Overall, our data suggests that the experiments in Section 4.4 show that the
techniques in Section 4.3 help to more accurately predict lattice reduction
success probabilities for solving uSVP. It also suggests that in the case of short
vectors sampled coefficient-wise from bounded uniform distributions, it is the
variance of the distribution, and not the exact probability mass function, that
determines the hardness of the primal attack against the LWE instance. The
uSVP simulators also seem to explain the success probability for smaller than
expected block sizes reported in Table 3.1 of Chapter 3.
As part of our experiments, we also tested whether using Progressive BKZ with
τ > 1 could be beneficial for an attacker. This seems to be useful to some small
degree from the point of view the of success probabilities, although BKZ seems
to perform comparatively well. However, Progressive BKZ could be of interest
to an attacker that wants to start performing lattice reduction as part of a
8For simplicity of implementation, our patch uses the GSA to predict the required block
size to perform lattice reduction and the optimal number of samples, as before. It uses
the [CN11] simulator for the basis profile output by BKZ, and to predict the block size
required to win by running OSVP on the last basis block.
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β, as predicted with the GSA
β, as predicted using [CN11]
Figure 4.11: Example plot showing the effect on the [ADPS16] methodology of
using the [CN11] BKZ simulator rather than the GSA, in the case of Kyber 512.
Due to the resulting higher basis profile, the GSA leads to picking a smaller
block size. The required winning block size in the [ADPS16] methodology is
the distance from the vertical line indicating the intersection to the final basis
index d. Note that this plot is zoomed in (d > 800).
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long term attack, but initially has access to fewer resources9 than necessary
to run BKZ with the expected first viable block size. Progressive BKZ would
then allow them to increase their resources as the attack progresses, with τ > 1
allowing them to stop at an overall slightly smaller final block size.
We also note that our preliminary estimates for the success probabilities of
lattice reduction on cryptographically sized instances result in higher block
sizes than output by the LWE estimator [APS15]. This seems to be mostly
due to our use of a BKZ simulator rather than the GSA. A patch to the LWE
estimator substituting the GSA with a BKZ simulator could mitigate this
effect.
While the simulators presented in [DDGR20] and in this chapter cover BKZ
and Progressive BKZ, the techniques are more general and could apply to
other lattice reduction algorithms. As an example, it could be interesting to
develop a uSVP simulator to assist designing and evaluating new strategies for
the General Sieve Kernel (G6K) [ADH+19].
Acknowledgements. We would like to thank Martin Albrecht and Léo
Ducas for useful conversations, and for their help simulating the LLL output
profile, and again Martin Albrecht for generating new Fplll preprocessing
strategies with non-decreasing block sizes.
9Say, memory if using lattice sieving to implement OSVP.
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In this chapter we repurpose existing RSA/ECC coprocessors for (ideal) lattice-
based cryptography by exploiting the availability of fast long integer multiplica-
tion. Such coprocessors are deployed in smart cards, in passports and identity
cards, in secured microcontrollers and in hardware security modules (HSM). In
particular, we demonstrate an implementation of a variant of the Module-LWE-
based Kyber Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) that is tailored for high
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performance on a commercially available smart card chip (SLE 78). To benefit
from the RSA/ECC coprocessor we use Kronecker substitution in combination
with schoolbook and Karatsuba [KO62] polynomial multiplication. Moreover, we
speed up symmetric operations in our Kyber variant using the AES coprocessor
to implement a PRNG and a SHA-256 coprocessor to realise hash functions.
This allows us to execute CCA-secure Kyber768 key generation in 79.6 ms,
encapsulation in 102.4 ms and decapsulation in 132.7 ms.
5.1 Motivation
From a practical perspective, two crucial requirements of cryptographic schemes
are efficiency and ease of deployment. Indeed, submissions to the NIST process
for standardisation of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are encouraged to
provide optimised software implementations aimed at general purpose micropro-
cessors. However, implementations of quantum-safe schemes are also required
in constrained (often embedded) environments such as microcontrollers or
smart cards.
In the smart card setting, low-power general purpose 16 or 32-bit CPUs are
commonly augmented by cryptographic coprocessors capable of executing Diffie-
Hellman key exchanges, encryptions or signatures based on RSA or elliptic
curves. As such, these cryptographic coprocessors come equipped with an
integer multiplier capable of handling multiplication (and addition) in ZN for
log2N ≈ 2048.
Contribution. In this chapter, we repurpose existing cryptographic copro-
cessors to accelerate lattice-based cryptography. For this we make use of
variants of Kronecker substitution combined with low-degree polynomial arith-
metic. Using this strategy, we manage to implement a variant of the Kyber Key
Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) [SAB+17] using the Kyber768 parameter
set promising 161 bits of security, as described in the first round of the NIST
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standardisation process.1 Our various implementations target a commercially
available smart card (SLE 78 with 16 Kbyte RAM) and its RSA, AES, and
SHA-256 coprocessors. To evaluate Kronecker substitution we implement
standard Kronecker substitution (KS1) together with Karatsuba-based poly-
nomial multiplication, and Kronecker substitution with negated evaluation
points (KS2) [Har09] using schoolbook-based polynomial multiplication. We
compare our results with an implementation of Kyber and NewHope on the
same target device that are not utilising large integer multiplication on the
coprocessor, implementations of RSA as well as related work. In summary,
our work provides evidence that lattice-based post-quantum cryptography can
be competitive with RSA on contactless high-security 16-bit smart cards with
only limited RAM when RSA, AES and SHA-2 coprocessors are used.
Approach and chapter roadmap. The key computational task in {Ring,
Module}-LWE encryption/decryption is to evaluate
MulAdd
(
a(x), b(x), c(x), f(x)
)
:= a(x) · b(x) + c(x) mod f(x)
for polynomials a(x), b(x), c(x) ∈ Zq[x]/(f(x)). In this work, we realise the
MulAdd gadget using a combination of a variant of Kronecker substitution
and low-degree polynomial arithmetic in the spirit of Schönhage’s trick [Sch77].
Kronecker substitution is a well-known and well-utilised technique in computer
algebra to reduce polynomial multiplication to integer multiplication. Briefly,
we start from standard Kronecker substitution [VZGG13, p. 245] by considering
a(2`) · b(2`) + c(2`) mod f(2`) where e.g. a(2`) represents the integer obtained
by evaluating a(x) at 2` for some sufficiently big integer `. However, for typical
parameter choices, e.g. those of Kyber or NewHope [ADPS16], this strategy
produces integers too large for our hardware multiplier to handle. Thus, in Sec-
tion 5.3 we apply a variant of Harvey [Har09] to our use-case. Harvey proposed
Kronecker variants which permit to half the required bit-size of the integers
being multiplied at the cost of doubling the number of multiplications. This
provides a worthwhile trade-off for medium-sized integers where quasi-linear
1We stress that our variant of Kyber is not interoperable with Kyber as specified
in [SAB+17]. The main differences are choices for symmetric functions and that Kyber
explicitly requires the usage of the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT), which we cannot
realise efficiently with our approach.
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integer multiplication algorithms [SS71, HVDH19] are not yet competitive.
However, in our context Harvey’s technique on its own still does not suffice
to reduce the integer operands to match our hardware multiplier. Thus, in
Section 5.4 we describe how we utilise (low-degree) polynomial arithmetic on
top. Overall, we obtain an implementation which computes the IND-CCA
Kyber768 decapsulation in 8 · (32 + 3 + 3) = 120 modular multiplications
of 2049-bit numbers. In contrast, decrypting 2048-bit RSA requires roughly
2 · 1.5 · 1024 = 3072 multiplications of 1024-bit numbers in Chinese Remainder
Theorem (CRT) representation.2 We describe our implementation in detail in
Section 5.5, discuss performance in Section 5.6 and finish with a discussion in
Section 5.7.
A proof of concept implementation of our MulAdd technique can be found at
github.com/fvirdia/lwe-on-rsa-copro.
Large modulus LWE. In lattice-based cryptography, noisy variants of
Kronecker substitution have been used to show various polynomial-time equiv-
alences. In [BLP+13] a reduction from n-dimensional LWE with modulus q to









n−i−1, A · S mod qn ≈ 〈a, s〉 · qn−1. (5.1)
This reduction is extended to the Approximate-GCD problem in [CS15].
In [CLT13], a variant of the Approximate-GCD problem is defined for re-
alising fully homomorphic encryption which permits to pack several plain-
text bits into one big integer using the CRT. The reduction from [BLP+13]
is extended in [AD17] to a reduction from Module-LWE to large modulus
Ring-LWE and a dimension-halving, modulus squaring self-reduction of Ring-







2Of course, this metric does not account for the cost of embedding of polynomials
into integers as well as additional operations required in lattice-based cryptography, like
randomness sampling or expensive CCA transformations. Moreover, the data structures in
RSA are much smaller than in lattice-based cryptography so that transfers between CPU and
coprocessors with internal memory appropriate to hold RSA-2048 base, exponent, modulus
and result have much less impact on performance.
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c(x) = a(x) · s(x) mod xn + 1, we have





where ≈s means ≈ in each “slot” defined by powers of q. This observation
then gives rise to the I-RLWE problem, which also permits packing several
plaintext bits into one large integer. In [Gu19], a reduction from Ring-LWE to
I-RLWE is given, but this reduction does not consider the noise distribution,
only its size.3 In [Ham17], a variant of I-RLWE over a pseudo-Mersenne field
is given to instantiate an MLWE KEM. Similarly, [AJPS17] can be considered
as an integer variant of NTRU.
Post-quantum cryptography on microcontrollers. Microcontrollers and
embedded processors usually have only very limited amount of available RAM
and space to store program code, and operate with relatively simple 8-, 16-,
or 32-bit processor architectures. They are sometimes also referred to as
constrained devices and are mostly used in embedded applications where low
energy consumption, reduced device costs, and other aspects like real-time
capabilities are required. Such requirements are commonly not fulfilled by com-
puter systems or powerful System-on-Chips (SoC) with external non-volatile
memory (NVM) or RAM. A special class of constrained devices are smart
cards or chip cards which are used in electronic banking, secured identification
(e.g. passports or national ID cards), authentication, or transport and ticketing
applications. Smart cards are usually equipped with protection mechanisms
against a wide range of invasive or non-invasive attacks and they often feature
dedicated accelerators to speed up and to protect cryptographic operations
(e.g. AES, ECC or RSA). Most commercial chip cards are certified according
to Common Criteria4 and evaluated in a laboratory.
The implementation of post-quantum cryptography on constrained devices is an
active research area. Most works in the literature focus on performance but from
a practical standpoint RAM consumption, code footprint and maintainability
3We note, though, that according to all known cryptanalytic results for public-key





of the code-base are also important metrics. Examples of PQC implementa-
tions are works that deal with multivariate signatures [CHT12], code-based
encryption [vMOG15] and hash-based signatures [HRS16]. In the area of
lattice-based cryptography, examples are an implementation of NTRU [BSJ15],
an implementation of BLISS signatures on 32-bit ARM [OPG14], an imple-
mentation of CPA-secure public-key encryption based on Ring-LWE on an
8-bit AVR [LPO+17] and 32-bit ARM [dCRVV15]. An implementation of the
NewHope key exchange protocol which is similar to Ring-LWE encryption is
given in [AJS16]. In [KBMSRV18] an implementation of Saber is provided
which is an MLWE-based KEM that does not rely on the NTT for polynomial
multiplication.
Similarly, the protection of lattice-based cryptography against side-channel at-
tacks has already been explored. An implementation of a masked decryption of
Ring-LWE CPA-secure PKE is described in [RdCR+16] and an implementation
of a CCA-secure and masked variant is given in [OSPG18]. A masked imple-
mentation of the GLP signature scheme is provided in [BBE+18]. What had
received comparably less attention in the literature up to the time of publication
of this chapter as [AHH+18] were flexible cryptographic coprocessors for lattice-
based cryptography in the spirit of RSA or ECC coprocessors (cf. [SBPV07])
and instruction set extensions (cf. a multiply-accumulate instruction [Wen13]).
5.2 Preliminaries
We use the notation for polynomials set in Section 1.1. In particular, we let
R = Z[x]/(xn + 1) where n is a power of two, and let Rq = Zq[x]/(xn + 1) for
some positive integer q.
5.2.1 Kyber
A recent construction relying on the MLWE problem is the Kyber Key En-
capsulation Mechanism. Kyber has been submitted to the NIST PQC stan-
dardisation process [SAB+17] and a variant is also published as an academic
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paper [BDK+18]. It is defined by an intermediate IND-CPA secure Public-Key
Encryption (PKE) scheme which is then transformed to an IND-CCA secure
KEM using a generic transform [HHK17].5 We note that Kyber unambiguously
refers to the IND-CCA secure KEM, i.e. [SAB+17] does not formally propose a
public-key encryption scheme nor a KEM which only claims IND-CPA security.
Furthermore, we stress that we will be referring throughout to Kyber as it was
presented during the first round of the NIST standardisation process, and will
not discuss the updates made to the its parameters in the following rounds.
Definition 27 (Simplified Kyber.CPA following [BDK+18]; cf. [SAB+17]).
For n = 256 let k, n, q, η, dt, du, dv be positive integers. Let M = {0, 1}n be the
plaintext space, where each message m ∈M can be seen as a polynomial in R
with coefficients in {0, 1}. Define the functions
Compressq(x, d) := b(2d/q) · xe mod(+) 2d ,
Decompressq(x, d) := b(q/2d) · xe,
let χ be a centered binomial distribution with support {−η, . . . , η}, and let
χn be the distribution of polynomials of degree n with entries independently
sampled from χ. Define the public-key encryption scheme Kyber.CPA =
(Kyber.CPA.Gen, Kyber.CPA.Enc, Kyber.CPA.Dec) as in Algorithms 13,
14 and 15.
1 (ρ, σ)




σ←− χkn × χkn
4 t← Compressq(As + e, dt)
5 return pkCPA := (t, ρ), skCPA := s
Algorithm 13: Kyber.CPA.Gen.
In Kyber, the parameters that define the base ring Rq are fixed at n = 256 and
q = 7681. The parameters that define key and ciphertext compression are also
fixed and set to du = 11, dv = 3 and dt = 11. The three different security levels
are obtained by different choices of k and η. All relevant Kyber parameters
are summarised in Table 5.1.
5We note that [SAB+17] does not include the Targhi-Unruh tag.
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1 t← Decompressq(t, dt)
2 A
ρ←− Rk×kq
3 (r, e1, e2)
r←− χkn × χkn × χn
4 u← Compressq(AT r + e1, du)
5 v ← Compressq(〈t, r〉+ e2 + b q2e ·m, dv)
6 return c := (u, v)
Algorithm 14: Kyber.CPA.Enc.
Input: skCPA = s
Input: c = (u, v)
1 u← Decompressq(u, du)
2 v ← Decompressq(v, dv)
3 return Compressq(v − 〈s,u〉 , 1)
Algorithm 15: Kyber.CPA.Dec.
The performance of an implementation of Kyber depends highly on the speed
of the polynomial multiplication algorithm and the performance of the PRNG
instantiations as a large number of pseudo-random data is required when
generating A
ρ←− Rk×kq or when sampling noise from χkn. Regarding operations
in Rq, Kyber.CPA.Gen requires the computation of k
2 multiplications and
(k − 1)k + k additions (line 4 of Algorithm 13). For encryption as defined in
Kyber.CPA.Enc, k2 multiplications and (k − 1)k + k additions (line 4 of
Algorithm 14) as well as k multiplications and (k− 1) + 2 additions (line 5) are
needed. The decryption routine Kyber.CPA.Dec can be implemented with k
multiplications and k−1+1 additions (line 3 of Algorithm 15). Note that Kyber
specifies a Number Theoretic Transform (NTT). The NTT allows to implement
a fast polynomial multiplication by computing c = NTT−1(NTT(a) ◦NTT(b))
for a, b, c ∈ Rq, where ◦ denotes coefficient-wise multiplication. Kyber exploits
that the NTT is a one-to-one map and assumes that randomly sampled poly-
nomials in A are already in the transformed domain. Thus, an implementation
using a different multiplication algorithm than the NTT would have to apply
an inverse transformation first and then use the polynomial multiplication
algorithm of its choice to stay compatible with the original specification.
Given two hash functions G : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2×256 and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}256,
Kyber is obtained from Kyber.CPA using a Fujisaki-Okamoto style transform
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Scheme n q k η Bit-sec. NIST lv. failure |pk| |sk| |ctxt|
Kyber512 256 7681 2 5 102 1 2−145 736 1632 800
Kyber768 256 7681 3 4 161 3 2−142 1088 2400 1152
Kyber1024 256 7681 4 3 218 5 2−169 1440 3168 1504
Table 5.1: Parameters proposed to NIST for instantiating Kyber KEM. Sizes
of the public key (|pk|), secret key (|sk|), and ciphertext (|ctxt|) are given in
bytes. “Bit-sec.” refers to the “quantum” bit security claimed by the designers.
from [HHK17] as shown in Algorithms 16, 17, 18. Within Kyber.Decaps a
re-encryption has to be computed whose result is compared to the received
ciphertext. Thus Kyber specifies exactly how to generate the uniformly random
matrix A as well as polynomials from the error distribution χn from a seed.
For this the authors of Kyber have chosen different instantiations from the
SHA3 family (SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256, SHA3-256 and SHA3-512).
1 ((t, ρ), s)← Kyber.CPA.Gen()
2 z
$←− {0, 1}256
3 h← H(t, ρ)
4 return pk := (t, ρ), sk := (s, t, ρ, h, z)
Algorithm 16: Kyber.Gen.




3 (K̂, r)← G(m,H(pk))
4 (u, v)← Kyber.CPA.Enc(pk,m; r)
5 c← (u, v)




We use an Infineon SLE 78CLUFX5000 chip card6 with 16 Kbyte RAM and
500 Kbyte NVM which features a 16-bit CPU running at 50 MHz. The target
chip is equipped with common peripherals (watchdog, timers), internal secu-
6We refer the reader to https://www.infineon.com/cms/de/product/
security-smart-card-solutions/security-controllers/sle-78/ for more informa-
tion on the SLE 78 family.
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Input: sk = (s, t, ρ, h, z)
Input: c = (u, v)
1 m′ ← Kyber.CPA.Dec(s, (u, v))
2 (K̂ ′, r′)← G(m′, h)
3 (u′, v′)← Kyber.CPA.Enc(pk,m′; r′)
4 if (u′, v′) = (u, v) then
5 K ← H(K̂ ′, H(c))
6 else
7 K ← H(z,H(c))
8 return K
Algorithm 18: Kyber.Decaps.
rity functions and encryption procedures, a True Random Number Generator
(TRNG), as well as a symmetric coprocessor to accelerate AES, a coproces-
sor to compute SHA-256 and an asymmetric coprocessor for RSA and ECC
acceleration. The chip allows contact-based as well as contactless operation
where it is powered by a field generated by a common smart card reader. It is
intended for use in applications like passports, identity cards, access control or
payment cards (e.g. banking, value or credit cards). A similar target device
from the SLE 78 family has previously been used to implement hash-based
XMSS signatures [HBB13] and eta pairings [GK15].
The asymmetric coprocessor on the SLE 78CLUFX5000 allows fast basic
long number calculations on integers slightly larger than 2048 bits (addition,
subtraction, integer multiplication, modular multiplication). In practice it is
mainly used by cryptographic libraries for RSA and ECC. However, for an
earlier generation smart card (Infineon SLE 66P) Garcia and Seifert describe
an implementation of AES on the modular arithmetic coprocessor [GS02].
As there is no standard for RSA/ECC coprocessors, our low-level implemen-
tation is certainly vendor specific. However, the general approach described
in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 should be transferable to a large number of
devices as most other smart card vendors appear to use similar approaches.
Additional devices that could profit from our work could be server systems like
the IBM PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor7 or existing FPGA-based RSA/ECC
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5.3 Kronecker substitution
Kronecker substitution (KS) is a classical technique in computer algebra for
reducing polynomial arithmetic to large integer arithmetic, cf. [VZGG13, p. 245]
and [Har09]. The fundamental idea behind this technique is that univariate
polynomial and integer arithmetic are identical except for carry propagation
in the latter. Thus, coefficients are simply packed into an integer in such a
way as to terminate any possible carry chain. For example, say, we want to
multiply two polynomials f(x) := x+ 2 with g(x) := 3x+ 4 in Z[x]. We may
write f(100) = 100 + 2 = 102 and g(100) = 300 + 4 = 304. Multiplying gives
102 · 304 = 31008 or 3x2 + 10x + 8. In implementations, we use powers of
two as evaluation points since this permits efficient “packing” (polynomial to
integer) and “unpacking” (integer to polynomial) using only cheap bit shifts.
In this work, we employ Kronecker substitution for computing
MulAdd
(
a(x), b(x), c(x), f(x)
)
:= a(x) · b(x) + c(x) mod f(x)
with all polynomials having signed coefficients from different ranges.
In more detail, we first pack the polynomials into integers A,B,C, F using
Algorithm 19 (Snort). We then compute D := A · B + C mod F . Finally,
we unpack D to d(x) using Algorithm 20 (Sneeze). We note that our pack-
ing/unpacking algorithms are straight-forward adaptations of standard Kro-
necker packing/unpacking to the signed case, cf. [Har09]. We made public
high-level, proof-of-concept SageMath [S+17] implementations for the algo-
rithms in this section at https://github.com/fvirdia/lwe-on-rsa-copro.
Lemma 20 establishes the correctness of this procedure. While correctness of
Kronecker substitution is well-established [Har09], we give a complete proof of
correctness and in particular the required precision in order to maintain the
same error as in Kyber, since faithful re-encryption is required for standard
IND-CCA transforms such as the one in [HHK17] utilised by Kyber. On the
other hand, loosening this requirement, permits to decrease precision (the
parameter ` below) and hence to improve performance. Before stating and
188
5.3 Kronecker substitution
Input: g ∈ Z[x]
Input: f ∈ Z[x]
Input: bitlength `
1 return g(2`) mod(+) f(2`)
Algorithm 19: Snort(g, f, `).
proving Lemma 20, we describe in Example 18 the approach to signed coefficient
unpacking that we use, which underpins the proof of the lemma.
Example 18. Let f = f1 x+ f0 and F = f(B) be the result of a polynomial
multiplication using KS with evaluation point B = 100. In the case of unsigned
coefficients, we would know that |fi| < B and would recover f0 as F mod(+) B.
However, in the case of signed coefficients, this is not sufficient. Indeed, let
f = x − 3 such that F = 97. Then f̄0 = F mod(+) 100 = 97 6= f0. We can
however unpack f if we change our guarantee on f ’s coefficients to |fi| < B/2.
Indeed, in this case
f̄0 = F mod
(+) B = f1 ·B + f0 mod(+) B = f0 mod(+) B = f0 + t ·B,
for some t ∈ Z. Since we know that |f0| < B/2, t must be either 0 (if
f̄0 < B/2) or 1 (if f̄0 ≥ B/2). In the first case f0 = f̄0, otherwise f0 = f̄0−B.
We can now subtract f0 from F , divide by B and move on to recover f1 by
repeating the same process.
Remark 19. The procedure described in Example 18 essentially amounts to
replacing mod(+) with mod(−) during KS unpacking, and subtracting f0
from F and dividing by B when moving to the next coefficient rather than just
floor-dividing F by B.












i ≡ a · b+ c mod f
with |di| ≤ δ, where δ is positive and depends on α, β, γ, n, f and f is monic
of degree n such that f(2`) > 2n` − 1. Let ϕ := maxi<n |fi|, and let ` >
log2(δ + ϕ) + 1 be an integer (e.g. ` = dlog2(δ + ϕ+ 1)e+ 1).
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Input: G ∈ {0, . . . , f(2`)− 1}
Input: f ∈ Z[x], monic
Input: bitlength `
1 n← deg(f)
2 G[−1] ← G
3 for i← 0 to n− 1 do // step i






6 if e(i) > 2`−1 then // negative coefficient
7 e(i) ← e(i) − 2`
8 G[i] ← G[i] + 1
9 r(i) ← e(i)
10 for i← 0 to n− 1 do r(i) ← r(i) − fiG[n−1] // subtract b · f(x)
11 return {r(i)}n−1i=0
Algorithm 20: Sneeze(G, f, `). The label G[i] represents the state of the
n`-bit integer variable G at step i.
If
A := Snort(a, f, `),
B := Snort(b, f, `),
C := Snort(c, f, `),
and
D := A ·B + C mod(+) f(2`),
then Sneeze (D, f, `) returns {r(i)}n−1i=0 where r(i) = di for i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
Proof. We need to uniquely encode any possible d as an integer modulo f(2`).
Since the encodings of the coefficients di are ` bits long, and we need to store
n of them, this means that we require f(2`) > 2n` − 1.
When Sneeze is called, we set
G[−1] := D = A ·B + C mod(+) f(2`).
Since d ≡ a · b+ c mod f , it follows by explicit computation that




`i + b f(2`)
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2` − 1 ≤ (2
`−1 − 1) 2
n` − 1
2` − 1 < 2
n`−1,
the assumption that f(2`) > 2n` − 1 > 2n`−1 implies that b ∈ {0, 1}.
The main computation in Sneeze is done between lines 3 and 9, and amounts
to signed coefficient unpacking of d+ bf as described in Example 18. Formally,
we define some conditions on the output of the i-th iteration of the loop and
prove they hold by induction.
Claim 2. After step i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, we have











Assume Conditions 5.2, 5.3 hold for step i − 1 ≥ 0. We start on line 4 by
assigning










= di + b fi + ti 2
`
for some ti ∈ Z such that e(i) ∈ [0, 2` − 1]. Similar to before, by definition of `
and the fact that b ∈ {0, 1}, we have
|di + b fi| ≤ δ + ϕ < 2`−1 for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} (5.4)













and balance e(i) mod 2` (lines 6–8). By the size consideration made in Inequal-
ity 5.4, this amounts to subtracting ti2
` from e(i). We keep account of this
subtraction by adding back ti to G
[i] (line 8). Finally, we assign r(i) ← e(i).
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Hence Conditions 5.2, 5.3 hold for step i ≥ 1. Similarly, we can see that
Conditions 5.2, 5.3 also hold for step i = 0, proving the claim.
By Condition 5.3 and f being monic, after step i = n − 1 we have G[n−1] =
b < 2`, which would become the coefficient of an n-th power of x in d. Line 10
takes care of reducing this modulo f , which results in assigning
r(i) ← r(i) − fiG[n−1] = di + b fi − fi b = di for all i < n,
completing the proof.
Since operating on G[i] involves integer arithmetic on n` bit integers, we may
modify Algorithm 20 to correct carries on e(i) in order to avoid executing
line 8 of Algorithm 20. This variant of the algorithm is given as Algorithm 21.
Note that with this change the only large integer operations are division with
remainder modulo 2` and thus cheap, while the final output of the algorithm
is the same.
Lemma 20 can be in particular used in the case where f is a power of two
cyclotomic polynomial or a prime cyclotomic polynomial.8 This results in the
following corollaries.
Corollary 4 (Power of two cyclotomic). Let α, β, γ be as above, let n be a
power of 2, and let f(x) = xn + 1. Let δ := nαβ + γ. Then Lemma 20 applies.
Proof. We need to verify that
f(2`) > 2n` − 1 (5.5)
and that
|di| ≤ δ (5.6)






i := a(x) · b(x) + c(x) (mod xn + 1)
8The latter being proposed by the LIMA team [SAL+17] for use with safe-primes, as to












|di| ≤ nαβ + γ =: δ.
Corollary 5 (Prime cyclotomic). Let α, β, γ be as above, let n = p− 1 where
p is prime, and let f =
∑n
i=0 x
i. Let δ := (2n − 1)αβ + γ. Then Lemma 20
applies.
To prove Corollary 5, we first need the following lemma.










i. Let ci :=
∑
j+k=i ajbk such that c :=
∑2n−2
i=0 ci x








(ci − cn + ci+n+1)xi + (cn−2 − cn)xn−2 + (cn−1 − cn)xn−1
and each di is a sum of at most 2n− 1 terms of the form ajbk.
Proof. Let f (m) :=
∑m
i=0 x
i (it follows that f ≡ f (n)). Since a and b have
degree < n, we know that we need to reduce modulo f only the powers xi+n
for i = 0, . . . , n− 2 of c. For i ≥ 1 we have
xi+n ≡ xi(xn − f (n)(x)) (mod f)
= −xi(f (n−1))
= −xi−1(xf (n−1))
= −xi−1(f (n) − 1)
≡ xi−1 (mod f),
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(ci − cn + cn+i+1)xi + (cn−2 − cn)xn−2 + (cn−1 − cn)xn−1 (mod f)
where each ci is a sum of
#{(j, k) ∈ [0, n− 1]2 ∩ Z2 | j + k = i} = n− |i− n+ 1| (5.7)
terms ajbk, where (5.7) can be shown by considering first the case where i < n
(easy), and the case where i = n + h for some h ≥ 0 (we need j ∈ [0, n − 1]
and k = n+ h− j ∈ [0, n− 1]; check for how many j the constraint k ≤ n− 1





(ci − cn + cn+i+1)xi + (cn−2 − cn)xn−2 + (cn−1 − cn)xn−1
where by explicit computation dn−1 is a sum of 2n−1 terms ajbk, dn−2 is a sum
of 2n− 2 such terms and, for i ≤ n− 3, di has 3n− |i− n+ 1| − |n− n+ 1| −
|n+ i+ 1− n+ 1| = 2n− 2 such terms.
We can now prove Corollary 5.
Proof of Corollary 5. We need to verify that
f(2`) > 2n` − 1 (5.8)
and that
|di| ≤ δ (5.9)
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i ≡ a · b+ c (mod f)




|di| ≤ (2n− 1)αβ + γ =: δ.
























with |ai,j | ≤ α, |bi,j | ≤ β, and |cj | ≤ γ and want to compute
∑κ
i=1 ai · bi + c
(mod f), by letting
` > log2(κ(δ − γ) + γ + ϕ) + 1.
Overall, we arrive at the following corollary.












η + η + 1
)
+ 1
be an integer. Let Ai := Snort(ai, f, `), Bi := Snort(bi, f, `), C := Snort(c, f, `),
and D := A · B + C mod(+) f(2`). Then Sneeze (D, f, `) returns d :=
∑κ
i=1 ai · bi + c (mod f).
Remark 22. From d ∈ R, the result in Rq can be obtained by coefficient-wise
modular reduction.
195
RLWE-based Schemes Using an RSA Coprocessor
Input: G ∈ {0, . . . , f(2`)− 1}
Input: f ∈ Z[x], monic
Input: bitlength `
1 n← deg(f)
2 G[−1] ← G, c ← 0
3 for i← 0 to n− 1 do // step i






6 e(i) ← e(i) + c
7 if e(i) > 2`−1 then e(i) ← e(i) − 2`, c ← 1 else c ← 0
8 r(i) ← e(i)
9 for i← 0 to n− 1 do
10 r(i) ← r(i) − fi (G[n−1] + c) // subtract b · f(x)
11 return {r(i)}n−1i=0
Algorithm 21: Sneeze-Fast(G, f, `). Same as Sneeze, but avoiding
large integer arithmetic for carry propagation. The label G[i] represents the
state of the n`-bit integer variable G at step i.
5.3.1 Compact Kronecker substitution
In [Har09], David Harvey presents two improved packing techniques for Kro-
necker substitution, reducing integer sizes at the cost of performing more










halves the required integer bit size at the cost of performing two multiplications.
Note that integer arithmetic is super-linear (e.g. Karatsuba multiplication is
used for medium-sized inputs and has a cost of 3log2 L multiplications for inte-
gers of size L, see below) and thus this trade-off produces a noticeable speed-up.
The two techniques are orthogonal and can be combined, which reduces bit
sizes by a factor of four at the cost of increasing the number of multiplications
to four. The combined algorithm is referred to as KS4.
The KS2 algorithm proceeds as follows. Assume a(x), b(x) are such that their
product c(x) := a(x) · b(x) has positive coefficients bounded by 22`. Let



















5.4 Splitting the ring
Then, we can recover the even coefficients of c(x) from





and the odd coefficients from





since the sum and the difference cancel out either the even or the odd powers.
The coefficients can be either read directly with care to their offset, or dividing
the above quantities by the appropriate power of 2 over the integers.
The KS2 algorithm is compatible with arithmetic modulo f = xn + 1, when n
is even. When doing this over Zf(2`) some care must be taken since reducing
c(·) modulo f(2`) may change its parity. In such case the coefficients can be
recovered by either multiplying c(+) + c(−) by 2−1 mod(+) f(2`) and c(+)− c(−)
by 2−`−1 mod(+) f(2`), or multiplying both quantities by a desired power of 2
modulo f(2`) and reading the coefficients with the appropriate offset. Packing
and unpacking are identical to standard Kronecker substitution, i.e. the proof
of Lemma 20 applies directly when working with such an f .
On the other hand, adapting packing and unpacking to combine the KS3
algorithm with modular reduction is somewhat more involved, requiring a fair
amount of careful bit shifting. Implementing this strategy would roughly half
the number of multiplications required at the cost of a more involved pack-
ing/unpacking algorithm. However, since our packing and unpacking routines
already take time comparable to the actual multiplications they facilitate and
since our target platform does not have efficient bit-shift operations, we did
not attempt an implementation of KS3 or KS4.
5.4 Splitting the ring
Commercially available multipliers are usually capable of evaluating (x, y, z) 7→
x · y (mod z) where log x, log y, log z < m for some fixed value of m which
may be lower than what is required to apply Lemma 20 directly. In fact,
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for typical parameter sizes of lattice-based cryptography and of RSA, this is
expected to be the case. Thus, in this section – where we focus on f = xn + 1
with n a power of two – we explain our strategy for utilising these “too small”
multipliers.
Let a(x), b(x), c(x) be polynomials of degree < n as defined in Lemma 20
and let ` be the packing length used, we want to compute a(x) · b(x) + c(x)
(mod f(x)). So far we have considered two ways of doing this. First, we
can pack every coefficient of each polynomial individually in a large enough
buffer, say of length `, and then directly compute the result using polynomial
arithmetic. Alternatively, we can use Lemma 20 and evaluate a(2`) · b(2`) +
c(2`) mod(+) (2n` + 1) packing all the coefficients of each polynomial at once
in a buffer of length n`+ 1, and then unpack the final result. A third option
consists of interpolating between these two methods by combining Kronecker
substitution with (typically low-degree) polynomial arithmetic in order to
shorten the lengths of the multiplier’s inputs. This approach is similar to fast
integer multiplication algorithms by Schönhage [Sch77] or Nussbaumer [Nus80].
The idea is the following. Say we have
a(x) = a0 + a1 x+ a2 x
2 + a3 x
3 and b(x) = b0 + b1 x+ b2 x
2 + b3 x
3
and we want to compute a(x) · b(x) (mod x4 + 1), i.e.
(a3b0 + a2b1 + a1b2 + a0b3)x
3 + (a2b0 + a1b1 + a0b2 − a3b3)x2
+(a1b0 + a0b1 − a3b2 − a2b3)x + a0b0 − a3b1 − a2b2 − a1b3
but we have a multiplier that would only let us work modulo x2 + 1 given the `
required by Lemma 20. Letting y = x2, we can write a(x, y) = a(0)(y)+a(1)(y)x
where
a(0)(y) = a0 + a2 y and a
(1)(y) = a1 + a3 y,
and similarly for b = b(x, y). Then, computing a(x, y) · b(x, y) (mod y2 + 1)
can be accomplished by packing A(·) = Snort(a(·)), B(·) = Snort(b(·)), and
multiplying
Ĉ(x) := a(x, 2`) · b(x, 2`) mod(+) 22` + 1
= (A(0) +A(1) x) · (B(0) +B(1) x) mod(+) 22` + 1,
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where the coefficients A(·) = a(·)(y)|y=2` and B(·) can be multiplied on the
coprocessor since now the substitution is y = x2 = 2`, meaning the packed
polynomials will fit the smaller multiplier. If we were to unpack the coefficients
of Ĉ(x), we would obtain
(a1b1 − a3b3 + (a3b1 + a1b3) y)x2 + a0b0 − a2b2 + (a2b0 + a0b2) y
+(a1b0 + a0b1 − a3b2 − a2b3 + (a3b0 + a2b1 + a1b2 + a0b3) y)x.
Note that the coefficients on the second line match our target, but the coeffi-
cients on the first line do not (they are not grouped correctly and the signs do
not necessarily match). This can be corrected by using the identity y = x2 and
thus rewriting x2 → y and reducing again modulo y2 +1 (equivalently, rewriting
x2 → 2` and reducing modulo 22` + 1). From our intermediate representation
Ĉ(x) = Ĉ0 + Ĉ1 x+ Ĉ2 x




` · Ĉ2 mod(+) 22` + 1)
)
mod(+) 22` + 1 and C1 = Ĉ1,
and then unpacking C(x) to obtain a · b (mod x4 + 1).
More generally, this can be formally described as follows. Let n = m ·ω, where
m  ω. Given a polynomial p(x) = ∑n−1i=0 pixi of degree < n, we can set
y = xm, and then rewrite p as
p(x, y) =
(





p1 + p1+m y + · · ·+ p1+(ω−1)m yω−1
)
x1
+ . . .
+
(
pm−1 + pm−1+m y + · · ·+ pm−1+(ω−1)m yω−1
)
xm−1
= p(0)(y) + p(1)(y)x+ · · ·+ p(m−1)(y)xm−1
where we write p(i)(y) :=
∑ω−1
j=0 pi+jm y
j , polynomials in y of degree < ω (i.e.
p(i) ← Ff(p,m, i), cf. Algorithm 22). The idea is to pack each p(i), p ∈ {a, b, c},
into buffers P (i) := p(i)(2`) mod(+) (2ω` + 1) of length ω`+1, and then evaluate
a(x, 2`) · b(x, 2`) + c(x, 2`) mod(+) (2ω` + 1),
where p(x, 2`) ≡ ∑mi=0 P (i) xi. By Lemma 20, the integer modulo operation
will act on the coefficients as reduction modulo yω + 1 ≡ xn + 1 (mod y − xm)
would.
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Working with polynomials a(x, y), b(x, y), the resulting polynomial a(x, y) ·
b(x, y) will be a linear combination of monomials of the form yi xj . If we were
to substitute xm = y back now, we would obtain monomials of degree ≥ n every
time that im+ j ≥ n, which we do not want. Furthermore, depending on how
we index the yi xj in our code, we may be in need of combining (“grouping”)
constant coefficients from different monomials yi xj 6= yr xs mapping to the
same power of x.
To better see what adjustments need to be done to the resulting polynomial in
x, we look at a(x, y) · b(x, y) (mod yω + 1) in detail.
















(−1)Jj+s≥ωKai+jm br+sm y[j+s]ω xi+r (mod yω + 1)
Given that y[j+s]ω xi+r ≡ xm·[j+s]ω + i+r (mod y − xm), we can see that after
reducing modulo yω + 1 it will be necessary to further reduce modulo y − xm
whenever m · [j + s]ω + i+ r ≥ n, which can happen only if i+ r ≥ m. We do
this by sending any monomial yj xi where i ≥ m to yj+1 xi−m (mod yω + 1),
or equivalently by mapping monomials xi with i ≥ m to 2` xi−m, as done in
Line 10 of Algorithm 23. This also takes care of groupings. Then, we can
simply Sneeze every coefficient to obtain the final result. The full procedure
results in Algorithms 22 and 23.
A possible optimisation could be that of choosing ` more aggressively. Indeed,
we only ever need to pack polynomials of degree ω, and hence we could use
this value in place of n. This would save ≈ logm bits per packed coefficient
while still being able to perform the reduction modulo yω + 1 ≡ 2ω` + 1, overall
resulting in a saving of size ≈ ω logm bits per packed polynomial p(i)(y). In
this case one would need to unpack the P (i) before the second reduction and
final grouping, and handle these afterwards on the CPU.
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Input: polynomial g ∈ R
Input: step size m, dividing n
Input: offset o





Algorithm 22: Ff(g,m, o). Re-
turn a new polynomial containing
every mth coefficient of g, starting
at offset o.
At the heart of Algorithm 23 is polynomial multiplication of two, typically
low-degree, polynomials in line 7. A straightforward choice to realise this
multiplication is schoolbook multiplication. This has quadratic complexity
but is a simple algorithm. Another natural option is Karatsuba multipli-
cation [KO62]. In its simplest form, the algorithm computes the product
a+ b ·x and c+ d ·x in Z[x] by computing the products t0 = a · c, t1 = b · d and
t2 = (a+b) ·(c+d) = ac+ad+bc+bd and outputting t0 +(t2−t0−t1) ·x+t2x2.
It has a cost of 3dlog2 Le multiplications for degree L− 1 polynomials. We note
that finding better multiplication formulas for larger degrees is an active area
of research [Mon05, FH07, CÖ10, BDEZ12].
5.5 Implementation
Using the strategies outlined in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we are now ready to fix
an implementation of Kyber and the KyberMulAdd gadget (see Corollary 6)
using a big integer multiplier. We focus on the Kyber768 parameter set
and implement our variants of the scheme on the Infineon SLE 78 (SLE
78CLUFX5000) equipped with an RSA, an AES and a SHA-256 coprocessor
and 16 Kbyte RAM. All our software is native code written in C and assembly
language.
5.5.1 Description of Kyber using Kronecker substitution
First we provide a description of our variant of Kyber.CPA that takes
into account Kronecker substitution. The algorithms closely resemble the
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Input: polynomial a(x) ∈ R
Input: polynomial b(x) ∈ R
Input: bitlength `
Input: width parameter ω, dividing n
1 f ← xω + 1
2 m ← n/ω
// construct polynomials A(x), B(x) of degree < m
3 for i← 0 to m− 1 do
4 Ai ← Snort(Ff(a(x), m, i), f, `)
5 Bi ← Snort(Ff(b(x), m, i), f, `)
6 F ← 2ω` + 1
// polynomial multiplication modulo integer F
7 Ĉ(x)← A(x) ·B(x) mod(+) F
// construct polynomial C(x) of degree < m
8 Cm−1 ← Ĉm−1





2` · Ĉm+i mod(+) F
))
mod(+) F
// construct tuple ĉ of polynomials ĉi each of degree < ω
11 for i← 0 to m− 1 do
12 ĉi ← Sneeze (Ci, f, `)
// construct polynomial c(x) of degree < n
13 for i← 0 to ω − 1 do
14 for j ← 0 to m− 1 do
15 cm·i+j ← (ĉj)i
16 return c(x)
Algorithm 23: a(x) · b(x) mod xn + 1 using an integer multiplier capable
of performing modular multiplication of integers up to ω`+ 1 bits.
implementation on our target device and include certain optimisations for
performance and reduction of memory consumption.
In Algorithm 24 we describe our implementation of Kyber.CPA.Gen9 and
follow the notation of [SAB+17] where appropriate. The sampling of a uniform
polynomial ai,j ∈ A is done by Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) for a random seed ρ ∈
{0, 1}256 using an Extendable Output Function (XOF) denoted as XOF(·). The
sampling of a secret or noise polynomial in Rq is described by CBD(PRF(σ,N))
where CBD stands for centred binomial distribution and where PRF is a
pseudo-random function (PRF) that takes a random seed σ ∈ {0, 1}256 and an
9Instead of using SHA3-512 to hash the randomness, we directly take the output from
the on-chip TRNG using the TRNG(·) function; see below.
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integer N for domain separation. In [SAB+17] it is specified that PRF(σ,N) =
SHAKE-256(σ,N) and that XOF = SHAKE-128.
With regard to arithmetic, it is easy to see that s0, . . ., sk−1 are used k times
each, when computing A · s. Thus a straightforward optimisation is to pack
them into a big integer only once. This resembles some similarity to the NTT,
where it is also possible to achieve speed-ups by the very simple observation that
polynomials that are used several times have to be transformed into the NTT
domain only once. To obtain more control over the usage of Snort and Sneeze,
which is already integrated into the high-level gadget KyberMulAdd, we
split KyberMulAdd into sub-functions. The Ĉ = MulAddSingle(A,B,C)
function takes as input A = Snort(a), B = Snort(b), C = Snort(c) for
a, b, c ∈ Rq and computes D̂(x)← A(x) ·B(x) + C(x) mod(+) F as specified
in line 7 of Algorithm 23. The D = FinalEll(D̂) function takes D̂ and
constructs the polynomial D(x) of degree < m (line 10 of Algorithm 23) by
multiplying by 2`. To save stack memory we do not generate the full matrix
A but only one coefficient after the other. All in all, our approach to key
generation requires k2 + 2k calls to Snort, k2 big integer multiplications
realised by MulAddSingle and k calls to Sneeze as well as FinalEll.
CPA-secure Kyber encryption is described in Algorithm 25 where the computa-
tion of AT r+e1 can be realised in the same way as the key generation procedure
by packing each polynomial of r into R ∈ Zk only once and with on-the-fly
generation of polynomials of A to save stack memory. The only difference is
that we initialise Ûtmp with on-the-fly sampled and packed error polynomials
ei ∈ e1 before computing the k scalar products. For 〈t, r〉 + e2 + b q2e · m
we sample e2 by e ← CBD(PRF(σ,N)), set V̂ ← Snort(e + m̄) and then
compute the scalar product in a loop with V̂ ←MulAddSingle(Ri, Ttpm, V̂ ).
All in all, Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc requires k2 + 3k + 1 calls to Snort, k2 + k
big integer multiplications by MulAddSingle and k + 1 calls to Sneeze as
well as FinalEll.
In Algorithm 26 we describe CPA-secure Kyber decryption. The implemen-
tation of the scalar product to compute 〈s,u〉 follows the approach from
encryption. To reuse MulAddSingle and to save code needed for a subtrac-
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1 ρ
$←− TRNG() // ρ ∈ {0, 1}256 sampled from internal TRNG
2 σ
$←− TRNG() // σ ∈ {0, 1}256 sampled from internal TRNG
3 N ← 0
// Sample s and transform to S
4 for i← k − 1 to 0 do
5 stmp ← CBD(PRF(σ,N))
6 N ← N + 1
7 Si ← Snort(stmp)
// Compute As + e
8 for i← 0 to k − 1 do
9 e← CBD(PRF(σ,N))
10 N ← N + 1
11 T̂ ← Snort(e)
12 for j ← 0 to k − 1 do
13 atmp ← Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j))
14 Atmp ← Snort(atmp)
15 T̂ ←MulAddSingle(Atmp, Sj , T̂ )
16 T ← FinalEll(T̂ )
17 ti ← Sneeze(T )
18 pk ← Encodedt(Compressq(t, dt)||ρ)
19 sk ← Encode13(s mod(+) q)
20 return pkCPA := pk, skCPA := sk
Algorithm 24: Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen, function names follow [SAB+17].
tion gadget we first negate v by computing V̂ ← Snort(−v) and then negate
the final result again as Compressq(−v, 1) to obtain v−〈s,u〉. We need 2k+1
calls of Snort, k big integer multiplications by MulAddSingle and one call
to Sneeze as well as FinalEll.
5.5.2 Implementation of Kyber on SLE 78
We now give details of our implementation of CPA and CCA-secure Kyber768
(thus k = 3) on the SLE 78 that are independent of the chosen approach for
packing and big integer multiplication (see Section 5.5.3 and Section 5.5.4). All
our implementations are not fully compatible with the specification as Kyber
is explicitly defined with a specific NTT and assumes that the pseudo-random





1 t, ρ← Decodedt(pkCPA)
2 t← Decompressq(t)
3 N ← 0
// Sample MLWE secret r and transform to R
4 for i← k − 1 to 0 do
5 rtmp ← CBD(PRF(σ,N))
6 N ← N + 1
7 Ri ← Snort(rtmp)
// Compute AT r + e1
8 for i← 0 to k − 1 do
9 e← CBD(PRF(σ,N))
10 Ûtmp ← Snort(e)
11 N ← N + 1
12 for j ← 0 to k − 1 do
13 atmp ← Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j))
14 Atmp ← Snort(atmp)
15 Ûtmp ←MulAddSingle(Atmp, Rj , Ûtmp)
16 Utmp ← FinalEll(Ûtmp)
17 ui ← Sneeze(Utmp)
// Compute 〈t, r〉+ e2
18 m̄← EncodeMsg(m)
19 e← CBD(PRF(σ,N))
20 e← e+ m̄
21 V̂ ← Snort(e)
22 for i← 0 to k − 1 do
23 Ttpm ← Snort(ti)
24 V̂ ←MulAddSingle(Ri, Ttpm, V̂ )
25 V ← FinalEll(V̂ )
26 v ← Sneeze(V )
// Encode ciphertext
27 c1 ← Encodedu(Compressq(u, du))
28 c2 ← Encodedv(Compressq(v, dv))
29 return c := (c1||c2)
Algorithm 25: Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc, function names
follow [SAB+17].
To expand randomness into a longer bitstream, Kyber originally specifies the
use of various instances from the SHA3 family as PRNG (originally, XOF
is SHAKE-128 and PRF is SHAKE-256). We implemented one version of
the samplers that is compatible with the specification where SHAKE-128 and
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3 v ← Decompressq(Decodedv(c2))
4 V̂ ← Snort(−v)
// Compute v − 〈s,u〉
5 for i← 0 to k − 1 do
6 Utmp ← Snort(ui)
7 Stmp ← Snort(si)
8 V̂ ←MulAddSingle(Stmp, Utmp, V̂ )
9 V ← FinalEll(V̂ )
10 v ← Sneeze(V )
11 return Encode1(Compressq(−v, 1))
Algorithm 26: Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec, func-
tion names follow [SAB+17].
SHAKE-256 are realised in software. Hardware acceleration is not possible
as our target device does not have a SHA3 hardware accelerator. The SHA3
implementation written in C has been optimised to some extent with assem-
bly to remove obvious performance bottlenecks introduced by the compiler.
Additionally, we have implemented a (non-compatible) Kyber variant that
is using AES-256 in counter mode to implement XOF and PRF. A similar
approach has been used by Google in their NewHope experiment where the
constant polynomial a was also sampled using AES [Lan16]. Even though
there are some theoretical concerns [ADPS16], this approach appears to be
secure in practice. When AES-256 is chosen as PRNG we can rely on the AES
coprocessor of the SLE 78CLUFX5000 and do not need to implement AES in
software.
A difference that is not noticeable by a user is that we, as previously mentioned,
do not hash the randomness provided to key generation due to the availability
of a TRNG. The hashing of the input randomness in the Kyber specification
is intended as a protection against leakage of the internal state of a random
number generator. However, on our target device we have access to a certified




The implementations of CBD, Parse, Encode, Decode and Decompressq
follow the Kyber C reference implementation and are not particularly opti-
mised using assembly. Our implementation of CCA-secure Kyber using the
FO transformation is denoted as Kyber.CCA.Imp.Gen for key generation,
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Enc for encapsulation and Kyber.CCA.Imp.Dec for de-
capsulation and we straightforwardly follow Algorithms 16 to 18. The main
additional operations demanded by the CCA conversion are the computation
of hash functions to implement random oracles. In one version of our imple-
mentation we follow the specification where H is using SHA3-256 and G is
using SHA3-512 and where SHA3 is implemented in software. Additionally,
we implemented a variant where G is realised by the MAC-based scheme
HKDF [Kra10] using a SHA-256 coprocessor and where H is realised by a call
to SHA-256. The usage of HKDF is necessary as the output of G has to be
longer than a single SHA-256 hash.
5.5.3 Realisation of KyberMulAdd with KS1
The KyberMulAdd gadget consists of the functions Snort, MulAddSingle,
FinalEll, and Sneeze. In case of KS1 (standard Kronecker substitution)
parameters (ω,m) = (64, 4) can be used (see Algorithm 23 and Section 5.4).
Then 64 coefficients can be packed into one integer and it is possible to perform
polynomial arithmetic modulo x4 + 1. When aiming for minimal size we could
have used 25 bits of precision per coefficient and thus 64 · 25 = 1600 bits in
total. However, to simplify the packing algorithm we have chosen 32 bits per
coefficient (thus ` = 32) which leads to integers of 64 · 32 = 2048 bits. This way
no shifts by arbitrary integers are required as everything is immediately word
aligned in Snort. This provides a performance advantage as the SLE 78 needs
one cycle for each shift to the right or left. Moreover, the big integer multiplier
is relatively fast and thus the trade-off between simpler packing/unpacking
and slightly larger integer coefficients turned out to be favourable. However,
on different platforms this may not be the case. An issue that costs some
performance is the correct handling of carry bits caused by negative coefficients
in Snort.
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For a single big integer multiplication in MulAddSingle we use the RSA
coprocessor on the SLE 78CLUFX5000 which has five registers of length slightly
larger than 2048 bits. In a simplified model it is able to compute additions
of two registers in 8 cycles while a multiplication with modular reduction
takes roughly 9,300 cycles. However, not all registers are general purpose.
One register is a working register that contains the result of a computation
and is not directly accessible from the CPU. Another register is needed to
store the modulus when performing operations modulo p. Thus three registers
are available for temporary results or operands. Naturally, for an integer
multiplication modulo log2 p = 2048, two registers are already occupied with
operands.
For KS1 with parameters (ω,m) = (64, 4) and ` = 32 one option to realise the
polynomial multiplication Ĉ(x)← A(x) ·B(x) mod(+) F for A,B, Ĉ ∈ Zp[x]
with p = F = 2ω` + 1 = 22048 + 1 described in line 7 of Algorithm 23 would be
schoolbook multiplication. As we have to do polynomial arithmetic modulo
x4 + 1 this would lead to 42 = 16 multiplications in Zp due to the quadratic
complexity of schoolbook multiplication. To reduce the number of multiplica-
tions we have chosen Karatsuba multiplication for our KS1 implementation of
the MulAddSingle function, which leads to 9 multiplications, 17 additions
and 16 subtractions in Zp. These numbers include additions or subtractions
required for the modulo x4 + 1 operation. In general, Karatsuba multiplication
leads to a large number of additions as a trade-off for fewer multiplications.
An approach where the additions are executed on the RSA coprocessor would
be possible but requires a lot of transfers. We thus decided to exploit the
ability to run the coprocessor and the CPU in parallel. While the RSA copro-
cessor executes a modular multiplication we compute long integer additions in
parallel on the CPU. This can easily be achieved by the appropriate rearrange-
ment of multiplication and addition/subtraction operations in the Karatsuba
formula. For simplicity, we give a sort example for a(x) = a0 + a1 x and
b(x) = b0 + b1 x. A polynomial multiplication can be computed with Karatsuba
as a(x)b(x) = a0b0 + ((a1 + a0)(b1 + b0)− a1b1 − a0b0)x+ a1b1 x2. Here some
additions can be performed in parallel to multiplications where T1 = a1 · b1
and T2 = b1 + b0 is computed in parallel, then T3 = a0 · b0 and T4 = a1 + a0,




2 ·T1, T8 = T5−T6, T9 = x ·T8, T10 = T7 +T9, and T11 = T3 +T10 where
a(x)b(x) = T11. Note in our specific case also some additions or subtractions
caused by the modulo x4 + 1 operation are also hidden behind multiplications.
For the remaining additions and subtractions we make use of the coprocessor.
To save cycles for transfers we store the result of several additions/subtractions
in one register of the coprocessor so that we only have to transfer values into
the coprocessor and then read out the final result. The FinalEll function (see
line 9 of Algorithm 23) requires 3 multiplications by 2`. They are implemented
on the coprocessor using a special command that allows fast shifting by 32 bits
and are thus relatively cheap.
5.5.4 Realisation of KyberMulAdd with KS2
The KyberMulAdd gadget can also be implemented for KS2 (compact
Kronecker) with parameters (ω,m) = (128, 2). Compact Kronecker would
allow to pack 128 coefficients into two big integers with 13 bits per coefficients.
With 13 bits of precision per coefficient 13 · 128 = 1664 bits would be required
in total. However, similarly to KS1 we use 16 bits for easier packing/unpacking
and end up with integers of size of 16 · 128 = 2048 bits (` = 16). Computations
are then performed on two polynomials modulo x2 + 1. This leads to 2 · 22 = 8
multiplications in Zp for p = F = 2ω`+1 when using schoolbook multiplication.
With Karatsuba a reduction to 2 · 3 = 6 multiplication would be possible. As
the difference between Karatsuba and schoolbook is small we use schoolbook
multiplication to implement KS2. This allows us to store partial products
during schoolbook multiplication in the free register of the RSA coprocessor.
This way we can perform additions with the RSA coprocessor and save time
as we do not have to retrieve every result from the coprocessor into memory.
5.5.5 MulAdd for higher degree polynomials: a NewHope example
In a similar fashion to Sections 5.5.3 and 5.5.4, one could choose to implement
MulAdd for RLWE-based schemes working with polynomials of higher degree.
For example, NewHope [PAA+17] proposes the following set of parameters
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(NewHope512) targetting Category 1 security [Nat16]: n = 512, q = 12289, η =
8, f = xn + 1. Lemma 20 suggests using ` = 26 (resp. ` = 13) bits of
precision per coefficient for use with KS1 (resp. KS2). To further improve
packing and unpacking performance, we consider ` = 32 (resp. ` = 16), which
results in parameters (ω,m) = (64, 8) with 32 · 64 = 2048 bits per polynomial
coefficient (resp. (ω,m) = (128, 4) with 16 · 128 = 2048 bits per polynomial
coefficient), assuming our integer multiplier supports inputs of length 2048 + 1
bits. Schoolbook multiplication would then require 82 = 64 (resp. 2 · 42 = 32)
multiplications in Zp for p = F = 2ω`+1, while recursively applying Karatsuba
would result in 3log2 8 = 27 (resp. 2 · 3log2 4 = 18) multiplications. While this
outline gives us a rough estimate of the cost of implementing NewHope512
using different strategies, it does not take into account concrete implementation
issues such as the size and number of registers available in the CPU, the number
of additions required, or the possible speed-ups from running light operations
on the CPU while waiting for the modular multiplier to return a result for
each multiplication.
5.6 Performance and comparison
In this section we describe the performance of our Kyber768 implementation
on the SLE 78 and compare our results to related work available at the time
of publication. All cycle counts are averages of several runs and have been
measured on a cycle accurate FPGA-based emulator.
5.6.1 Implementation performance
In Table 5.2 we provide cycle counts of our implementation of Kyber768, its
variants, and selected sub-functions. The results show similar performance
for the KS1 and KS2 approach in Kyber.CPA.Imp with a small advantage
for KS2. The explanation is that KS1 with Karatsuba requires only a single
multiplication more than KS2 with schoolbook. The additional additions
necessary for Karatsuba in KS1 can effectively be hidden by running them
in parallel with the RSA coprocessor and Snort for KS1 is roughly twice
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as fast than for KS2. However, this is only a conclusion for the particular
parameters using the specific coprocessor. KS1 and KS2 might lead to very
different results in case our approach would be used to implement a scheme like
NewHope where the polynomial degree n is much larger than in Kyber. Cycle
counts for CBD and Parse show that usage of the AES coprocessor provides a
significant speed-up compared to the SHA3 software implementation. For CBD
the difference is a factor of 300 and for Parse even a factor of 945. With more
optimization of the SHA3 software, e.g. by writing it fully in assembly, it might
be possible to reduce this to some extent. An additional advantage is that the
AES coprocessor already implements some countermeasures against physical
attacks. Such attacks are not the focus of our work but a secured PRNG
would be easier to realise with the AES hardware (HW) coprocessor than by
using a shared software (SW) implementation of SHA3 (see [OSPG18] where
this necessity is discussed and performance of a shared SHA3 is given). With
roughly ≈ 376, 000 cycles used for sampling in Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen (≈ 9×
Parse+6×CBD) and roughly ≈ 407, 000 cycles used in Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc
(≈ 9 × Parse + 7 × CBD) the sampling requires only about 10 percent of
the overall runtime. Additionally, in Table 5.3 we have computed the sum
of cycles based on the calls to measured subfunctions for KS1. This gives
an overview what amount of cycles can be associated to each operation. In
all three functions the most cycles are contributed by MulAddSingle and
Sneeze. They would be a natural target for further optimization.
Compared to a Kyber768 implementation that is using the NTT as specified
in [SAB+17] on the SLE 78 in software, our approach of using the coprocessor to
compute the KyberMulAdd gadget provides an advantage. On the SLE 78 a
single n = 256 NTT costs 997,691 cycles. The computation of KyberCPA.Enc
for k = 3 requires 10 calls to the NTT10 which alone would account for roughly
10 · 997,691 ≈ 10.0 million cycles plus additional overhead from pointwise
multiplication and addition.
In case one would want to make our implementation compatible with Kyber
as specified in [SAB+17] in terms of NTT usage and still use the KyberMu-
10See [SAB+17, Algorithm 5] where 3 NTTs are required to transform r, 3 inverse NTTs
are applied to Â ◦ r̂, 3 inverse NTTs are needed to transform t and 1 inverse NTT is then
needed to obtain v.
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lAdd gadget, they would have to perform k2 inverse NTTs and then use our
multiplication algorithm. This would add roughly 32 · 997,691 ≈ 9.0 million
cycles to Gen and Enc when executed on the CPU. It would basically nullify
all gains from a different and faster algorithm for polynomial multiplication.
All in all, when our Kyber variant that is using the AES coprocessor (i.e. AES-
HW) is run on our target device with an average clock frequency of 50 MHz
we can execute Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen in 72.5 ms, Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc in
94.9 and Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec in 28.4 ms.
For the CCA variant the decryption becomes slower due to the re-encryption
but the additional overhead of the hash functions H and G is rather low when
the SHA-256 coprocessor is used (HW-SHA-256) to compute SHA-256 and
HKDF with HMAC-SHA-256. When H and G are instantiated with SHA3
implemented in software (SW-SHA3) a significant portion of the computation is
now attributed to SHA3. In comparison we can execute Kyber.CCA.Imp.Gen
in 79.6 ms (2,903 ms with SW-SHA3), Kyber.CCA.Imp.Enc in 102.4 ms
(571.2 ms with SW-SHA3) and Kyber.CCA.Imp.Dec in 132.7 ms (394.0 ms
with SW-SHA3). An implementation of Kyber that is fully compatible with
the specification [SAB+17] would not achieve practical performance mainly
due to the slow SHA3 PRNG performance and to a lesser extent due to the
slower NTT in software. Of course, further low-level optimization of SHA3
and the NTT could change this picture to some extent.
5.6.2 Comparison with related work
In Table 5.4 we provide a comparison of our results with related work on
similar target platforms available at the time of publication of this chapter
as [AHH+18]. However, it should be noted that such a comparison will always
lack precision as many parameters of published implementations differ in terms
of cryptographic (post-quantum) bit-security level, implementation security
level, exact variant of a scheme, CPU architecture, maximum clock frequency
of the device, or availability of specific accelerators. Moreover, only limited
information is available about most smart card platforms and those platforms
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NTT (n = 256, in SW) 997,691





Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; KS1) 3,953,224
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; KS1) 5,385,598
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec (KS1) 1,382,963
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; KS2) 3,625,718
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; KS2) 4,747,291
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec (KS2) 1,420,367
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Gen (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; HW-SHA-256: H; KS2) 3,980,517
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Enc (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; HW-SHA-256: G,H; KS2) 5,117,996
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Dec (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; HW-SHA-256: G,H; KS2) 6,632,704
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Gen (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; SW-SHA3: H; KS2) 14,512,691
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Enc (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; SW-SHA3: G,H; KS2) 18,051,747
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Dec (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; SW-SHA3: G,H; KS2) 19,702,139
Table 5.2: Performance of our work on the SLE 78 target device in clock cycles.
are often not available without signing non-disclosure agreements. It is also
clear that the requirements for a certified contactless high security controller,
where most computations are done using coprocessors, are expected to lead
to different CPU designs or low-level implementations than those for a high
performance embedded microcontroller.
As we use an RSA coprocessor for lattice-based cryptography, a natural target
for a comparison is RSA. The cycle counts given in Table 5.4 for coprocessor
supported RSA on our SLE 78 target device are based on the data sheet.
With an average clock frequency of 50 MHz, on the SLE 78 RSA encryption
can be executed in 6 ms while RSA decryption with CRT needs 120 ms.
In comparison with our work this shows that our Kyber implementation is
one order of magnitude slower for encryption but performs decryption with
similar speed. In case RSA is not used with CRT our Kyber decryption even
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Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen (KS1)
Function Calls Cycles per function Product
CBD(PRF(σ,N)) (HW-AES) 6 31,068 186,408
Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) (HW-AES) 9 21,081 189,729
Snort 15 31,017 465,255
MulAddSingle 9 201,767 1,815,903
Sneeze 3 295,730 887,190
FinalEll 3 28,381 85,143
Encode/Decode - - 400,226
= 4,029,854
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc (KS1)
Function Calls Cycles per function Product
CBD(PRF(σ,N)) (HW-AES) 7 31,068 217,476
Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) (HW-AES) 9 21,081 189,729
Snort 19 31,017 589,515
MulAddSingle 12 201,767 2,421,204
Sneeze 4 295,730 1,182,920
FinalEll 4 28,381 113,524
Encode/Decode - - 676,453
= 5,390,629
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec (KS1)
Function Calls Cycles per function Product
CBD(PRF(σ,N)) (HW-AES) 0 31,068 0
Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) (HW-AES) 0 21,081 0
Snort 4 31,017 217,119
MulAddSingle 3 201,767 605,301
Sneeze 1 295,730 295,730
FinalEll 1 28,381 28,381
Encode/Decode - 365,175
= 1,511,706
Table 5.3: Called functions, number of calls, clock cycles, and final sum of
clock cycles.
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CBD(PRF(σ,N)) (HW-AES) Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) (HW-AES) Snort
MulAddSingle Sneeze FinalEll
Encode/Decode
Figure 5.1: Total cycle counts per Kyber.CPA.Imp (KS1) function from
Table 5.3.
outperforms RSA. However, it should be noted that the RSA cycle counts do
not account for padding like Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)
which is often used to achieve CCA2 security for RSA. However, they include
countermeasures against physical attacks (e.g. exponent blinding or message
blinding, see [FWA+13]) while our implementation does not.
Publicly available information on the performance of RSA and ECC on var-
ious smart cards running the JavaCard platform can be found in works like
[DRHM17, SNS+16], the Bachelor’s thesis of Kvašňovský [Kva16] as well as in
the JCAlgTest project11. Across the selected cards, the runtime for an RSA2048
encryption function call is in the range from 8 to 74 ms while RSA2048 decryp-
tion takes between 426 to 2,927 ms and 140 to 1,569 ms when using the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT). On-card key generation for RSA2048 is a complex
process [NSS+17] with a variable runtime due to the required primality testing
and takes between 6,789 and 44,143 ms. There is also a certain overhead by
the JavaCard platform compared to a pure native implementation as well as
overhead from various countermeasures against physical attacks.
11See https://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/jcalgtest/comparative-table.html.
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For comparison with other post-quantum schemes we have ported the reference
implementation of ephemeral/CPA-secure NewHope with n = 1024 claiming
255-bits of post-quantum security onto our target device. To obtain a fair
comparison we also changed the internal PRNG to use the coprocessor-based
AES in counter-mode and we removed costly randomness hashing in the key
generation. With these modifications the main bottleneck in NewHope is the
computation of NTTs. When comparing CPA-secure NewHope implementation
(claimed 255-bit security level) with our CPA-secure Kyber (claimed 161-bit
security level) in an ephemeral key setting12, we achieve a factor of 6 better
performance for Alice (Gen+Dec) and a factor of 7 better performance for Bob
(Enc). Note that the implementation of our variant of Kyber that is not using
the NTT would most likely lead to a loss of performance on other platforms.
However, the implementation of Saber on ARM given in [KBMSRV18] shows
that high performance is also possible without using the NTT when parameters
are chosen accordingly.
Most modern general purpose ARM-based microcontroller platforms (e.g.
Cortex-M) have the advantage of a 32-bit architecture and are equipped with
a single-cycle or few-cycles multiplier (optional in Cortex-M0). Thus good
performance can be expected for most arithmetic operations, e.g. the inner loop
of the NTT. Open-source implementations of Kyber768 and NewHope1024
targeting general purpose ARM controllers are available through the mupq
project [va18]. It can be seen that in comparison with such a different class of
devices our CCA-secure Kyber768 implementation of Gen and Enc is slower
than CCA-secure Kyber768 on ARM using the NTT.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have shown that fast post-quantum cryptography is feasible
on current smart card platforms. On a commercially available device it is
possible to obtain a significant speed-up of the arithmetic of lattice-based
cryptography by reusing already existing coprocessors dedicated to the accel-
12Of course, a better target for comparison would be Kyber1024 with 218-bit security but
an implementation on SLE 78 is not available as we focused on Kyber768.
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Table 5.4: Comparison of our work with other PKE or KEM schemes on various
microcontroller platforms in clock cycles.
Scheme Target Gen Enc Dec
Kyber768a (CPA; our work) SLE 78 3,625,718 4,747,291 1,420,367
Kyber768b (CCA; our work) SLE 78 3,980,517 5,117,996 6,632,704
RSA-2048c SLE 78 - ≈ 300,000 ≈ 21,200,000
RSA-2048 (CRT)d SLE 78 - ≈ 300,000 ≈ 6,000,000
Kyber768 (CPA+NTT)e SLE 78 ≈ 10,000,000 ≈ 14,600,000 ≈ 5,400,000
NewHope1024f SLE 78 ≈ 14,700,000 ≈ 31,800,000 ≈ 15,200,000
Kyber768g ARM 1,200,351 1,497,789 1,526,564
NewHope-1024h ARM 1,168,224 1,738,922 298,877
CPA-RLWE-512i AVR - 1,975,806 553,536
CCA-RLWE-1024j ARM 2,669,559 4,176,68 4,416,918
Saberk ARM 1,147,000 1,444,000 1,543,000
QC-MDPCl ARM - 7,018,493 42,129,589
Curve25519m MSP 5,941,784 11,883,568 5,941,784
Curve25519n ARM 3,589,850 7,179,700 3,589,850
a CPA-secure Kyber variant using the AES coprocessor to implement PRF/XOF and
KS2 on SLE 78 @ 50 MHz.
b CCA-secure Kyber variant using the AES coprocessor to implement PRF/XOF, the
SHA-256 coprocessor to implement G and H and KS2 on SLE 78 @ 50 MHz.
c RSA-2048 encryption with short exponent and decryption without CRT and with
countermeasures on SLE 78 @ 50 MHz. Extrapoliation based on data-sheet.
d RSA-2048 decryption with short exponent and decryption with CRT and
countermeasures on SLE 78 @ 50 MHz. Extrapoliation based on data-sheet.
e Extrapolation of cycle counts of CPA-secure Kyber768 based on our implementation
assuming usage of the AES coprocessor to implement PRF/XOF and a software
implementation of the NTT with 997,691 cycles for an NTT on SLE 78 @ 50 MHz.
f Reference implementation of constant time ephemeral NewHope key exchange
(n = 1024) [ADPS16] modified to use the AES coprocessor as PRNG on SLE 78 @ 50
MHz.
g Kyber768 from mupq project [va18] on ARM Cortex-M4F (STM32).
h Constant time ephemeral NewHope key exchange (n=1024) [ADPS16] from [AJS16] on
ARM Cortex-M0 (STM32) @ 48 MHz.
i Constant time CPA-secure RLWE-encryption [LP11] (RLWEenc-IIa with n = 512)
from [LPO+17] on 8-bit ATxmega128A1 @ 32 MHz.
j CCA-secure RLWE-encryption [LP11] (n = 1024) from [OSPG18] on ARM Cortex-M4F
(STM32) @ 168 MHz. With first order masking decryption is 25,334,493 cycles.
k Saber [DKRV17] from [KBMSRV18] on ARM Cortex-M4F (STM32F4) @ 168 MHz.
Parameters provide 180-bit of quantum-security.
l CPA-secure QC-MPDC public-key encryption [MTSB13] from [vMOG15] on ARM
Cortex-M4F (STM32F407) @ 168 MHz. Parameters provide 80-bit pre-quantum
security level.
m Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman using Curve25519 [Ber06] from [DHH+15] on 16-bit
MSP430X @ 16 MHz. For simplification we report the cost of one point multiplication
(PM) in Gen, two PMs in Enc and one PM in Dec.
n Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman using Curve25519 [Ber06] from [DHH+15] on ARM Cortex
@ 48 MHz. Reporting as in l .
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eration of RSA or ECC. Our work can thus be used by the industry for a
possibly smoother migration towards PQC, by reusing already existing and
available hardware. Our work also shows that the NTT might not always be the
superior polynomial multiplication algorithm.13 This seems to be a worthwhile
consideration in the context of the NIST standardisation process where some
schemes made the NTT part of their definition. Moreover, our results show
that the performance of lattice-based schemes on particular embedded devices
highly depends on the speed of the underlying PRNG. It might be worthwhile
to consider constructions that make use of PRNGs based on AES instead of
SHA3 due to the better availability of (secured) AES hardware acceleration on
smart cards or constrained devices in general. The same argument applies to
the instantiation of hash functions using SHA-256.
With regard to the optimisation of our particular Kyber implementation, a
possible next step is an implementation on an ARM-based smart card or
embedded secure element equipped with an ECC/RSA coprocessor. On such
an architecture the comparison to standard microcontroller-based implemen-
tations of PQC (e.g. [vMOG15, DHH+15, OSPG18]) would be much easier.
Additionally, it is an open question how much speed-up ECC/RSA coprocessors
will actually provide on ARM platforms equipped with a single-cycle multiplier.
Here it is also worth to consider that on an ARM processor Snort, Sneeze,
and software-based big integer addition are also expected to be significantly
faster due to the more efficient instruction set and larger word size, while the
CPU and the coprocessor could still execute in parallel.
From the algorithmic side, in the case of the KS1 ω = 64 implementation of
Kyber we currently require ` ≥ 25 bits of precision, and hence opted for using
32 bits. By using the considerations made in Section 5.4 about swapping ω
for n in the formula for computing `, we could get down to ` ≥ 23, making it
possible to save some memory at the cost of a more complex unpacking (` = 24
would be of particular interest, being byte-aligned).




In a more general direction it appears interesting to investigate whether a per-
formance advantage can be obtained with schemes specifically designed with the
constraints of the big integer multiplier in mind, such as ThreeBears [Ham17]
or Mersenne-75683917 [AJPS17]. However, we note that these schemes use
integer sizes too large for direct handling with our coprocessor. In contrast,
MLWE-based schemes immediately allow for a piece-wise approach. Thus,
another interesting target for implementation could be an MLWE-based scheme
that is parametrised with a power-of-two modulus q, e.g. SABER [DKRV17],
which permits to efficiently implement the strategy from (5.1). For example,
a viable choice could be a prime-cyclotomic ring for n = 167 − 1 = 2 · 83
with q = 213 such that each ring element fits directly into a coprocessor
register. Another approach would be a Kyber instantiation with a smaller
prime modulus q, as we do not have to choose q in a way that a fast NTT
exists. Moreover, our results naturally transfer over to the Dilithium signature
scheme [LDK+17] and an implementation on the SLE 78 is a natural next
step. However, parameters have to be adapted for Dilithium, as it uses a larger
modulus q = 8380417. Another interesting question is whether it is possible to
efficiently use RSA/ECC coprocessors to implement the NTT by treating the
big integer multiplier as a vector processor using smart packing of coefficients
or a variant of Kronecker substitution.
5.7.1 Developments since publication
Since publication of this chapter [AHH+18], three papers extending this line
of research appeared. In [WGY20], the authors investigate implementations
of Saber [DKRV17] on a ESP3214 IoT microcontroller, using KS1/2 together
with Karatsuba and Toom-Cook [Too63, CA69] multiplication and different
“ring splitting” strategies. In [BRv20] the authors introduce “Kronecker+”, a
generalisation of the work of Harvey [Har09], and propose a rough analysis
of the cost of evaluating Saber using their techniques. Finally, two other
alternative techniques to KS1/2 were introduced in [GMR20], where the authors
describe them and use them to implement some instances of Kyber, Saber
14https://www.espressif.com/en/products/socs/esp32
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and LAC [LLZ+18] on an unspecified15 platform with a ≈ 2048 bit RSA
coprocessor.
Furthermore, the second round specification of Kyber [SAB+19] and the third
round specification of Saber [DKR+20] added “90s” variants that replace
newer symmetric primitives with less hardware support such as SHA3 with
older primitives from the AES and SHA2 families, as we suggested in our
conclusions [AHH+18].
15The authors write that this is due to intellectual property reasons.
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Damien Stehlé, and Weiqiang Wen. Faster enumeration-based
221
BIBLIOGRAPHY
lattice reduction: Root hermite factor k1/(2k) time kk/8+o(k). In
Micciancio and Ristenpart [MR20], pages 186–212.
[ACC+18] Martin Albrecht, Melissa Chase, Hao Chen, Jintai Ding, Shafi
Goldwasser, Sergey Gorbunov, Shai Halevi, Jeffrey Hoffstein,
Kim Laine, Kristin Lauter, Satya Lokam, Daniele Micciancio,
Dustin Moody, Travis Morrison, Amit Sahai, and Vinod Vaikun-
tanathan. Homomorphic encryption security standard. Technical
report, HomomorphicEncryption.org, Toronto, Canada, Novem-
ber 2018.
[ACD+18] Martin R. Albrecht, Benjamin R. Curtis, Amit Deo, Alex David-
son, Rachel Player, Eamonn W. Postlethwaite, Fernando Virdia,
and Thomas Wunderer. Estimate all the LWE, NTRU schemes!
In Catalano and De Prisco [CD18], pages 351–367.
[ACPS09] Benny Applebaum, David Cash, Chris Peikert, and Amit Sahai.
Fast cryptographic primitives and circular-secure encryption
based on hard learning problems. In Halevi [Hal09], pages
595–618.
[AD17] Martin R. Albrecht and Amit Deo. Large modulus ring-LWE ≥
module-LWE. In Takagi and Peyrin [TP17], pages 267–296.
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[BP10] Joan Boyar and René Peralta. A new combinational logic min-
imization technique with applications to cryptology. In SEA
2010, pages 178–189. Springer, 2010.
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[CDW17] Ronald Cramer, Léo Ducas, and Benjamin Wesolowski. Short
stickelberger class relations and application to ideal-SVP. In
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Practical multilinear maps over the integers. In Canetti and
Garay [CG13], pages 476–493.
[CN11] Yuanmi Chen and Phong Q. Nguyen. BKZ 2.0: Better lattice
security estimates. In Dong Hoon Lee and Xiaoyun Wang,
editors, ASIACRYPT 2011, volume 7073 of LNCS, pages 1–20.
Springer, Heidelberg, December 2011.
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[NSS+17] Matús Nemec, Marek Sýs, Petr Svenda, Dusan Klinec, and
Vashek Matyas. The return of coppersmith’s attack: Practical
factorization of widely used RSA moduli. In Thuraisingham
et al. [TEMX17], pages 1631–1648.
[Nus80] H. Nussbaumer. Fast polynomial transform algorithms for digital
convolution. IEEE Transactions on Acoustics, Speech, and
Signal Processing, 28(2):205–215, Apr 1980.
[NV08] Phong Q Nguyen and Thomas Vidick. Sieve algorithms for the
shortest vector problem are practical. Journal of Mathematical
Cryptology, 2(2):181–207, 2008.
[NV10] Phong Q. Nguyen and Brigitte Vallée, editors. The LLL Al-
gorithm - Survey and Applications. Information Security and
Cryptography. Springer, 2010.
[OF15] Elisabeth Oswald and Marc Fischlin, editors. EURO-
CRYPT 2015, Part I, volume 9056 of LNCS. Springer, Hei-
delberg, April 2015.
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nical report, National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy, 2017. available at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/
post-quantum-cryptography/round-1-submissions.
[SAB+19] Peter Schwabe, Roberto Avanzi, Joppe Bos, Léo Ducas, Eike
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nical report, National Institute of Standards and Technol-




[SAL+17] Nigel P. Smart, Martin R. Albrecht, Yehuda Lindell, Emmanuela
Orsini, Valery Osheter, Kenny Paterson, and Guy Peer. LIMA.
Technical report, National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology, 2017. available at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/
post-quantum-cryptography/round-1-submissions.
[SBPV07] Kazuo Sakiyama, Lejla Batina, Bart Preneel, and Ingrid Ver-
bauwhede. HW/SW co-design for public-key cryptosystems on
the 8051 micro-controller. Computers & Electrical Engineering,
33(5-6):324–332, 2007.
[Sch77] Arnold Schönhage. Schnelle multiplikation von polynomen über
körpern der charakteristik 2. Acta Informatica, 7(4):395–398,
Dec 1977.
[Sch87] Claus-Peter Schnorr. A hierarchy of polynomial time lattice
basis reduction algorithms. Theor. Comput. Sci., 53:201–224,
1987.
[Sch03] Claus-Peter Schnorr. Lattice reduction by random sampling and
birthday methods. In Helmut Alt and Michel Habib, editors,
STACS 2003, 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects
of Computer Science, Berlin, Germany, February 27 - March 1,
2003, Proceedings, volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 145–156. Springer, 2003.
[Sch20] Lars Schlieper. In-place implementation of quantum-Gimli.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.06319, 2020.
[SE91] Claus-Peter Schnorr and M Euchner. Lattice basis reduction:
Improved practical algorithms and solving subset sum problems.
In FCT, 1991.
[SE94] Claus-Peter Schnorr and Martin Euchner. Lattice basis reduc-
tion: Improved practical algorithms and solving subset sum
problems. Mathematical Programming, 1994.




[SGT+18] Krysta M. Svore, Alan Geller, Matthias Troyer, John Azariah,
Christopher E. Granade, Bettina Heim, Vadym Kliuchnikov,
Mariia Mykhailova, Andres Paz, and Martin Roetteler. Q#:
Enabling scalable quantum computing and development with a
high-level DSL. In RWDSL@CGO 2018, 2018.
[Sho94] P. W. Shor. Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete
logarithms and factoring. In Proceedings 35th Annual Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 124–134. IEEE,
1994.
[Sho97] Peter W. Shor. Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factoriza-
tion and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer. SIAM J.
Comput., 26(5):1484–1509, October 1997.
[SHT18] Damian S. Steiger, Thomas Häner, and Matthias Troyer. Pro-
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to AES design. In Tim Güneysu and Helena Handschuh, edi-
tors, CHES 2015, volume 9293 of LNCS, pages 63–80. Springer,
Heidelberg, September 2015.
[va18] various authors. Post-quantum crypto library for the ARM
Cortex-M4. Website, 2018. accessed April 2018, see https:
//github.com/mupq/pqm4.
[Vas21] Dmitry Vasilevsky. Computing width and depth of
a quantum program in the Tracer. Technical re-







[vMOG15] Ingo von Maurich, Tobias Oder, and Tim Güneysu. Implement-
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